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INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this dissertation is to describe 
two great international organizations, the United 
Nations and the Commonwealth of Nations and, 
through a survey of selected problems brought 
before the United Nations, demonstr 8te how these 
two groups have worked together and the effect of 
each upon the other . 
The selection of topics was limited by 
several factors: 
1) the time element: a cut-off date had to 
be chosen and the one selected was April 20 , 1957, 
just prior to the very remarkable growth of 
Afro-Asian ~embership of both the Commonwealth 
and the United Nations . A passage of several years 
will be necessary to properly asses the impact of 
this world change and the reasons for the actions 
of the new Members at the United Nations; 
2) the availability of documents: topics 
which are of an intra-CommonvJeal th nature, though 
discussed by the United Nations, have been omitted, 
e . g . , Kashmir, as the foreign offices and defense 
i 
ministries of the nations concerned have closed their 
files for a period of ye~rs, preventing their 
use by the general public; and, 
3) within t hese limitations by the author's 
considert ~ion of what could be properly displayed 
in writing after a perus~l of the records of the 
United Nations which would give substance to 
the aims of the dissertation as set forth above. 
The majority of primary sources used come from 
the open and public records of the United Nations, 
which are both voluminous and extraordin~rily 
wordy. One wonders hm..r decisions were ever 
arrived at due to the length of discussion and the 
constant repetitions of the speakers . Other 
prima ry s ources embraced legislBtion of the 
various 1'1embers of the Co monvieal th and information 
supplied by their Hissions to the United Nations and 
Embassies to the United States of America, as well 
as certain of their Information Services . 
ii 
iii 
OTHER ·.-lORI<S IN THE FIELD 
The list of secondary sources has been deliberately 
limited. Host vlriters on the Commonwealth and the 
United Nations h~ve simply re-picked the same material 
to prove their ~articular biases, which gener~lly 
are favorable to the organi zations. 
Of especial note, however, is the ,..,ork of 
:r .c . ·Jheare on the legal background to the groUJth of 
the Co'11JT!on··ealth. The reviews of Nicolas l1ansergh 
on Commonwealth affairs are very illuminating and 
instructive . Gwendolyn Carter's ~British Commonwealth 
and InternationalSecuritv is of particul~r interest 
having been published in t he for ma t ive ye?rs of the 
United Nations and the post-1945 Corunonv.real th. 
T. Hove t ' s survey of bloc vo ting at the United 
Nations was ~ f extreme interest and use in ~eaching 
cert Ain conclusions in regard to this dissertation . 
On the United Nations itself the works of Trygve Lie and 
also of Leland Goodrich and Edvard Hambro are very 
illuninating . 
In the case studies a few works stand out and 
deserve notice . \t.Talte r Eytan's rather journalistic 
IhQ First ~Years is a fine study on how to organize 
and run a fore ign ministry and sheds much light on 
United Nations activities . E.H. Brookes and 
J . B. 14acaulay ' s Civil Liberties in South Africa 
is a strongly written survey of the problems of 
that troubled land . Sir An t hony Eden 's EYll Circle 
presents the only av e~il::lb le memoir from an insider 
in the Suez Crisis . 
iv 
CHA.PTER I 
The Commonvreal th of Nations , often but inaccurately 
called 11British, 11 has its legal origins in the earlier 
imperial history of Great Britain. The first of the 
British empires came crashing dovm in the vortex of the 
American Revolution but not before t he seeds of the 
second empire had been smm by the Treaty of Paris, 1763 . 
It is from this date that there vTill gr01.r a new imperial 
dominion destined, eventually, to bring forth an unique 
association of states; an ass ociation that t o many will 
appear to ensure the safety and security of a large part 
of the '"or ld and, yet, vrh ic h will join in a larger and 
more universal association to better ensure, or attempt 
to ensure, world peace and security . 
There are, to be sure, other beginnings of the 
Commom1ealth. These are to be found in the migrations 
from Great Britain of adventuresome souls, the religiously 
persecuted, those wishing to better their way of life, 
those the government deliberately transported to advance 
the betterment of life at home, and the others who felt 
a compelling need to change their addresses . To them were 
joined other national groups moving about for many of the 
same reasons . Some twist of history is therefore 
responsible for the residences today of the Commomrealth 
1 
peoples . 
The eldest of the Commonwealth countries is, of course, 
the United Kingdom, the nation from vrhich the legal basis 
of the Commom·Teal th will flow . It is from the United 
Kingdom that the member nations vlill take many of their 
traditions and tm:Tard which they \·Till turn in seeking 
an expression of their unity . 
By the Treaty of Paris, 1763, Canada Has ceded to 
the British Cro\vn by the French. At first British 
legislation tended to preserve the rights and dignities 
of the existing French-speaking population, 1 and as the 
population of Canada increased due to the arrival of 
loyalists from the f ormer American colonies, it was 
necessary to enact the Constitutional Act, 1791, '\-Thich 
separa ted the linguistic sections of the colony . 2 This 
system did not v10rk and by 1837, there '\vere rebellions in 
both Upper and Lower Canada against colonial mis- government 
but "not against Her Majesty 's person. 113 
As a consequence of the disorders Lord Durham vTas 
dispatched as governor-general and, while his administration 
was a limited success at best, his recommendations to 
London that Canada be gr anted internal res~onsible self-
government with the Crmvn reserving t o itself pm-rers in 
1. 
2 . 
Lower, Arthur; Colonl to Nation (Longmans, Green and Co., 
London, 1953), pp . 73-~ 
2 
3. 
Ibid., pp . 151-152 
\littke ,carl ; History of Canada (A pelton Century, Crofts, 
New York , 1941), p . 111 
foreign affairs, constitutional changes, public lands and 
commercial regulations1 remain one of the landmarks of 
enlightened colonial rul e . Lord Durham's Report is 
often considered one of the foundation stones of the 
Commonwealth. 
The Act of Union, 1840, failed in its terms to implement 
res ponsible self-government though t he Royal Instructions 
to Lord Sydenham tacitly makes mention of the i dea . It 
3 
was lef t to Lord Elgin (governor-general from 1847 until 1854) 
firmly to establish res pons ible self-government, seizing upon 
the opportunity presented in the Rebell ion Losses Bill 
controversy in 1849 . 2 Ten years later the Canadian 
legislature removed the com:1ercial res trictions on its povTer 
with the introduction of a customs duty. 3 
Gradually there mmke the realization that a stronger union 
of British interests north of the United Sta tes frontier vTas 
needed, par ticular ly to hold at bay the expansionist ideas 
of a nation newly reconstituted and possessed of the largest 
e:;dsting army ivest of the Vistula . Afte r several years of 
negotiation the provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia and New 
Bruns1'lick vrere united i nto the Dominion of Canada, a federati on 
of forner colonies enjoying both local and cen tralized self-
governmen t and internal autonomy .4 
1 . LO'vrer, op . cit . , p . 248 
2 . Ibid . , p . 275 
3 .. 1·Ji ttke , op . cit . , p . 167 
~ 30 & 31 Viet . , c . 3 : British North America Act, 1867 
Around the ·world British settlement advanced in the 
last decade of the eighteenth century as a colony of 
transported persons iva s established at Sydney . Shortly 
becoming a free colony, Aus tralia experienced a rapid 
influx of immigrants and by 1855, t he colonies of 
Victoria, South Aus tr8lia, Tasmania and Ne~>I South \'!ales 
all had responsible governments dealing with local mat ters . l 
As the century progressed a ~ovement arose for the 
unification of the island continent and, if possible, 
the adherence of Nevi Zealand to such a scheme . An 
Aus tralasian Council organized in 1885, soon proved 
univorkable, but the intentions of the nation-builders 
ivere carried forth . In 1897 , a conference began the 
drafting of an Australian basic law and in 1900 t his 
was approved by the Imperial Parliament and established a 
rather decen tralized national government for Austre1lia \·lith 
full autonomy. 2 
In defiance of the wishes of the British Government, 
New Zealand was first settled in 1839, and, ivi th the 
exception of several J;iaori Wars, the islands have had a 
quiet history. The basis for the Nevr Zealand Government 
lay in the much amended New Zealand Constitution Act, 1852 , 3 
and the New Zealand Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1857. 4 
-----------------------------------------------------------1. HarJ.ovr, Vincent; Or igins and Purnoses, (His Na jesty ' s 
4 
Stationery Office, London, 1949), p . 33 
2 . 63 & 64 Viet . , c . 12 : Commonwealth of Australia Act, 1900 
3. 15 & 16 Viet ., c . 72 : New Zealand Constitution Act, 1852 
4 . 20 & 21 Viet ., c . 53 : New Zealand Constitution 
(Amendment) Act, 1857 
ljhen i n 1907, Ne\v Zealand "'>Tas proclaimed to have dominion 
status the proclamation made no marked difference in the 
situation as New Zeal anders had been self- governing for 
years . 
Uith South Africa the British connection has been 
quite uneven . In 1815, the Ca pe of Good Hope colony 
vTas permanently secured. Since the presence of British 
administrat ors was more than some Dutch settlers could 
tolerate, the Dutch trekked inland . Here they 
estabiished the Or ange Free Sta te and the South African 
(Transvaal) Republic, over both of vrhich the Brit ish 
sovereign claimed suze1a1nty in varying degrees, 1 and 
sometimes recognized their independence . 2 Finally, i n 
1899, t he clash of interests resulted in the tragic 
Boer Uar, L om which t he British emerged victorious . 
In 1906, the tvTO former Boer states were gran ted 
resp onsi ble government and, joined by the Cape and 
Na tal, '\·Tere organized into a centralized dominion under 
the terms of the South Africa Act , 1909 .3 
To these "older dominions " have been added a group 
since r.Jorld liar II vlhich have emphatica l ly alt ered the 
composition and international impor t ance of the Cor:t1on'\·1ealth : 
the Asian and African members of Ceylon, India, Pa'·istan , 
1 . The Sand River and London Conventions 
2 . Harlo-vr, op . cit . , p . 39 
3· 9 Ed . 7, c . 9: The South Africa Act, 1909 
5 
Nalaya, Ghana, Nigeria and a Nediterranean nation, Cyprus . 
They have brought to the Commomveal th ne\'/ races and 
nationalities, old established traditions, and 
strikingly non- European concepts of custom and la'\·1 . 
They correspond in the Commonv1eal th to the Afro- Asian 
bloc at the United Nations . 
1l foothold in Ccyl:rn·Tas quickly turned into 
complete con t rol and in 1802, the island became a 
Crovm col ony . The situation vras only gradually modified 
until 1947, when a fully Ceylonese government vras installed . 
The follovring year Ceylon \vas granted "fully r esponsible 
status vli th the CommomTeal th . rrl 
The history of India is long, chequered, and not 
properly '\vithin the scope of this dissertation. Suffice it 
to say that t h ough long termed an "Em:r-ire" Ind ia remained 
a dependent empire with authority remaining in London and 
not at Government House . Nonetheless, Ind ia received 
a seat at the League of na t ions . As ·l emands from the 
Congress party gre\v for Indian independence so also grew 
demands from the 11uslim League for a separate Islamic state 
of Pak istan. A promise of dominion status made during 
Horld Har I I vias implemented ivhen His Majes ty ' s Government 
announced in 1947, that it "would take t he necessary steps 
1. 11 Geo . 6, c . 7: Ceylon Independence Act, 1947 
6 
to effect the transference of povrer into res ponsible Indian 
hands by a date not later than June, 1948."1 In July , 1947, 
the Royal Assent \'las granted to the Indian Independence Bill 
and, after rapid guidance under the hand of the last 
Viceroy, Earl Hountbatten of Burma, the dominions of India 
7 
and Pax istan were proclaimed . 2 Unfortunately, inconsistencies 
in the border would soon turn this outstanding action 
of the British government into an intra-Commonvrealth 
problem still unsolved . 
British rule on the Gold Coast began with a series 
of connnercial contacts \oJhich culmina ted in 1874, Hith the 
establishment of the Gold Coast and Lagos colony . 3 
Gradually leading the colony to self-government, and aided 
in great measure by the economic solvency of the area, the 
British effected an orderly withdrawal in 1957, with the 
grant of independence .4 This nevi nation of Ghana remained 
in the Commonwealth though there would seem to be less in 
common for it \·Ti th the older members than is the case 
\•Tith the successor states of the Indian Emnire . 
The same year vli tnessed the wi thdra\val of British 
administration in Mal8ya where the British protectorates 
over the sultanates of romantic and exotic names and other 
colonial areas were terminated under the Federation of 
1 . 
2. 
3· 
4. 
I 
Harlow, op . cit . , pp . 64- 65 
I bid., p . 56 
Britain .§!.llil the Gold Coast, (British Inforr1ation Services , 
New York, 19560, p. 7 
5 & 6 Eliz . 2., c . 6 : Ghana Independence Act, 1957 
Halaya Independence Act .l Though Malaya has its mvn 
elected sovereign king it has remained within t he 
Cormnon\<real th under the formula used for the republican 
members . 2 
"Welcome to Cyprus" proved to be rather an 
illusion for the British who welc~med themselves there 
in 1878 , as part of the struggle over the Eastern 
Question. Following vlorld vlar I I the Cypriot demands 
for a change of status became insistent, generally 
taking t he form of "Enoss is" or union with Greece . To 
this the Turkish-s peak ing minority violently reacted 
until republican independence with communal safeguards 
brought into being this small member of the Commonwealth . 3 
The emer gence of Africa received further notice when 
in Oct ober , 1960, Niger ia gained its sovereignty, after 
ninety-nine years of British administration and 
protection .4 As the shadm-r of imperialism withdraws from 
the great continent, it aDpears that Bri tish jur isdiction 
1-ril l quickly go in the 1960s . 5 It is quite likely that 
the Commonweal th vTill continue to expand on the African 
continent . 
' 
______ n ___________________________________________________ _ _ 
1. 
2 . 
3. 
5 & 6 Eliz . 2, c . 60 : Federation of Malaya Independence 
Act, 1957 
See further in chapter 
8 
4. 
5. 
Cyprus , CMD 1093, Her Jvfajesty ' s Stationery Office, 
London, 1960 
Nigerian Indep endence Ac t, 1960, statute listing unavailab l e 
For example, Tanganyika 
There have also been tuo other r.1c:mbers of the 
Cornrron• ~al th . l Newfoundland held dor.linion status for 
several decades prior to 1949 , though her rovernnlAnt 
had been sus~ended in 1933 , because of fin~ncial 
considerations . In 1949 , she becar.1e t he tenth province 
of ~anar'Ja . 2 
r ron 1801, until 1921, Irel and was a p~rt of the 
lTnit·~d Kingdom of GreJ.t Britain and Irel Wld , v1ith 
representation at ·:;estminster . As t: is arranr,ement was 
not in accord wit}"' the vlishes of the I rish people , 
cont~Pual a itat ion e~isted for an alter~tion and an 
Irish government was established in 1919 . After 
p r otracted l egal and l"ilitary complications3 the I rish 
Fr ee State came into existence in 1922 , comprising 
the twenty- six southern counties on tho island . Though 
granted a status equal t o that of Carac~a, the Irish 
n.overnnont did everyt' ing \lithin its povrer to weaken its 
ties to the Corunonwealth . In 1933 , the oath wr.s rr:n,.,oved 
---------------------------------------------------------1 . I'J'lhe termination d'ltf-' of t' is d'. s:>""""S"' io . 1957, '1. r'J. 
.,)~u-ch r ·-c~ '· ' no c 1"' vr Cl P. r:o· ~·I') ·~··' ., ',h ·mt ·1 13ol . 
2 . L '"' r:. , ol .s , Jurv o_ :__ :. ' :. -'o .om1 -1 ·:1 
\!'fairs , Proolcms of Ext .-.rr.il po1 i c.r , 1961-19...>9 , 
(Oxford Uni versity Fress , London , 1939) , p . 17 
3 . An argtunent e ,.ists as to ,,hether the 1919 Irish Dail w s 
local . The Irish hold it '• .s, the British, not . 
Ratification of the \rt i cles of ~creement for a Treaty 
and t he Constitutional Act was confused over tne 
question of ¥n1ere sover aisnty l ay . For a full 
discussi~n see heare , r . J ., The Statute of' estninster 
and Dor.1inion 3tatus , (Oxford Universlty Press , London, 
~~' pp . 101-106 
9 
, from the Constitut ionl and in 1936, the Irish managed to 
only externally associate themselves with the Crown . 2 
This strange situation lasted until 1949, when Ireland 
declared itself a republic and opted out of the 
Comnom1eal th. 3 
The growth of the pov1ers and functions of the 
dominions was erratic , frequently depending upon local 
considerations and rising nationalistic feelings, as well 
as on the intentions of the imperial government . As 
early as 1871, Canada demanded and received representation 
on a British delegation negotiating with the United 
States on Canadian interests . 4 Vlha t Canada demanded other 
dominions often did not and it became apparent that a 
definition ought to be made as to \·That the British 
Empire vias, particularly after schemes for imperial 
federation and centralized control failed of being . 
Upon His 1'-Iaj esty ' s declaration of vrar on 4 August , 
1914, the entire empire, vlith the dominions, found itself 
in the stru[ gle . 5 During the course of the \var the 
dominion prime ministers were invited to sit on an 
Imperial Vlar Cabinet \vhich, vlhile a tribute to their 
1 . 
2 . 
3· 
4. 
5. 
Hancock, W. K., Survey of British. Commonwealth Affairs , 
Problems of Nationality , 1918-1936, (Oxford University 
Press London 1939) pp . 337- 338 Execu~ive Authority {External Relations) Act, 1936 
See: Hancock, op . cit . , pp . 387- 390 
The relevent Uni ted Kingdom legislation is 12 & 13 
Geo . 6, c . 41: I reland Act, 19~9 
Hancock, op. cit . , p . 43 
Ibid . , p . 63 
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role in1 the conflict was quit e extra-legal . l That the 
dominion contributions justified for them a greater 
role at the conclusion of the war was readily admitted . 
The 1917 I mperial War Conference called for a post-war 
conference on imperial adjustment which 
while thoroughly preserving all existing 
povrers of self-government and complete 
control of dominion affa irs should be based 
upon a full recognition of the dominions 
as autonomous nations of an imperial 
cmnnom1ealth ••• rif ht to an adequa te voice 
in foreign policy and in foreign relations, 
and should provide effective arrangement s 
for continuous cons ultations in all 
important matters of common i mperial concern, 
and for such necessary concerted action, 
founded on consultation, a~ the several 
governments may de termine . 
This statement of future intent Hent far to ans,ver the 
objections of many in the Empire \'Tho were dissatisfied 
with the e: isting arrangements, s uch as Jan Christian 
3mu ts \vho argued that 
although in practice there is much freedom, 
yet in actual theory the status of the 
dominions is of a subject character . 
11 
llhatever vre may say, whatever \ve may think, we are 
subje ct provinces of Great Britain . That is 
the actual theory of the Constitution, 
and in many \Jays ••• that theory still permeates 
practice to some extent . 3 
The South African leader ' s point of vievl \vas 
1 . Ministers must be responsible to a legislature and these 
ministers ··ere responsible to noe, either at l-les tminster 
or , in these circumstances, at home . 
2 . Wheare, op . cit . , p . 23 
3 · I bid . 
technically correct and it Hould take some time to alter 
the constitutional basis of the emerging Common\<Tealth. 
When the Paris Peace Conference opened in 1919, Great 
Britain obtained some international recognition for the 
dooinions . No delegation sat for the United Kingdom; 
one sat for the British Empire . In the signature of the 
Treaty the Imperial delegation signed, follovTed in 
subheadings by the dominions (except Ne,.,rfoundlflnd) and 
Inc ia . 1 The dominions and India \<Tere also granted 
membership in the League of Na tions, a grant \vhich 
12 
caused political repercussions in the United States and 
thus helped prevent United States adhe r ence to the League . 2 
The pro~ised Imperia l post- war conference 
materialized in 1921, but it took no action in r egard to 
defining status, determining to "leave \!ell alone, 11 in 
the words of the Austr <'ll i an Prime Ninister . There e: is ted 
a fear that a too careful definition of the ~m~ire might 
caus e it to collapse or, at least, too rigidly establish 
various attributes of Membership . The negotiations 
leading up to tbe abrogation of the Anglo-Japa nese 
alliance t hat year are certainly indicative that the 
1 . Hancock, op . cit . , p . 67 
2 . American opinion was confused over dominion stC'ltus . 
Ther e \'Tas also no question that India was a dependency 
of the Crown and that her membership in the Lea gue 
vTas thus of uncertain right . 
dominion~ did not see eye-to-eye at all on various 
as pects of intra-imperial affairs . l By t he middle of the 
decade , however, enough had occured to necessitate t hat 
some policy be clearly laid dmm . The shocl\: of the 
Chanak affair 1:1ith its obvious lack of, or breakdovm of , 
imperial consultation2 the dissolution c ::mtroversy in 
Canada i'rith Lord Byng , 3 the question of legislative 
repugnancy ,~ the demands for Canad ian and I r ish 
diplomatic representation abroad, 5 all demanded a better 
ansHer than to "leave Hell alone . rt 
The I crperi al Conference of 1926 finally undertook to 
define Hhat changes had occured in the i mperial structure . 
The dominions and the United Kingdom were t hus classified 
They are autonomous communities with the 
British Empire, equal in status, in no way 
subordi nate to another in any aspect of 
their domes t ic or external affairs, t hough 
united by a common al legience to the Crovm, 
and freely as socia ed as menbers of the 
British Commonwealth of Nations . 6 
An equality of sta tus was thus recognized, but a status 
1 . 
2 . 
~ : 
5. 
6. 
Carter, Gwendolyn 11., The British Commom·1ealth and 
Internat i onal Security~Ryerson ~ ress, Tor onto, 
19~·7)' pp . 42- l+ 3 
Ibid ., pp . 85- 87 
'.1heare, op . cit . , p . 25 
The Colonial La\vs Va l i di ty Act, 1865 (28 &. 29 Vic t. , c . 
made colonial le gislation repur nan t t o tha t of England 
inVDlid • 
Hancock~ op . cit . , p . 75 
Cl·.:D . 27b8 , R.eT' ort of the 1926 I nperial Confer ence, 
(Hi s I-iaj esty ' s Stat i onery Office, London, 1926 ), p . 1~ 
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,, 
based upon a common allegiance . Being "freely associa t'ed" 
apparently meant that vri thdraHal from. the Cornmom·1eal th was 
possible, though hardly contemplated . The Report of the 
Conference , hm:rever , fails altogether to define 
"dominion status" beyond that of being a member of the 
British Commonwe~lth, recognizing the same king, and 
being in free association vrith each other . l None of the 
definitions really clarified the status enjoyed and, as 
the Report had no force of law, the legal arrangements 
'\vere as they had been before, and some VThat confusing . 
In regard to the conduct of foreign relations the 
Report clearly st~ted 
It was franldy recognized that in this 
sphere as in the s phere o: defence, the 
major res:-onsibility rests nmv, and must 
for some tine continue to rest, with His 
Hajesty ' s Government in Great Britain . 2 
In other vlords, regard.ess of the autonomy practiced 
by the dominions they '\•Tere still "British" and it 
would be from London that the central and controlling 
force of povrer, advice, and authority would come . 
Because of the Lord Byng controversy in Canada 
in regard to the dissolution of Parliament, the position 
of the governor- general demanded rectific~tion . There 
1 . \iheare , op . cit ., p . 3~ 
2 . CIID . 2768 , op . cit ., pp . 25- 26 
14 
had been , because of the mann~r of his appointment , 
some uncertainty as to '\·Thorn the governor - genera l 
represented . The Report cleared the air 
••• the governor-genera l of a dominion is 
the represent ative of the Cr m-m , holding 
in all essential respec ts the same 
position in relation to the administration 
of public affairs in the domini on as is 
held by His Majesty the King in Great 
Britain, and that he is not the 
representative or agent of His Najesty's 
Government in Great Britain or of any 
department of that governmen t . l 
The gove rnor- general vrould act upon the advice solely 
of the dominion minis try vTi thout reference to London . 
The \vay was also paved for the installation of 
native-born gover n ors-general . 
The di plor.a tic unity of the British Enpi!'e vras 
broke. in 1920 , by the recognition of the right of 
Canada to have a Hinister accr edited to the United 
States Government, though attached to the British 
Embassy. 2 ·.Jhile Canada delayed this reuresen ta tion 
until 1927, and then set up an independent legation, 
the Ir~sh Free State availed itself of the right 
earlier . The other dominions were far less 
enthusiastic f or separate representation and only 
the f orce of vlartime circumstances actually began the 
l . Clvill . 2768, op . cit .; quoted in Elliot , ·.J .Y. , 
The Hei·T Brit ish Enpire ,_ (HcGra\'r- Hill Boolr Co . , Inc . , 
New York, 1932), p . 30~ 
2 . Hancock, op . cit . , p. 78 
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netlvork of diplomatic missions abroad that they have since 
woven. At the approximate same time, there came into being 
the beginnings of the dominion foreign offices, or Depart-
ments of E:"ternal Affairs, though generally on a scale so 
small as to indicate a great amount of hesitency about 
diplomatic ventures . l 
Despite the work of the 1926 Conference, much remained 
to be done to clarify the legal inequolities e·isting in 
the British Commonwealth and to end them. Such 
ine~ualities incl uded the royal styles, extraterritorial 
rights, the Colonial Laws Validity Act , 1865, the right 
of disallm~ance and reservation held by the Crovm, and 
the aforestated inequalities in foreign affairs . 2 
The mere statement of autonomy was, in itself, insufficient 
to satisfy the dem?. nds made by the more nationalistic 
of the dominions, particularly Canada and the Irish Free 
State . 
Follmling Imperial Conferencesin 1929, and again in 
1930, the United Kingdom Parliament passed legislation 
that finally gave a legal basis to the Report of 1926 , 
and established in law the foundation for the existence of 
nations of the British Com.momveal th other than the 
----------------------------------------------------------1 . Mansergh, op . cit . , p . 7ln 
2 . Hheare, op . cit . , pp . 35-37 
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United Kingdom. This act, the Statute of ~Jestminster , 1931,1 
defined the dominions by enunerating them. It then ended the 
application of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, over 
dominion legislation, permitted extra- territorial 
legislation by the dominions, and prohibited the United 
Kingdom parliament to legislate for the dooinions exeept 
at their express desire . At the request of several of the 
dominions certain restrictions were kept in force, mainly 
due to the vagaries of dominion politics . Hhile the 
Statute is an act of the United Kingdom parliament and 
conceiva bly could be repealed it is evident that such repeal 
vTOUld be academic and \vithout validity in today' s -vmrld . 
The Statute v1as the legal signal for further moves 
by the dominions to advance, for themselves, their o-vm 
positions . In 1934, the Union of South Africa passed the 
Status of the Union Act2 which presented the thesis that 
soverei gnty in South Africa sprang from the Union and 
reiterated the full powers of the Union Parliament . 
At the same time, the Royal Seals and Executive Functions 
Ac t3 created for the Union its mm Great Seal and its 
o-vm soverei gn, \vho happened to be t he sovereien of 
Great Britain . 
1 . 22 Geo . 5, c . 4 : Statute of Westminster, 1931 
2 . No . 69 of 1934: Status of the Union Act 
3 . No. 70 of 1934: Royal Seals and Executive Functions Act 
In 1936, the British Commonwealth vias shaken by 
the abdication crisis caused by the renouncing of the 
Throne by Ed1.vard VIII . According to the preamble of 
the Statute of 1:Jestminster 
any alteration in the law touching on the 
Succession to the Throne or the Royal 
Style and Titles shall hereafter require 
t he assent as well of the Parliaments of 
all the Dominions as of the Parliamen t 
of the United Kingdom. 
The abdication , in the eyes of the la'tl officers of the 
United Kin gd om, certainly was a change in the succession 
and , in general, the various dominions agreed vri thout 
serious difficulties to the legislation passed . 
However , South Africa maintained that under its 
legislation that the moment Edward VIII abdicated 
Geo~ge VI beca me king without the need of any 
United Kingdom legislation. The Irish Free State 
took the oppor t unity to take the monarch out of Irish 
aff airs except as an agent for eY.ternal (foreign ) 
affairs and maintained that not until December 12, 
t1·ro days after the king si gned his abdication and 
one day after the Abdication Act became law, did George VI 
reign for the Free State . Thus, the Commom:leC'll th 
a ppears to have been treated to three days with two 
1 . 22 Geo . 5, c . 4: Statute of ~lestminster, 1931, preamble 
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different kings, a rather sad conmentary on the vie\·T, 
so carefully nutured, that "common allegiance to the 
Crown" '\>las an unifying factor of the CommonweC'll th . 1 
The idea of the divisibility of the Crown was 
highl.y unpopular in both the United Kinrdon and the 
all- British dominions2 but more and more acce,ted as 
a fact of Commomveal th lif e as exemplified by the 
delay in both Canada ' s and South Afr ica ' s declarations 
of '\-Tar against Germany in 1939 . That time the 
CommonHealth did not go to vrar simpl y because His 
Majesty of the United Kingdom was at war . Canada 
dela yed advisincr the King to declare '\'Tar on her behalf 
until her m·m Parliament so agreed, and used the 
opportunity to take in arms from the neutral United 
S t a tes, with the obvious a pproval of Presiden t 
Roosevelt . 3 Only a f ter the fall of the South African 
19 
Government and a ra t her close vote in the !.ssernbly d id 
the Union join t he Allied side . 4 The Free State re~a ined 
neutral throughout the vrar . 5 
1. 
2 . 
3. 
4. 
5. 
In Aus t ralia and Ne\·T Zea land, however, both 
\'lheare, op . cit . , pp . 283- 288 
That is, Australia and HeH Zea land 
Elliot, .! .Y . , and Hall, H. D., The British Empire .at. ·.'Jar, 
(Alfred A. Knoph, Ne'·l York, 194J), p. 11 
Mansergh, op . cit ., pp . 381-400 
Ibid . , p . 4-03 
gov errunen t s considered thenselves at w~r on Septenber 3, 
1939. But two years later the Austr alian gover~ment 
voluntee ·· ed to follo-vr a diff erent c ours e i n regard 
to Japan and a t that time the Aovernor- general 
declar ed \•Tar upon the advi ce of the Canberra Gover nment •1 
Thus the '·Iorld vras t r eated to the spectacle of a king 
at vrar, at peace, and in diulomatic relations with 
hi s enemy2 all at the same tin e . The flexibility 
of the Co:nr1on\>1eal th vias becoming increasingly a _lparen t . 
~~he second .. orld Uar was to brine ui th i t an end 
to old- fr-·shi oned imperialism and the col l apse of 
the structure of the depend ent B~itish Enpire . For 
meny reasons , the inability of Britain t o safeguard 
her erapire , the pointed fact that Europeans -v~ere not 
superior to p eople of color, the risinc t i de of 
nation: lism , nd the fin~ncial '·rea"keninc- of Britain, the 
United i:(ingdon ,.las unable and unwilling to even atte11pt 
to res ur.e the tra rpinrs o-:: e~pire folloHing the Allied 
victorJ' . 
The pre- ,Jorld cdar II Co'"'ll!lomveal th had been a 
c ons ta ntly evolving one, bringing ab'"~ut nevr i deas of 
1 . hnnsergh, op . cit . , p . 380 
2 . An Irish charge d ' affaires ''"'8S in Berlin throur·hout 
the v1ar but , as His Hajes ty could not sign the 
20 
necessary crecen tiPls ther e \·ras n o I rish Hinister there . 
See Nanscreh , op . cit . , p . 404 
status that gradually e~erged from convention to 
constitution and from theory into actual practice . 
It had functioned vlell, basically t ' rou,s:.;h a 
consLlitative system. The Colonial Office foLmd 
itself inade uate for the new scope of affairs and 
in 1926, the ~oJinions Office was estEblished1 to 
guide and ~uard over the interests of the British 
nations, insofar as the United Fingdom vtas concerned . 
Frequent neetings of the prine ministers maintained 
a pattern o::' unity, though sometimes it vra s closer 
to a :~acade . CornpriseC: entirel y of the \vhi te 
dominions and the United Kinf om, the Commom.realth 
tended to be European orient ted and its a ttention 
like that of the rest of the vrorld \eras centered on 
Conti~ental events . Only the pressure of affairs 
turned i t s a~tion to the East . 
\·Ihile the Imperial \'iar Cabinet had eyisted in the 
first of the \Jorld Hars there was no such organization 
in the second . The British Prime Ninister rejected 
the notion as he \•Trote to the Australian :;rime 
Since the declarations of the Imperial 
Conference of 1926, embodied in the 
1 . Hancock , op . cit . , p . 264n 
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Statute of Vlestminster ••• it v10uld not be 
possible, therefore, VTithout organic 
ch"'nges ••• to make an Austra::.ian l·:inister 
who is responsible to the Co~'"'nvrealth 
legislature a nenber of ur body . l 
HovTever , Churchill vras perfectly vJillinD' to have the 
various C'on-:ini.on pr::.me ministers, vTben in London, sit 
with the Cabinet . In the li -ht of the ch"nces ;,:h ich 
had occured vlith the past year s to the Com• onweal t h 
t his attitude as e).-pressed to the A us t ali an leader vm s 
enti?'ely p:-oper . 
The adnission of Asian and then !~fr icen member 
states to the Co :r.10m1ealth af ter .. orld iJar II dra s t ically 
altered the c om''OSi t ion of the organization . There novT 
existed an opportunity to 111CI 1-ce this c o:'"'munit y of na ions 
an e:;-peri men t in inte rnationa relc:~tions . At the sa ·1e 
time the United Nations \-Tas ta' inr· sh? pe . The tin inr was 
quite ironic . THo or gr nizat ions ~ one dec. ica ted to a 
fairly vT i i: e nationc;l isn ,qnd the ot.her to internationalism 
emerged at the very time '•lhen the \mrld \vf!S c 8n tinuing 
to shc:~tter itself into many s~c:~ll nc;tionalistic states . 
At the same ti~e "hese snall states soupht the umbrella of 
one or the other of the international gr~up~nrs, or 
of both . 
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1 . Churchill, Uinst on s., Historo y of .:orld Har II, vol . iii, 
"The Grand Alliance ," (Hou(l"hton ~·~ifflin Co . , Boston, 
1950), pp . 844- 845 
The rapid growth of n~tionalism and ne\·J menbership 
\·Tithin the Cor::Irlom·Jeal th caused several c;l tera tions . The 
Dominions Office i:TC'IS reborn as the Cor1nonwealth -•elations 
Officel thougt vTiihcut any substantial change of i' unction . 
A far more drastic innovation occured in 1949. India 
decided the time had come to decl~re itself a sove-eign 
republic but the Indian Government also inc icated it 
iris heel to re'l? in i:Jithin the Col"'lffionweal ':h . Up to 
this ~J oint the one cor:1mon focal point of Cornomvealth 
unity had been that 
the Crmm is the sy::"1bol of the free 
associ~tion of the members of the 
British Common' 'e ~ lth of nations, and ••• 
they are united by a conmon alle~iance 
to the Cr ovm ••• 2 
To accept Indian re:nublic.:mism \·lOuld be to repudiate 
the very bas is for ComMonwealth e" is tanc e . .:hen it 
came, hovlever, to the question of disso.,ving the 
Comnom;ealth or again a pplying the rules of fle::ibility, 
the latter prevailed . 
A Cormnom·1eal th PriMe Hinis ters Conference held in 
London in 1949, announced that 
1 . 
2 . 
The Governments of the United Kingdom, 
Australia, Nel'l L..eBland, South Africa, India, 
}a is tan Clnd Ceylon, vlhos e countries are 
unit· d as Hembers of the British ConmonHealth 
'ltlheeler-Bennett, J . ,J .~ King Georre VI, (St . Hartin ' s 
Press, New York, 1958J, p . 685 
22 Geo . 5, c . 4 : Statute of \Jestminster, 1931, preamble 
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of Nations and O'I:Te a c onnnon allegiance to 
the Crmm, which is the symb"l of their free 
associ ? tion, have conside~ ed tte i m ending 
constitutional changes in I ndi a . 
The Gover nment of Ind ia have inforned t he 
other g-.vernments of the Coomom·1eal t h of the 
intention of t he Indian people t ~ at under t he 
ne·p c'"~nstitution v1hicr is about to be adopted 
!Pdia shall become a soverei f n inJ ependent 
republic . The G~vernment of India have , 
hmrever , declared and affirmed India's desire 
t o continue her full membership of t he 
Conn onvreal th of Na t ions and her ace n tance 
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of t he King as the symbol of the free association 
of its independent Me~ber nations ~nd as such 
the Head of the Comr.10mveal t h . l 
So a f ormula ,.,as evised to adrni t re "';)Ublican member s hi p 
into the Comn"mver lth a nd yet maintain the position of the 
s vereign for tbe remaining realms of the Cormnom1eal th . 
At t he sC~me t ime a new titulC~r di gnit y vias best01·1ed upon 
the person of the king . It is note· ·or t hy that t t is 
declar a tion speaks of tl~ e Crown only in referenc e t o t he 
"British Commomvealth of Na tions" and of the King in 
r efe r e!lc e to the 11 Corrn:nom1eal th of Nations . 11 l·Ji thou t 
l egal sanc t ion the prime ministers changed the concep t of 
Common,veal th unity, the symbol of that unity, 2 and the 
name o :~ the community . ..hat began as a conventi on will 
soon find itself enacted into legislation a s C~cts of the 
United Kingdom and other Cof'71.1'10nvreal th :'a.r liaments c rop 
the adject ive "Brit ish" in des cri bing the organizat ion . 
1 . lJheeler- Bennett, op . cit . , pp . 730-731 
2 . The_·e is a great di fference ben1een the "Crovm" and the 
person of the soverei gn . The most obvious is that the 
Crm·m is per petual, the person is no t . 
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The new formula has also been a pplied in regard to 
Pakistan, Ghana and Cyprus . It was further stretched to 
perr1it the Federation of Halaya to remain vTithin the 
Commonwealth under its mm elective monarch. 
Thus the Co~onwealth has unofficially been 
divi dec in t o t,:lo s e ctions, t h e ::\oyal CorJmon··eal th and 
t h e Republi can Common· ·eal t h, \·lith a subdivisi on in t he 
first category for the l·1alayan monarchy . l•!i th i n t he 
Royal Commonue;,l th the custom ha s evolve,' of cons'idering 
the sovereign as a d i stinc tly personal soverei>n . Upon 
the a ccession of Her Majesty Queen Eliz ~ beth II the 
aut'~orities in Ottawa proclaime -:- her, in a dition to 
the USUCl l tit l es "s unr en e leige Lady in and over Canada . " 
At Fre t or ia she was acclained as "Sovereic-n in a nd over 
the lJnion of South Africa . "l Throug!:out the Com·1omrealth 
ind ividual proclamations of her sove reignty '\vere made 
without much uniforn ity and, occasionally, in advance 
of t he London proclamations . India sent a teleeram 
welcor.J.ing Eliza beth as " the ne,,r Head of the Cornmonv1eal th" 
Hithout any further ad o than hoisting the Union Jack in 
front of the .t resic ential residen ce, along vrith the Ind ian 
Fla g , as a mar~ of respect . 
1 . \iheare, op . cit . , p . 298 
Today the queen ' s titles vary from realm to realm 
and it is e· trenely 8]:-parent that the royal union is a 
personal union . The old ars uments of froiP ~.rhence 
s rrings sove::·eirnty have become completely academic and 
settled in quick order out of locPl-national 
consider:-tions . lJhile the queen remains as Head of the 
Cor.t.':lOmJealth she is simply a f::)::'eign He<1d of S tate in 
republican members of the Cornoomveal th . l 
The position of the queen, even though pers~nalized 
in her realms, is somevrhat unusu<'l . It is not possible 
for her to be physically present in all of her re?.lms 
even most of the time and her visits to them tend to 
take the f o:'m of State visits, ·.1i th an occasional 
functioning as national sovereign as in o~ening 
Parliaments, most o \lhic h have been s·· eci?.lly closed 
that she might re-open them with regal 1. orL'.ali ty . If the 
sovereign v1ere to remain for any leng t h of ti:ne in her 
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other realns she vmuld quicl<ly find her usefulness anyl·!here 
ser i ously impaired . It being a ...... olitic.-,1 ac cident that the 
~2ueen of Ca nada is the Queen of the United Kingdon it is a 
physic ~l accident tlat the Canadian queen resides in 
London and not in Otta,·ra . 
1 . Information suprylied by letter from the Indian ~mbas sy, 
.:as.hing ton, on 12 Jul: , 1°60, and f rom the Fec"eration 
of :-:al- ya E"'lbassy, by letter, 5 July, 1960. 
There are dis~inct advantages to a state remaining 
in the CommonvTeal th . Tracie bet\veen Conmon-vreal th nations 
is quite heavy, about one- half being a ong thernse~ves, 
ren~ing from a Canadinn lmT of seventeen - er cent to 
a hi.r.h of seventy - three per CPnt for Nen Zealand . l 
This trade is abetted by I~ erial preference, a lower 
prefe~ence is losing in significance as international 
trade agreeme~ts e and . Then, too, with the e•ce tion 
of Canada r•nd 'Hith the addition of severel other nc::tions, 
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the Co·nnonue, 1 th members bel on..:; to the sterling bloc . ':lhis 
pr8vides fo: a cer ta in amount of c ::~trol in \vorld trade 
aff irs not ot.erwise readily availc>ble ~nd in a genc~al 
pool for the sho:::·ing up or occ2sion..,lly vJea'~ currencies . 
The Co!'"!."lon·\·eel t.b serves a useful uu:-pose in proviC.ing 
for unusUE~lly close co .nunic"' ion bet1·1een its val.~ious 
governments . He ers gen e:n31ly under t·lcc to inform ti1e 
others o: its inte~:·nation::-1 intentions and the Co .. ~,on'Jea lth 
LiE~son Je-~ar";ment of the United Kin ·dom Foreign Office 
alone sends i·Tell over one hundred co .nunic~·tions to 
the va:•ious membe1·s d "ily . 2 On occE' sion this cor-:munica tive 
1 . 
2 . 
The Co:·nomreE~lth ·.ssocia'-ion in Brief( B:-itish 
Infornation Services. (He··r York, 1959;, r . 28 
NClnse· gh, I.ichola, The Co'!I1om·Jealth c>!ld the h~ tions, 
(Royal Institute .., ..... Inter~.., ational "..ffairs, O"'"O"'d 
Un1vers i t y 1ress, London, 1948), p . 36 
, 
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center shuts dovm and, as happened over Suez in 1956 , 
with clisas trous c onsequences . 1 The frequent c onf er ences 
of Conmomveal th m...~..nis ters and pa r t icularly heads of 
governmen t give ample opportunity t o thrash out mutual 
proble:ms , though not al1·12ys 1-vith outstanding success.2 
The question of nation~ lity and cit i zenship is one 
which t ends to serve as an unifying link in the Cornmom.,realth 
and begins to approach something of an intern<'ltional 
ci t izenshi p status . This a pplies, most c omuletely, 
to the United King ~om , and in varyinG degrees to t he 
other membe~s o: the Commonvreal th. Under e~ ist ing 
Br itish l egislation 
1. 
2 . 
3· 
4. 
Every pers on \·Jho under this Act is a citizen of 
the Uni t er ~~ingd om <'lnd Colonies or who under any 
enactment for the time being in f orce in any 
coun tyy mentioned in subsection (3 ) of t his 
section3 is a citizen of that coun try shall, 
by virtue of tha t cit~zenship, have the status 
of a Br it ish s ub ject . 4 
Commomveal th reac tions to the Anglo- French invasion of 
the Suez Cana l Zone ·VTere often dr ama tic . See Chap ter VI . 
The desire for unanimity of t en causes the issuance of 
vac:ue c o!'1muniq ues on matters of i mpor t ance, such <'l S the 
racial policy in South Africa, prior to that nation's 
\·Tithdrawa l f rom the Commonwealth in 1961 . 
Section 1 of 11 & 12 Geo . 6, c . 56 : British Nationality 
Act, 1948 . 
The countries referred t o are Can a da , A us tr Rl ia, New 
Ze<'l l and , South Afri ca, I nd i a , Pakis tan, Southern rthodes ia, 
Ceylon, Ghana, the Federation of Halaya , Nigeria , 
Cyprus and Sier ra Leone . As new members of t he Common-
wealth join, their name s are amended t o this subsection . 
Under the terms of the British National ity Act, 1948 , 
there i s no distinction between a "British subject" and 
a "Co;nmonwealth citizen . rrl The Act also created the 
status of a citizen of t he United Kinpdom and Colonies . 2 
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This st~t us entitles one to vote in British elections . The 
righ t of obtaining such citizenshi p by registration is 
gr antE?d to any Commonv1eal th ci tizen or Irish cit izen3 
by the same act . 4 In other \vords, any citizen of any 
Comrnonvre~lth country (as '·Tell as I reland) may enter 
Britain and , after twelve mon ths residency, apply for and 
be grFnted citizenship of the United Kingdom and all 
rights per~ining t hereto . This exceedingJ.y liberal 
act thus gives the ConrnonHe~l th essen'·ial unity: the 
United r .. ingdom treats everyone alike. 
The legislat ion of the other members of the Common-
wealth is not so liberal, t hough th~t of New Ze?land is 
the most similar .5 In Malaya the st~tus of Cornmom·realth 
citizen is recognized "in accor(anc e Hith the position of 
1 . 
2 . 
3-
4. 
5. 
11 & 12 Geo . 6 , c . 56, Section 1 (2) : British 
Nationality Act, 1948 
Ibid . , Section 4 
Iri.sh citizens are not aliens in the United Kingd om . See 
11 & 12 Geo . 6, c . 56, Section 2 
Ibid . Section 6 
No. 15 of 1948, Sections 2 (1), 3(1), (2), (3): British 
N"' tionali ty and Ne,·l Zealand Citizenship Ac t 
the Federation within the Co"T.lonwealth"l but all 
Commom·Jealth citizens -,ay not beco:-:e llalClyan citizens . 
A similar situation prevailed in South Afr ica prior to 
1961 . Ceylon insists that non- Ceylonese citizens be 
treated as <'l liens2 and India recor::nizes CoiTL"'lOnHeal th 
citizenship " f or Ii'OSt pr<=lc tical purposes . 11 3 While 
Canadian citizens are British subjects and British 
subjects are Common·"eal th citizens under Canadian law, 
not all such citizens (of the Commonwealth) may becone 
Canadian citizens .4 Then, too, immi r ration rerul?.t ions 
in the various Coi!IIlom.,real th countries, oth er than Great 
Britain, tend to limit the actual effect of the co~jon 
st?tus of CommonvTealth citizen, thourh for ord::.nary 
travel it generally is e~sier ~or him than for ~liens 
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to ente r CornrnonYicalth count!"ies . Vlhile the ln ited Kingd om 
offers no b rs to the ent:-y of Common··ealth citizens it 
is rather obvious that the economic circums t < nc8s of thB t 
C'"'un try void the danger of its being flo oded with 
unnecessary a dd itions to the VIorking force . It can afford 
to l"'JC!intain this symbol of ConmonvTealth unity though it 
occasionally gets frayed at the ec' ges . 
1 . 
2 . 
3· 
4. 
5. 
Feder a tion of Ha1 a ya Cons t itution, Fart III, Section 29 
Info!"nB tion by letter fro!'1 Embassy of Ceylon, lashington, 
25 June, 1957 
Info:'mation by letter fron tre Indi~n E~bassy, 
.1ashington, 12 July, 1960 
10 Geo . VI, c. 15, Sections 2(a), 21 , 22, 23 : Cana' ian 
Citizenship Act 
For example, the 1959 Nottinfham Hill riots in London 
Considering that the newer states of the 
Conmom·:eal th, 1·1i t h the exce,ti on of Cyprus, are non-
European, it is hardly likely that there -.,.,r i l l be any 
further relayat ion in e· is tinr citizens hip <md 
il!UJigrR tion laws . Lore than probably, the lav1s 1-1ill 
be ti p,htened up . 
There e .:.. s ts no unified Conrnonweal th defens e 
sys tern. On occasion there is close coo:-cra tion, as 
during .:o:-l d \Jar II vrhen units of t he :.oyCll Aus tr al_ian 
Nc-vy Here ::-'l a ced under the co-:unand of the B:::-itish 
Admiralty, or -.,.,rhen, during the Korean confl ict there 
e:·is tee the CoP111omle"~l th Division . On :" · asion 
the v ~rious Chiefs ~f Staff hold conferenc r-s but these 
are of a most i nformCll na ture . Unha·-pily, v r-rious units 
of the Co:::rnon .. eal th ar'ted forces have .::'·.r ed at e~ch other, 
as in the :~shmir c~nflict . 
Upon request tt-- e British milit'!'Y Hil suppl y officers 
to trflin o:' t:- command units in other Co"1!non· ealth 
CO"ntries . untill961, for e·arrrle, the Ghana '.rmy 
Commander WfiS 8 British major-general . l 
The var .:.. ous Co~onwealth c ountries h~ve made no e:fort 
to even mt=lintain an all-CO:-l."lOnvealth defensive alli nee . 
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1 . Houever, the Coonander of the N<'lval College i·las an Israeli . 
Indeed, the member states have defense agreements both 
among thenselves, with other pm·rers, and, on occasion, 
\vith no one . Austreli~ and I evr Zealand are allied \lith 
the United States in the AUZUS Treaty v:hile the three 
of them join \vith Pakistan, the United Kingd om, and several 
other nations to forn t he South East ;~sia Tr eaty 
Organization . Tal.cistan and the United Kingdom belong 
to the Central Treaty Organizc?tion vThile Canada and the 
United Kingdom are members of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Or nization. Malaya and the United Kingdom 
have the ir o·o~n defensive arr <'lngements and other 
a greements exist betHeen the United Kingdol'>l and 
ce:'ta in Hembers of the Co ~·10mo~ealth in regard to bases . 
I t is ~erfe ctly possible for Con:mom1eal th nations to 
be in treaty ~lliances with nations against w~ic~ 
other r1e:'lber s' incl udinp themselves' su pose"lly are allied 
against •1 
It is significant that In..::ia, the larges t 11ember of 
the Commomre- 1 th by popul? tion and a leader of the non-
Coi!lillunis t As ian \•lo ld has teken a neutralist position 
in most internation<'ll matters \dthout compromisinp, her 
Co'1m.C'nvre~l th member ship . Perhaps t h e Co!::lrlomveal th can 
1 . Until 1956, the United Kin~~om was i n treaty alliance 
'\•Titn the Uni on of Sovie t Socialist :..:lepublics and, 
at the same time, a member of NATO, C~NTO (then 
1'-IETO) and SEATO. 
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In many other areas, of course, t he Corrnnom1eal th 
~s close co-operat i on and often, as in the Colombo 
Fl<m, i.·Iith spectacular success . It has many elements 
of unity in sp ite of its diverse meqbership : t h e 
use of the En glish l~n ·· uare, a common e:··e:r:. ce v.rith 
British admi nistra tion and justice, and a general 
respect for parliamentary institutions . l Perhaps 
t11a ck enzie King s urnmed it all up '\1hen he said 
Lil<e t h e nations of "i·Thich it is c onpos ed, 
the B:-i t i sh Cor.unom·1e e1 l th has within 
itself a s pirit which is not exclusive, 
but the orposi te of e: el usion . i'herein 
lies its st ~ength . That spirit 
expressed itself in co- o·!era tion . Therein 
lies the secret of its unity . Co- -peration 
is c~ ~rb le of indefinite e-p~nsion . 
The~ lies the ho~e of the future . 2 
He sha 11 ex·'nine these ideals in the r ec or C' of the 
Connnomvealth at the United Nat ions . 
33 
1 . On occasion such institutions do have rough qoing , as 
in I a1ds tan and Ghana. 
2 . !:ut c:,ins on , B:::'uce 1 The Incredible CanE~d ian, (Lon~mans, Green, and Co . , lnc . , Nm·r York, 195'3) , p . 335 
CHAPTER II 
The concept of the United Nations as an 
organization to maintain ·Horld peace vias, by no means , 
a sudden inspiration on the part of the Allied 
leade:-:-s of Uorld Vl8r II. The idea of "lvorld pe'1ce 
through an established international order is quite 
old and precedes the post- Uestphalian ideal of 
nationelism, "lvhich has made so nuch more difficult 
the att~iiTQent of international peace and security. 
The concept of the international person grevr 
up in the nineteenth century Hhen a rC'lpid growth in 
technolo:-"ical lmm·Jledge resulted in a nUPlber of useful 
orfanizC'ltions such as the Danube Co~ission, 1856; the 
InternAtional Telegraphic Union, 1865; the Universal 
Postal Union, 1874; and, after the turn of the century, 
the International Health Office, 1907 .1 These 
practical efforts vJere seconded by unofficial 
internctional bodies such as the InterparliamentAry 
Union, 1889; and the International Federation of 
Trade Lnions , 1901. 2 
A more political form of international co- oper· tion 
---------------------------------------------------------1 . Halter , J . P ., A His tory of tre League of I·Ta tions , 
(Oxford University Press , London, 1952J, p . 7 
2 . Ibid ., p . 8 
was projected vThen , in 1899 , the Ha~ue Conference met 
upon the initiative of the Russian government 
••• a) De rechercher, sens retard, les moyens 
de met tre un t erme a l'accroissement 
proeressif des armements de terre et de 
mer • •• 
••• 1° Entente stipul~nt la non augmentetion 
pour un terme a fixer des effectifs actuels 
des forces arn§es de terre et de oer, ainsi 
qu~ des budgets de guerre y affcr~nts , etude 
prealablcs des voie dans lesquelles pourrai t 
meme se realiser dans l ' avenir une reduction 
des effectifs et des budgets ci- dessus 
nentionnes . l 
Unfortunately the matter o~ disarmament or li~itation 
was never seriously persued2 and the Conference turned 
to conventions for t he pa cifi c se ttlement of 
intern tional dis putes and the establishment of the 
Perm~nent Court of Arbitration. 
The second Harue Confer rnce, in 1907 , called again 
upon Russian initiative, '"as attended by the 
representatives of for ty-four nations and ~assed 
resolutions in favor of arbitrettion3 \lbich, as had 
alreaoy been indiceted , could be successful . 4 
1 . Dotation Carnegie pour la Paix Internationale , ~ 
Conventions et Declarati~ns de la Haye de 1399 et 
.l2QZ, "Circul~ ire Rus se propos ant -:.. e p:·orraiD.Me de 
la premier conf~rence, Saint- Petersbourg, 30 
deco1bre 1 '198 I 11 janvier, 1899 " (Oxford 
University Press, Hew York, 1918), Introduction 
2 . Halters , op . cit . , p . 12 
3 . Ibid . , p . 14 
4 . ?recty of Uashin[ ton, 1871 
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During the course of the first '.Jorld Har 
considerable discussion occured in regard to t he 
es t a blishment of a means to maintain t he post-war 
settlenent and international order . In 1917, the 
British Government set up a co~~ission to consider the 
form of a post -1·1a r lJOrld organization, under t he 
chairnanship of Lord Phillimore . A simil?r French 
coMmission tmder the eninent statesman Leon Bourgeois 
was established the follmving year . l The United 
States Government gave support to the aims of these 
commissions , es pecially through President '.lilson ' s 
last of his "Fourteen Points " 
A general association of nations nust be 
formed under spec ific covenants for the 
purpose of affording mutual guaran tees 
of political independance and territorial 
integrity to great and small stC'Ites alike . 2 
At the Versailles Confer ence a s ~ecial co~"".mission 
including Lord Robert Cecil and Gene -al J an Christian 
Smuts drafted the Covenant of the Le8gue of Nations . 
It emerged as a brief t\'Jenty-six article documen t 
establishing a central deliberative Assembly, an 
executi ve or gan, the Council, and a Permanent Court of 
International Justice . 3 
---------------------------------------------------------1. \'!alters, op . cit., p . 22 
2 . Bartlett, Ruhl J ., The Record of American Diplomacy, 
~lf::-ed A. Knoph , Ne\·1 York, 1948), p . 461 
3 . Ibid., pp . 461 - 470 
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The British Et:1pire and Cornnon·1ealth were i·lell 
represented in the LeaF,ue . Along with the United 
Kingdom sat Canada, Aust··alia, Ne·H Zealand, the Union 
of South Af~ica , and, less logically, the Empire of 
India . After the crant of a status ec.ual to that of 
Canada, Eire joined their ranks . The doninions at 
first remained in the bac~ground at the League , 
preferring to let the United Kingdom speak for them, 
as on the Handates ~uestion . 1 Hmvever, in 1926, 
Eire stood for election to the Council and, in the 
following year, Canada separately becPme a nember. It 
was at about this tine that c~nada atte:"p tec1 to reshape 
the Learue into ~ for n cap~ble of attracting to it 
the United st~tes . Constantly concerned for her ovm 
sec uri t/ and conscious of her position bet\·Teen the 
London ~nd t·ashington r;overnments, Canada souP"ht an 
unders tan· inc- t na t ioJOUld heal the unfortunate rift 
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between the international or raniza tion and the United 0t2tes . 2 
Tragically, no solution could properly be found in time 
to prevent disaster . 
1 . 
2 . 
There Has one occasion vlhen it arype"'red that a 
l.Jalker , op . cit . , p . 336 
Hutc~inson1 Bruce , The Incredible Ca~adian, (Longmans, Green and Go . , Ne··1 York, 1953), p . 96 
ma~or split occured in the general facade of British 
Commom·Teal th unity at the Lea sue . Tba t '\·Ta s over the 
question of sanctions against Italy following her 
arr:res sion against Ethiopia . It '\·Iha t turned out to 
be the final test of the League, the Canad ian 
dele r-a te arose in co.r ittee '\'lith, auparently, the 
consent of the Liber<'ll C"Overnment of 1:ackenzie King , 
to pro;ose extendin~ the list of sanctioned naterials 
to include petroleum. Three dC'lys later the OttaHa 
gove~nment reversed its position and pulled back 
into vThat obviously i·Tas alignment '\·rith the London vievl. l 
Nine d<ys later the Eoare- Laval Pa c t v1as announced to 
a stunned \·iorld and the League "Yras so totally 
discredited that it \vC!s finished as an organiza tion 
fo!' the preservation of the "':>e~ce . ?ri"'le l1i"1ister 
:i.ing ' s ections more than likely Here taken \·lith an eye 
tmvard 1.me~ican reaction had sanctions :;.recipi tat ed 
a i·lOrld wcr2 and his o-vm vie\v that the Leaeue was not 
"an in ternC! tional vlAr office . " 3 \d th this fiasco 
1 . 
2 . 
3· 
Hutchinson, or . cit . , p . 205 
Ibid . , p . 204 . It is interestin ~ to note that the 
Duc e believed th t had the petroleum sanctions been 
imposed his forces would have been co~pelled to 
l'i thdravJ \·Ti tbin a week . 
Lotver , Arthur 1:. , Colony to Ua tion , (Lonrnans, Green 
and Co . , Toronto, 1953), p . 545 
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temporarily vlent Canada 1 s one opportunity to pave the 
\·lay for the CommonvTea l th in exercising "~:Jorld leadership 
against the s pread of totalitarian danger . 
Events after 1936, moved '\'Tith such r8pidity that 
the Ler>gue viaS quickly by- passed and Europe returned 
starkly to attempts to settle t he increasingly 
important Dr oblems through personal diplomacy, such as 
the Chamberle in- Hitler, l'ussolini- Pitler 8nd 11unich 
conferences, as \'/ell as through a re turn to seel{ing 
security thro"gh bi-l8teral p8 cts, such as the 
Anglo- folish I:utual Ass is t 8nce Treaty and the Soviet -
German Non- Aggression Pact of 1939. 
On September 1, 1939 , German troops inva ded 
Poland 8nd two d8ys later the W8r becrrne a general 
conflict . The League stumbled on, finally terminating 
its exist8nce on April 19, 1946 . 
On August 10, 1941, President rtoosevelt and 
Prime H:Lnister Churchill met off the Newfoundland 
coast ir. a se tt in~ of Naval might, so typic8l of them, 
and , in the c ourse of their conversations, a greed upon 
a Charter in \'lhich the vTar aims of the de::locr8cies 
wer e stated . In his original draft the F:~ime Ninister 
"~dished to 
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••• seek a peace whic~ ••• by effective 
international o:·gan-~zation vlill afford to 
all states anc peoples the neans of 
dv!e lling in security ••• vTithout ••• the need 
of r1a intaining burdensome armaments . l 
The President ~>Jas unvlilling to a gr ee to the British 
wording . It is rather apparent that 2 oosevelt ~ad not 
yet formula ted a compl e te plan for t he pos t - 1var 1·/0rld 
(indeed, it would have been rather pre~atu~e), and he 
had to deal with a very sensitive domestic state of 
opinion . Too far ahead of his m.m people, he could not 
move i f he intended to maintain unity in the face of 
increasing adve~sity . 
A compromise solution vras '\vorl<.:ed out and the tvTO 
heads of governmen t afreed, in point eight of the 
Charter that 
they believe ••• that the dis?r~?.~ent o 
such nations (i . e . : Ger~Pny and Italy) is 
essenti~l pendin~ the establishment of ~ 
vrider and ~ permanent system of 
general securi ty . 2 
Here, then , the chief of st~te of t he nation 'hich had 
rejected anf t hus f?tPlly we~kened the League of Nations 
and the head of the r overnnent of the leading Member of 
the Commomvealth arreed in general teres that another 
1 . Churchill, op . cit . , p . 43~ 
2 . Ibid . , p . 435. ~mphasis added . 
40 
41 
international organization, of sene ch?rrcter, w2s 
necessary to establish and to ensure i·rorld perce . It 
v1as .~n i"istoric move and from it would flo"' i r'l eas that 
even·~ua lly resulted in t he United Ha tions . The de cision 
certrdnly vTPS not ..,ade in haste and p::-obably represents, 
on the part of t he United States, the Ho:rk of the 
Division o~ Political Stud ies of the De~artment of 
State . l 
American entry into the sec,..,nd ",Jorld ':iar vTas 
follcvTed rapid ly by Cordell Hull ' s idea of t he issu"nce 
of a joint declaration by those nations fighting 
the Axis powers setting forth in urun.ist <J}{eable 
terms the unity of the Allied pm.;ers . l•:ax1.·Jell 
N. Ha1:1il ton, Chief of the State Depr rtmen t ' s :Ji vision 
of Far Eastern A ~fairs , drevl up such a decl?.ration at 
the Secretary ' s suggestion . 2 
During the series of conferences that .rine 
Minister Churchill held with President : oos evelt the 
final ter·1s o:.' the Decl ration v1ere lia rmlered out . The 
title WPS c~osen in 1 bat was o rather bizarre meetinf . 
As the head of Eis 111a j es ty ' s GoverP..IIlent in the United 
1 . Chase, Eugene, The United Jlntions in Action 
(1.1cGrai·J- Hill Book Co . , Inc . 1 Uei' Yor:{ , 1950~, p . 19 2 . Hull, Cordell, Lemoirs of Gordell Hull, vol . ii , 
(Eacmil:!. n Co . , Net' Yor'k , 1948), pp. 1114-1115 
Kingdom \•Tas bathing the President of the United 
States entered the room and there sugrcsted the 
title "Declar E~ tion of the United Hations .rr l The 
acc o~d, si~ned by twenty- six nations2 was a 
statement of vrar aios but became politicfllly 
important as adherence thereto provi ded automatic 
admiss ion into tte later world or ganization . 
During the course of the vle~r, until the San 
Francis co Conference, the phrase uunited hfltionsrr 
r efers correctly only to El military coalition 
ag~inst the Ayis powers . 
President Roosevelt, at the outset, a9parently 
Has not completely convinced as to en~ctly ·ha t sort 
of inte"na tion~l or P"anization ought to be formed . It 
would a ppear thflt at the time of the Atlanti c Charter 
conference he favored an interim police force tha t 
vrould precede the organization and allovr the vior1d to 
settle dovm . 3 That he fel t t.be me.inten"'nce of --·eace 
was tt·,e duty of the grea t powers he strongly SUE'·ested 
to the Sovi et Fo' eign Hinis ter in J'I0y of 1942 . 
It \vas in + is conversAtion, also, that the 
president broached t.be question of post- wa r 
------------------------------------------------------1 . 
2 . 
Hull, op . cit., p . 1124 
The significant omission was Fr ?nce which at the 
time \vas under the Vichy Governmen t 
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3· Sher\vood, Rober t E. , Roosevelt and Ho'Jkins, (Ha:-per & 
Bros . , Publ . , New York , 1948) , p . 359 
trusteeships . The idea of placing those lands 
formerly m~nd~ted by the ~eague of N~tions to certain 
adni istering powers, as well as certa in other 
colonial l Pnds, under a systeM of international 
trustees hips ,.,as a favor::.. te one of the American 
gove:'I".ment . 
Secreta rr Hull dis cussed the i dea Hi th Foreign 
Secretary Eden du-inr, the C"urse of the ""irst 
Quebec Conference in Aucust o~ 1943 . Hull ' s 
propcs~ls called for the independ~nce of colonial 
peoples after they had been brouP,ht, by stages, throL~h 
governmental develop~ent suryervised under an 
internfltiona l t r usteeship administration ~·rithin the 
v1orld organization and O':era 1ing through reFional 
councils •1 
The British P"overnment, an.:; partic ~ la:~J.y Eden, thouP"ht 
little of the plan . Churchill eventu' lly i:Tas 
agreeable but only Hith the e:x,licit underst~n,inc- that 
no areas i'Tithin the British Empire vrere involved . 2 
'I'he London r:;overnment cont::..nuec to give attention 
to the pro ble of a pos t - Har or[aniza tion . In !'.arch 
of 1943, Eden confer~ed with Presi'ent Roosevelt and , 
1 . Hull , op . cit . , pp . 1235- 1236 
2 . Sherwood, o; . cit . , p . 865 
il 
during the course of the discus s ions , heard the 
president expound the vieiv tha t the :'uture organiz"ltion 
ou·ht to contain r n ' ssembly and an Zxecutive Council 
of the United ,:, tates, the United I..ingdon, the Soviet 
Union and China . Eden was skeptical of the role of 
China .1 The conversations prob· bly were not verly 
pro,,uctive for Eden ' s 0\'ffi Government had conce ·;_ved of 
the or gani z::>tion in stri,dngly dissi~ilar terns . 
Cn Hay 22 , 191~3 , <'lt the British E·-,bass~· in 
·.:ashington, Chu!'chill set forth his o,·n vievTS on the 
v!Orld orranizEltion . He ::'avored the establishment of a 
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Supreme ·~·lorlC:: C')Lmcil consisting of the four rnajor powers 
and added the:'eto, by annua l rotation, other nations . 
Under th is Council there \.,rould be three regional 
council, for EuroJe, for t re acific, and for the 
\·Jes tern Hejj,isphere . Neobers of t'· e '.!orld Council vTOUld 
sit on those Rerional Councils in "\·T.bich t hey "\vere 
directly interested . The P!'ime 1·1inister hoped that 
the United States vould see its way clear to join all 
three regi~nal councils . The final drcisions in set tling 
dis"t"utes i·Tould rel'1ain "~:lith the Supreme '.lorld Council. 
The plan further envisioned dual national fo~ces, one 
1 . Feis , Herbert , Churchill, ~oosevelt, Stalin, 
(F~ :Lnceton Universit:· .ress, Princeton, 1957) , p . 121 
for local use and one seconded to an internation~l 
police force at the disposal of the re?ional and 
supreme councils . As a corallary to the plan , 
Churchill vTould redraw the rna n '1f Europe in to tvrel ve 
st8tes or confederations, i . e . , a Danubian and 
Bavari~n federation or a B~l~~n federation . l 
This , lan '.-Ja s not ~ t all ·1ha t the United States 
had in mind and disc ussions continued . 2 :~ conference 
of the Soviet, British and American forei n 
ministers was called for I oscow i n Gct ~ber of the 
same year . In the interval , however , Secretary Hull 
presented to Forei~n Secretary Eden, on Au~ust 21, a 
draft for a Four Ha tion Declaration vThich \vould bind 
the Four Pov1ers after the conclusion of the \•IRr an 1 
also C9ll for 8 general international o·· gc>niza tion 
based on the principle of the soverei n 
equ~lity of all nRtions, and open to 
membership by all nations, larve and small , 
for the maintenance of intern8t~onal 
peace Rnd security . 3 
The Soviet Government objected to the decl~ration due 
to the inclusion of China4 but later relented . 
1 . 
2 . 
~ : 
ChU!'chill Hinston S. , History of orld .lar II, 
vol . iv, ?'The Hinge of Fate, " (Houghton- I:iflin 
Co . , Boston, 1950), pp . 0 02- 805 
Feis , op . cit . , p . 215 
Hull , op . cit . , p . 1238 
Ibid . , p . 1256 
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Among the matters discussed at the : oscm:1 
Conference wa s the future wor ld or panization. The 
position ori r-;inally held by the British Government 
was expressed in a Note vlhich Churchill gave to 
Eden, st~ting , in pa rt 
\le hold strongly to a sys•em of a League 
of Ha tions, 1·Tr ich vrill include .§. Council 
of Europe , with §11 International Court and 
2n armed power capable of enforcing its 
decisions. During the Armistice period, 
vTh ich rna y be prolonged, we hold that the 
three Great Powers, the British Commonwealth, 
the United ~ ta tes, and the Union of 
Soviet docialist Republics, with the 
add ition of China, should rema in united, 
well armed, and capable of enforcing the 
Armistice terms and of building up the 
permanent str ucture of peace thro ughout 
the globe . l 
The conferees finally drmv up a de cl<'l r a tion 1:Jhich 
met, in great measure, the desires of the United 
States and the United Kingdom , though without the 
hint of regionalism i mplied in Chur chil l's Note . It 
seemed that a strong regional char8cter to t he future 
organization would no longer be considered . 
The Declaration, issued on October 30, 1943, at 
Mos cmv, stated 
1 . 
The Governments of the United ~ta te s of 
Churchill, ~'linston S. , History of -.. orld \Jar II, 
vol. . v, "Closing the Ring , 11 (Houghton-l.ii:'lin Co., 
Boston, 1951), p . 282. Em,hasis added . 
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America, the U·1ited T.ingdom~ t he Soviet 
Union and China: ••• jointly declare : 
l . That t heir united action ••• vrill be 
continued fo= the organiz?tion and 
maintenance of ~eace and secu=ity ••• 
4. That they rec::> P:"'~ize t he necessity of 
establi shing at t he earliest practicable date 
a generfll interna tionn~. o=c·a !"' iZCltion, 
based on the ,r inci~le of the sovereign 
e uality of all pea ce-loving stC'ltes , and 
open to rne~be=ship by all states, 18-ge 
and snall, for t he ro intPnanc e of 
international peace and security. 
5. That for t he _:"'_,r pos e of !:1 intaining 
inte rn a tional peace and security pending 
the re-es tC! blis ,.., 1.ent of la"~:T and order 
and t he ina ~ura t i on of a srs t e•1 of 
gene:·a l s e c urity, t h e:r Hill consul t i'ith 
one another and as occ<'~sion requires --ith 
other ne1he=s of t he United Hati:ms uith a 
vim·; to joint action on behalf of the 
co~Q~ity of nations . l 
The future or r::Y!ization T·ras not c::.eCJ =ly defined 
and t hough t he Eoscm·: Conference merely set forth 
generrl pr inc :.ples i t w~s vie'~eC' by Cordell Hull 
as the conference \'l:; ich g··ve birth to t f-Je United 
Eations organization.2 
In 1 ove·1ber , 1943, t he heats of the govern:1ents 
of the 3 ig Three me t for t~e first tiMe , toge ther, 
at Teheran , t he c ·rital of the rather surprised 
host country of Iran . Roosevel t pr esented to the 
conference the views of t he ~nericPn ~ove-n~en t on 
---------------------------------------- -------------1 . Good;· ich, Lele1nd and Henbro , gdvard, Charter of 
the United Nrtions, CTorld Pe ~ ce ::!ouncation , 
Boston , 1946 ) , p . 571 
2 . Hull, op . cit . , p . 1307 
the future orrc:lniz::>tion, vie\·Ts uhich incor~orated 
the fi~st tentative draft of the State De~artrnent . 1 
The Fresident foresaw· an orra~iz~tion vrith a r,eneral 
asse:--·bly of f orty or ··ore me·~bers as a discussion 
and acvis ory croup . There ·Has to be an executive 
c ou.nc il of the four "'18: or po\l'er s, joined by six 
other s t n tes, qualified to ma '-e reco'T:lenda t ions and 
to deal i·li th non- rnili tary r:1a t ters . The six non-
perna:!'lent members uould be distributed a 'onrr the 
Eu~~ope8n powers (two), South f,oerica (one), the 
I riddle East (one), the :;'C'Ir :Sa s t (one), and the 
Britis!"> Co:-:mon'dealth (one) . 2 The enforcenent acency 
i·lOUld be the four ,.,ajor pov1er s with ell' thol' i ty to 
deol c-t once ~·i th ;-> 11 problens . 3 
Pre 1ier Stalin countered with a for~n of 
regiona: is ~o : an EUJ.,O ean Cora11i t t ee ( ir cl ud in[ the 
United States) and a Far Eastern Co mit tee . :rtooseve1t 
disli,-ced this SUff es'-ion as he previors"'..y had rejected 
the Bri·'~ish rerional prorosals . 4 By the ti:-Je the 
Co'J.:'ererce Has concluded, hovrever, ) tc:~lin agreed to 
1 . Hull, op . cit . , p . 1647 
2 . Sheruood, on . cit . , p . 785 
3. Feis, op. cit . , ~, . 269- 270 
4 . Churchill \vas an::..,oyed by tre I resi':ent ' s failure to 
differentiate bet\veen the Br.:.tish [ll!C '3->viet '"lens . 
Churchill, v, op . cit . , n . 363 
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a v10rJ.d o.rgcm iza t ion and di::-c,zoded his regiona 1 vie'tvS 
v' ich see~, to bee; in ;lith, to have been basic"'lly 
directed ~gainst a revivAl of Gernany . l 
Tbe Decl"r-tion isse? at the conc 1 us:on of the 
Teheran discussions avoiced direc t refer rnce to the 
internntional orr;an·zation t.b'"'U '1 it stc?lted , in -~art, 
an oblique re·~inder of co""l!'1on ('"oals 
\ve, the Presic'ent of the United St"'tes, 
the Prine 1:i"'ister of 'lreat ~rit·dn, and 
the Prei ier o~ tre Soviet Union ••• h~ve 
sha"YJed and c onfirner our co~r: n policy ••• 
"'e shall seelr the cooper"tion and <"Ctive 
partici~8tion of all nations, large and 
small, vlhose peopJ es in he2r t and in 
~ind are dedic'lted. as are our mm ·)eo:;-les, 
to t~e eli1lnPtion o~ ty~anny and sl-very, 
o~press ion and intn ler2nce . · .. e , ·elcome 
the;-1, as they 'Tia y choose to co'1e, in t" a 
wo~ld family of de cra~ic nations . 2 
\·li. th the general outline of the fu tur c o.rf"ani.zc:> tion 
a ~~ arcr:tl:r settled at I:oscmr and at Teher~n, the:re 
burst rnon a ra t'1er stC"'rtled ~!a shine- ton a shift in 
Lond-n ' s ~olicy . The Br~tish Jnbassy handed to the 
St~te De~artment, on Decc~ber 18 , 1 943 , a 7oreisn Office 
memo,..<mi u- re- r...,ising 'che qucsti0:1 of :-egio~IC'I;_is-, . 3 
I t obvi o·:.sl:· · '8 s a fina 2.. ef·"'or t <:tnc afterward London 
1 . 
2 . 
3· 
Feis , op . cit ., u . 270 
Be'llis, S..,r'lUel 'l'i' . , :)inlon-::a~ic T:isto··x of the United 
St..,tes, (He:'lry ~~olt & Co . , :Te·· Yo1.·1-::, 195'C5'Y';" p . 887 
Hull , op . cit . , p . 1699 
returned to the stated vieH of uorld- •,-!ide s ecnri ty 
arrange'~ent s . 
Prime 1·1inis ter Churc.bill spelled out h is vievTs on 
t h . .;.. ' . t . . . 2 5 1 Ol..t..l• e pr OJe c eo organlZ.? 1on on i.a y . , / ."-t , 
As I see it, the Bir Three or ~i~ ~our 
\·1::.11 be the t:>ustees or steer in? co ··"1ittee 
of the \·!hole body in res"'ect Oj':' the use 
of for ce to preven t Har; but I thin}: nuch 
larger bodies , e1nd possibly ftmctional 
bodies, 1;,rould de? l Hith the econo..,ic si('e . 
You should "1.31\:e i~ clear th?t 'He ht=~ ve no 
ide"' o:' three or four Great ~ O"~:Ters ruling 
the "~:!Orld . On the cont'"'ar:·, their victory 
"tdll entitle them to serre the \:orld in 
the su~rP~e res~e ct of ~reventing t he outbre~~ 
of rwre uars . T·Je should ceJ"t?-:.nly not be 
preparer OUT selves to suh,...,i t to an ec ono-::1ic, 
fin<'lncial, e-nd monP tary system l aid dm·m, by, 
") • .l...h u . t d ... ..... ..... . ..... h h say, -lUSSlC!, or L.•le n1 e o L.B ~..es i";l L. er 
fa~ot -vote China . 
':'he Supre;'l.e T.br,.d Co1mcil o· E:"ecu ti ve is 
not to :-ule the nt=~ tions . It is onl;.r to 
prevent thc"l. tearing each other in pieces . 
I feel I could argue this very stron:·ly fron 
the no in t of vie\·f of deror-a tion o: n.., tiona l 
sover cdr,nties . 1 
Trus t.be Bri tish v ie\·T VTClS a very pr<'lctical one as the 
ne:rt ste'J in for rmlatinr.- the form of the p:-oje cted 
org'"'niz? tion \vas t=~ · pr oached . 
I n 1-i.ay , 1944, Hull su;:gested to the British and 
Soviet a~bassadors that t heir fOVernmen ts pre~are 
1 . Churchill, v, op. cit . , p . 713 
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n 
definitive dra:ts for discussion pll:',...,oses . l !l '1.·T:..'c:nr·le 
ove!' ·~h<t nations ouc,ht to meet to drp·..; U""' a C' r a::' t 
Charter '·l?S settled ,,,hen it '·Tas ac:-ced that the Chinese 
delcg~tion uould be se ., ted onl.y after the \'lith "ra·rc:;l 
o: the Sov iet re~rescnt~Lives . c~rside~inr ~tat 
the Soviet union Has not at uar i·rith Jrp<m this >'as 
politic?ll;t <m "Stute move . Af ter a--;peals from 
the U1:i ted 8ta tes, t'"'e Sovie t Union also a r r eed not 
to ins:!.st t hat the p::eli:".inary confe"ence not di~ cuss 
relations betHecn the econo· ic orr-e-ns and t.be r.l?in 
ones of '~be or r,anizP tion nor the processes of settling 
disputes . 
Cn Augus t 21 , 1944, at suburhc-n Du...,'J'=~ .... ton Oa!:s in 
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1 1a s:1; ,,r· ~on 
•4 ... -·· v ' D. C., the conference convened ·.·ith Stettinius , 
Cado>cm and Gro"1y1:o r enrsenting +;he U~i ted States , 
Grea~ Brit.:dn nnd t he 3oviet Un::.::-n , respcc'· i vely . In 
r:wny res,ects the dra"~ ts of the thl'ee pm.,rers po:..'allelcd 
el'l cl"' other . 2 
':rhe British and Soviets ~muld hove nj_nimized the 
role of t he Genera l Asset1bly but f'inrll;· accepted the 
Ane:'ic~n vieHroint . Ho~·rever, t he Ur-ited Sta tes 
----------------------------------------------------------1 . I"ull , or . ci t . , p . 1671 
2 . I bi d . , p . 1676 
was compell ed to conced e in its attitude tha t t he 
executive council could not impose ter~s of settle~ent 
unless srecif·:_c,lly requested to do so . 
A dis:::ut e as to \·!hether the votes of nations 
to a diS'"'Ute before t~1e council s hou1d be c oun ted 
in ceter :-::.ining t~~ e cot:ncil ' s action \:as pe.:'ti?.::.ly 
set':;led . Inso:~a:~ as pacific settle· ent s of a ciis.,ute 
\·Jere ccncerned it \ ·Jt> s ? ,.... reed t he> t tlrt the votes of 
the di sputing ----a r '·ies not be counted . 1 Fo1·:eve :- , 
enforce~lent i'los quite another n?. tter . CJ.osel~~ c ou:--led 
1-lith t.'1is 1·1<1s the <;_ues tion of t he veto pmre::' of the 
::1a ;· or pm;ers c=md the s i ze of t l, e >1<' ~or i ty needed for 
c ouncil e ecis i ons . Even t uC! lly, the entire m.a t t er \·!8 s 
referr ed to the three he c> ~ s of ' overr..men t for their 
::'eview 8nd de c ision . 
I:uch to tbe shoc 1: of the ,.,\n glo- APe::' ·c8n del er;?tes , 
the '.:oviet Union SL'K~denly reque s ted si:rteen Asser.:bl y 
se?ts , c on.tendinr: tl1P.t the t hen si:·teen Soviet 
re··ub:ics ~·ere b~sic<'~.J. r indepPnden t. The United 
States :~ 18 tl:r refused, su~F"e s t in(";' ~~hC: t ;1e r.hC!ps, tl: en , 
":!8 s '· in r· ton HOUl d ,..1 ('f18 nd f 0!' t y- ei r h t S e1"' t S . 2 Gr o•1y':o 
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---------------------------------------------------------
1 . 
2 . 
Hull , o~ . cit . i ~ · 1677 
Constitution2J. y the U. S . 3 . 3 . :1e>cl C! better case than 
tl"'e 'Lni ted StF~tes . 
dro:::-ped the is sue ':Jut indico ted t ·~at ".:;he Soviet 
Gov er11.t:1ent still hrd it in mind . l 
B:- a :-ran~r'TIC'nt the Soviet dele~·ation i·!ithdreu on 
Se~tamber 28, rnd the c~:nesc took the~r se~ts . 
Furthe2.· iscussioi' co'1tinued tmtil October 7, l<;it4- . 
At tJ-e c '"'nc: "S ion of' the Cc:1:fe2.'e., ce the Pm·Ters issued 
Crap t e::- I . Pur~ oses : :.r intcr1arce of 
intPrn<ti0!!"l pe"' CC' anc' sec•J:·i~;.r , ef::'cct i ve 
c ol:ective ~ction ~or t!c -reven~:~n of 
a nil .re "'OV2l o-" t.h:' €''1 ts to tte 'le"' ce C1:1d 
t~e suppression o~ acts of 2gG~cssion and 
o~her bre~ches of tbc ~e.,ce . 
ChP?ter II . P~inci·1es : the cove~ei rn 
e 4'10:.it~· o::' all e"' c e- lovir...r st tcs . 
~ettl"'nent of dis p utes by J:,crce"'•,l 
ner~~ end refra .:.. .. .::.:-:,.. ::':'om ti:e USC' of' 
fo: ce by ·~cr:iJor states . 
Ch?.. +-e::' III. 
:)eP ce - : ovinr.; 
gen; ers'·i ' : 
states . 
O:_:en to all 
ChB·1t er IV . P:.:·inci·;~ l o·~g?.ns : Gener~l 
~sse~b~y, Securi~y CotPcil, =~tern"tional 
Cou~t or Justice, SecretPri~ t , and 
ne"ded subsic1 iPry a ·e ·~c ies . 
Chap t er V. The General !.sse~b:y : Discussion 
and consiccration of nattors to nrintain 
l-:le<'lce <'lnc1 sccuri t:- , a:::-nanents, 'nd to na'.o::e 
r e c o c., ations . ~he Asse~bly is to elect 
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---------------------------------------------------------1 . pull, o·~ . c i t . , ? · 1679 
the non- pernanen t nc>'Jbc :·s o:' t he Security 
Council, t !1e Econonic <nc 'Joci::> 1_ Co·~ncil, 
jus·'·ices of t~.e C"U:'t, enc~, in co1:1 cert i-:ith 
t~e Sccuri'y Counc~l, the Secret~ry­
Gener? l . The Asseubly to hole annual 
sessions . Ec>c > st2te to hc-ve one vote and 
on all i··1""~or'~<mt ":?+-te:.·s a tuo- thirds 
vote necess~ry to ~ass ? resol~tion . 
Ch::-·~t er VI. ':''le Security Co:.mc:..l: J'ive 
per~· nent ne"'lbers: t he United Stfl tes, the 
Soviet Union, tt'e United Y.inrdo" , Chin? al1d 
F?~nce, end siy electe~ ne~bers . Voting 
(Section C) left blank and fillec in later . 
Council to ')e ena '1led : o '"'lee t and function 
c ont inul!usly . 
Cha~ ter VII . Internationel c~urt of Jus~ice 
to ~e est hli ~ed very ~i~il?r to the 
e::·i s t:i.ng :-e.,.·!'JFlnent Court it ,.,auld re··loce . 
All men bers of t.be or ,...~r LZ? tion i DSO fCl c to 
~a rties to t.be sta t ute of the Court . 
Cha~ter VIII. Ar?"anre:~ents :'or t he 1-:r intcnance 
of International ~e~ce and Secu~ity 
incluclin'· the lrevention c;nd SU:_-''l ressio:n 
of Lrgression : 
Sec tion ~ : ! aci~ic settle~en t of "is~utes . 
If ~)m;ers une1ble to se ttle their ')vll1 
thre8terinz ,.;-is· utes tJ-·e~r ou~ht to be ;oeferred 
to the Securit~r Council v'.ich then could 
re c o:-ner.d approprie te p;oocecl ures or .:o1et.h od s 
of adjustment . 
Section :3 : De t erm:.:.na ti on of '!?hre8 t s to tbe 
Pee1ce or Acts of ',:gression ..,nd Ac t ·.ith 
Je·:pect ':'heret,.., : Sec lJ-r>it;r Con.ncil_ shou"!.d be 
e·..,:-o· ereC' to deter mine , .h?t rli~:l~y·,::-tic, 
econo· ic, or other easure not invo"!.ving 
<'lr"'led .:o:-:-- ce should be e"''1J.oyec~ to ef'fc c t 8 
decision . 
far<'lc-raph 4: :: ilitC~ry act:..o~ ~.e>y be t2'cen by 
de c is ion of tre Se c u:" i ty Co•ll1cil. 
Parp,rra •hs 5 and 6 provide f~r an 
inte~national ar 1ed fo~ce held i n 
reEl(Hness by :nev.ber st...,tes . 
Pa:"..,~r~""!1 7 i·/ould l.,ave all me bers or 
t' ose s-~ci~ically requestcG carry out 
decisi~ns o~ the Security Council . 
fpr~ ra~h 9 ~rovided r-~ r : :~itary 
StPff Co~ ittee . 
Sectior C: erional 8rr..,l -e1nnts 2 on~ 
na+:iOYlS n:-·~itted, ~roViCE''- t'.e•- a:'e 
c :'nsiste!1 t 11itr tlle ~)ur·')osec:: rnd 
:-:.r inc i ple s of the o:L' ran:~ a,_ ion . 
Cl1o-;te:, I~: : f_rra n ne11ts :or tl1e 
Eco~onic ~nd Social Co ne il, under L~e 
aut~ority o: t~e General Asre~b1y . This 
Council to -la,:e re c mnf'nc...,tions ~dth 
res~ect to ecnnoric, social, and 
~unanitarian nntters. coordin~te 
activities ir t~ese spheres ~nc assist 
the :Jecur .~ :y Council ':;hen neecled . 
Chcr,.'ter :~: Irovides .'"'cr the Secr0ta~i2t , 
head d by ~ Secretary- General . 
Cbr>pter .~I : !·~ethod ":!: ? :en ent o.::' +-he 
Cl:'? .... ter tc 1-;c by t\lO- t . ir: s vote of 
mer~be :-s and -ati•"'iec by tl1er.1, inc~_uC:inr 
the ::-'CZ"'mrnen~ ,1e' be::.~s of the 0r.o c· :-it:r 
Counc il. 
Cha·-ter :XII : Trensition<l: Tbe "our :Jc<or 
::-'0\•Te.:-s to c::msult· each othc:., and ot.!ler 
st-tes as occns~on de~?nds to ~-intain 
pea ce a:1d sect..~rit" ;-·:-ior t.y the co· ~::."!f 
:n~- ~or c e of the C~arter . ~ 
The p:"a os; l.s e~e t~-us CJ.llite ''Pfinitive but p::ovice 
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ronrJ. for c~ iscussion 2nc c>lterna' ive u:::::-a:!.n;:_-s, cs a note 
Ell-lpcndccl. to them at the tir.1e indic<"lted . 
----------------------------------------------------------
1. Goodrich 0.nd !iawbro, o~ . cit . , pp . 572- 592 
The Dunbarton Cc?''"S Conference had failed to 
resolve the :.et-ter of the votinr- p:"'OCC'1u·e of tl1e 
Secu""ity Cr·ncil . 'i'his involved not only the question 
of t h, inami tl o:' tbe fi ve ~a :i o:r pm,rers -- the veto --
but, 10~e inpo~tantly , ;.ihat were ~a tte:-s of subsbmce 
princi}.Jle of inani·:ity in the set'cle:nent of paci::'.:.c 
disputes to \'th icr e permanent r1enbe r uirht be P. pr rty . 
The Soviet delc~ation at Du~bArton l·ks had 
c:'eated, by ~~ei:- st8nd, an i~passe . The B-itish 
G~vernQent sought a dvice elsewhe:'e a~d the 
co 11 unicr tion from South Af~ica 1 s Pr ir.1e !:inis ter 
Smu.ts to c·~ 1 1I'Cl..,ill is notevTOrthy 
( t~"'is) ••• L"vo1ved t !"'e .hono::- and stanr·i. ~ 
o:' :~'lS s ~a .., 10~ • her :~llies . ':he quest ions 
~hether she :~ t~usted ~n? treqted as a~ 
e ua1 o .... uhether s he is still the _t:la.riah 
Pnd ou t cast ••• t~e s,..,ll ~owers s~o~:: ~e 
"')r-:-r-arC'd t ~ .a'·e <1 C'"'nce""s:i.on to tU'"si~ 1 s 
a'loP~ "'1:---o .... re ••• On t ~.e .1e. its of t'e 
~r:nci~)le of un·mi'Tlity B""on:- t~e Gre<'t 
Po-:'e:·s h<'s ~uc.l- to recor"":enc-1 it. at least 
f'"'r .._he ye0r:: i 1t.11edii1 tel:' :'o1lo ·'ing on the 
\.'Br ••• l-lt \·:o1•st ••• its ef:'ect 1lill be 
ne~c~ivo : it will re tar~ ~ctio~ . But it 
uill ~,,..,render it im~ossib.e fo::- .• ussia 
to c· b": \:: on cours es not 8' :'l.,..oved of by 
t~e United 3 tates o! Americc? and the 
U:::~ ter~ !~incd om ••• 1 
------------------------------------------------------
1 C ~-.. 1-- • 1 1 . t " -- . " . 1 - 1 I I • . ·.~c. 1_ , 1ns on .J . , .n1s O' y .Ql. .,o· a .. a:r: _ , 
vol. v i , "Triu:npr "'rd Tragedy," C.ouf'· ton- l.i~lin 
Co . , Boston, 195~), pp . 210- 211 
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On Sep ter1ber 28, 191..!.4, Roosevelt cc: b'.ed to 
••• it srould be ~os sible to 0ccoo~lish 
t.!_-1is b:' Cl." jus tin': ou: dif.:'erences thr0ugh 
c:::: :pro 'is e by all the pRrt::.es C')ncerned, 
an" t~is ought to tide t~in~s over 
for ?. fe•1 .ve;:-rs until the c>ilC. le"rns 
ho~·J t ~ t :Y~r, le . 1 
Stalin infor~ed Churc~ill ~wo day~ ~at~r that 
I sh 1re your conv~ction that firQ 
p~ree~cnt between the three lead:.ng 
PoHers C"ns ti tutes a t··ue ~u[l:'Cl.Dtee of 
f'uture ""l<'<"'Ce a::td <'l'1S\'ers to the bPst ~opes o~ ~ll pePce-loving ;eo-:es ••• ~ 
not sh[l:-ed by Churchill,.~ o cc>hled ?.ooseveJ.t t 1 8t 
••• we 8re ~ret ty clear th~~ t~e only ~o~e 
is tl"'C't tl"'e Gre<'lt :m;ers ""rc t'l~reed . It i s 
wiL~ re~ret t~8L I have co~e to t~is 
conclusi~n , contrar7 to~ :irst~u~h~ ••• 3 
Frier to the Yalta Conference, President Roosevel t 
he on t he j...,sis rf seven af.:ir mative votes ror 
carrying procedural ~8tters but th<'lt :or all otter 
r.w tters t.!"ere ·nus t be i.Ji tl:in t:.ose SPVen votes the 
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------------------------------------------------------------1 . Cburc .... iJ.l , VI, '"lp . cit . , n . 216 
2 . Ibid . , ~ 217 
3. Ibid . , p . 219 . Emphasis added . 
Thi s Dece1":lber rro~osC!l \•/AS for··lt>lly -~11Pcer1 befo::e 
the Y~lt::> conferr'ef on 7ebrurry 6, 1945. 1 
The Joviet Union agreed on the follo·.:inr dC!y 
to the forr1. ula hut tl1en asked fo:- t~1.I'ee ex'cra seC'lts 
in the Asser:1bly : for t~e Lkraine, ~2yelo- h1ssia and 
Lith~nnia . It ?1'"~'De<:-ed that t.I-J;s ·pe~ <'l q_uid pro quo 
for <'lcce·ltencc . Churchill \o:as c~uite ilr.:en::>ble, 
:?o:- us t8 ~--ve fou:- or five ~aer,:bers, 
siy if In ia is included, -·hen :::tuss ia 
has onl:r one is C!S ri!lg e P're<'t c'e<'ll 
of an ;~sse ·bly of this , inc, in vi e1:1 
of other i'"l'"'Or~~mt c o.ncess.:.ons by the 
~ussi~ns ~~IU.ch fl:'e ~"CI-Jeived or ednin,... . 
I should like to ""'''<:e e f:- ienc:..y 2 restu:-e to .l.lussiC'l in t .:.s '10tte:- ••• 
Ti· e follo•.:ing dey '.:.!:e Sovie"'; Union uas cranted 
eyt~a sn~ts for the IT~C'line anc Byelo- 3ussiP . 
Ci~urcl"'ill ' s concess ::.on 1v?s indeed a ."'ine ..,.E" s ture 
but could he reC'l:.ly hflve believec that the 
rel;; tionsriy.> be t\·reen the various Soviet repub 1.ics 
and t he cent'al ;:-overnment ivC!s equal to tht=~t 
eyisting beb1een tbe dooinions and L~ndon? Certainly 
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tiMe, 1'hicb vr~s not true o:Z' the U:.:r;-,ine c?nd "3yelo- :1ussiC" . 
l . c~~u::-:chill, 'TI, o"' . cit . , p . 354-
2 . I bid . , p . 360 
To e. U? te the votes :'or i::'ht=>se '3ovie t l'epublics ;.fith 
th::Jse o· ... the doninions or t o impl~- t.h.9t the r,or:J.inion 
votes ···ere ·;ermanen t e:::·tr~ votes for t t,e U!•i tod I:ingdo:rn 
d isrlayer en <'~ bysn.-1 l~c'- o:' ·-no· ·lee' -e in the 
CJnstitution:~l n;:>' e - ur o"" the Cor~ wn·;ec::l'·h if that 
is Hrat Churcr ill 2ctua l_ly assur er' . 
1
.lhen the United Stc:;tes ~~over:rnent circnl~te <' its 
inv.:.tPtions ::'or st.1tes to <l tt end t'e San '7rr:lncisco 
Conference it also included a c 1~.7 oi' the l)urlb~r ton 
0 1 1 . th Ch t VI ,, .... . c ·"' . l ., I • ?._~s p:..'opos~ s \>il Cl:1 er , uec vlOD , -'- ..... ec ln 
c.nd ref' c ing 
1 . ..;,8ch "1e~·be!' o: t'·: e 3ecu:-i ty Council 
st~ul~ h~ve one vote . 
2 . l)r-c~sions of tbe 8ecQ~ity Council on 
'l")rocedurcl '"'lt' ttrrs shoulc1 be '"').ace by an 
affi,··a t~_ve vote o-~" seven 'TIE' ·•~n'l"s . 
3. J<?cisiors of t~.-,e Secu.rit:r c ~·-.,.., c~.2. on 
all o+-rer '!?.tters ~houlo be :ar'le by an 
flffir ,..., a tive vote o~:' seven menbers inc 1.U'1 ing 
the c0ncur :·in"' votes of the perr:1r>nent 
r:P"'bers; provided tt· t in c1ec"2.slons unr'er 
Chf> ter VIII, 0ction A, an·' UDder tr:e 
seco~c se11tence of p~r· ~rn~~ 1 of Chn~ ter 
VIII, Section C. a ~Prty to a ~is ute 
should a~st in fron votinr . l 
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It l:JFJ S Lmfo·~t·'nc>te t.b~t the protOS-"'ls '1nd to reBd 11 should 11 
for t he ques .... ion of "bs tention would arise P~ain Bt the 
fin-1 conference . However, a gre~t d~al ~ad been 
----------------------------------------------------------1 . Goodrich ~nd :~"hro, op . cit., ? · 576 
A "p~..,ccdural r.:e1t ter 11 is le:'t unce:·red . 
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accor.;plished ano the '.Jcster n poue:::-s ,.:e:::-e bnsit.,nt 
Bb")Ut rus~ . .in · tl~e .3oviet l.'li0'1 too fer . Uneasiness 
vl~s settinr i'1 C'~'lcernin~ Sovie t intent:.:..;)ns . In a 
~rotr~ctcd dispute ;)Ver the Jolis h governnent the 
~.c:stcrn pm:e.!'s vle:~c advised by Chr..!.~chiil not to be 
overly rostile out of fear that the Go~JiPt s •Jould 
b~ycott the Jan Francisco Confe.!'ence . I~ 8 1inute 
to .bis :Jo _inions Gecret?ry on Ar.!':.l :, 1945, Ct.-.· ~chill 
u:::- ot e 
No doub t we s~oulo nB~e suitPble 
od • f • ~ t • • .(' h ( th -T ~ C' -, ) n 1. l.c , J.ons ~-'- s e e u . .... . u . L . 
definitely re~ains ~lo~r ••• l 
The ob.'ective of estC~h1.ishing c: ;:o.rld o .... r,r· i?'"-'-::-ion 
n~~ters cou2-d not be pe:- .itted to bloc·~ it . 
Dll:' ·in~ tl~e ·"' •,..,..t ' l"'n'- of A ...... ~;l 1ch5 an 
. .... .:. t'.) 6 • .... ..l- ......, " ~ \,": .. l..-' ..- • ' -- ,/ I ' 
took p:.C~ce i::-' :.ondon to 'i!='cuss both the Du·:bc-rton 02 1 ~s 
Dispite '·l'e 'Buc::..ty of r let'sed '"'<'terial it i s very 
evident th"t this famil;· meeting ..... cc?s-i..oner' a fevl dis "" ut es 
and th;~t the Co ~:m·,.;e~l th nat ions rid not see eye to 
----------------------------------------------------------l . c~urc~ill, vr, o~ . cit . ' p . 747 
eye ,_.'i th the United ::ingdor.l , CrL'rch ill no b1i ~-hs tnnC:.inf" . 
Pri'Tie I:;_nister 'Svatt of ·.us '~r<-lli"' arrived i n the 
British c"'~ital demanding reco~nition of his n?tion 
as a middle ( '~r at le'='st second - rnn1r) pm-1er . He 
hoped, in c onju."'1c ~ion ~vi th others, that c lnrgo !Jloc 
of less p~rerful but not totally insi-nific~nt 
po~mrs . Ee nlso s ~res ted tr"'t t-he Econ"'1ic P.nd 
Soc -~:-1 Council hc:ve r.1ore pm1er . 1 This s t· nd 1-.:-o uld 
be upheld c----nsistently i n the future an" in ic~·ted 
.\ustr~liCJ ' s stronr, interes t in bavin,.. the or !=::'nization 
ern~ha~ize not "nly political and military ?OWer 
but elso the V8!'Y essentials of daily livinr and 
a concern for the Helfare of I:an . 
Cc- ned D ne t picl~ed up tbe y1i 'c~le- pover s tru~rle 
end supro--tod e ove in Lo,.,.d on 't·Therel~y the middle 
on the Secm·it:r Covncil . She als;:; il<'inteined, "'nd 
\'lOUld continue to do so, that so'1e r.1e;1ns "JUst be 
devised so thet the smnller nations mi-ht have a voice 
in ~ecisions involving the use of :orce or tbe 
im· osttion o: sanctions by the Secu!'ity C'"'uncil . '2 
-------------------------------------------------------1 . "lJe' l Yor'r ·ri·"'les, " li. ril 3, 1945, p . J 
2 . Ibid . , Arril 4, 19h5, p . 14 
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I:ev! ZealancPs :~rirle !:inister :-'rC!ser then sun~c sted 
that in ~e tters inv~lving s·nctiors or war the 
Assembly h2ve the de t e r mining vote.l T' is 
pro tection to the lesser powers i n t~e orF?n~z~ tion . 
c~naC' a uas ce1reful to point out thflt re ~11s~ l of 
t hese der:'!c~nc s would not be grounds :~o~ not cnter~.ng 
the J::roj'"'cted or 'Cl"" Lz~tion . 
Snuts mr·ntained that it uould be~ 11 sta "l>:: 
1is .... ster " i i' tre 8:">n Frrnc isco ConfP'"'ence failed 
and u:.· ~ed UDon his C::' nom-1eE1 l th collearne s 
t' Cce-- t-n ce of the vieH t ra t t he DW'lbarton Cc:'~s 
proposPls co·~res ponded to in ternRtion~l "'OJ.itic"~l 
1 . .... 2 rea ~'-'Y · 
:<'ina 11_y, thC' Co...,.I'lon eal th p··i"1e :''inisters a;;r eed 
that :.Jashin·ton , or C~t least the Uni t ed St,.,tes, ourht 
to be t he se0t of the ne·.-; org;miz;->tion . 3 Gn t n is 
plec>s::nt note, t hey '1C} ,iom•ned . 
The ,rice min:sters "'rpcar to br ve been fnr ~ore 
co ce·ned with settinr up the o~rr~ iz~tion than vith 
-------------------------------------------------------1 " ··e'·' ~.ro.,..·- ; es " i:"'..,.."'l 1 101"~J ~ 14 
• ~ - • ~ ....... ..L ' 1. iJ ... - ' .... ' • 
2 I , . ~ . . . , , 19t· 5 - 12 
• O~G • ' - · P- l ...t. ' .. ' - • -
3 . Ibid . , April , 1945, ~ · 23 . ~his co,tra s ts with a 
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:RooseveJ.t plan to h<?vc t~-,e Jecret""'"'i :; in Genev<> , the 
Cov'11c::.l al ternately in F..a' ""ii and ~he ; z:-res, and 
the -~sse bJ.~· rn[\~linf aro unc . See Hull, op . cj_ t . , 
p . 1681 
the role o£' tre Co"'!J onvreol th in it . Indeoc, t~-o ey trere 
often more concerned Hith the str ugc-le bebreen the 
18 or ~nd the ~-.1inor po\·Ters th0n in the ""'rese· ve tion 
of Cl S('lid Co·~.,..on\Jealth front at the f;:,rthcolling 
Confe :, ence . 1isnite Churc~ ill . t~ei~ votes were •. / 
not to be tr~en for ~ranted . 
The Unj_ted I;.'> tions Conference on Inte:-netionF! l 
O~gc.niz~tion ~:ened on April 25, 1945. As a tribute 
to the lC!te President Fren'·lin D. Roosove].t the 
Col"ference a c1op ted t"e nCll"'le " The L:--ited ~>tions " 
as the desipn?:;ion of the o.,..gcm5.zC'ltion . 
Fro, the very outset it w~s obvious th2t t~e 
vc:>:..'ious menbers of the Co-~ on··e.,::. '·h d i e" not 0 rr:e 
on~ nunber o~ n· t te~s . A time li it of the 
sersions fc>vo~e c:: by 8:"1uts · ·as orposed b:r tl'le 
Austr:-l_irn Forde as the l0tter felt this '·ould inju.re 
t he • n J...h c .::> 1 or · o: (, . e on.~. erence . 
Austra~ia dcte~rinod t o ~ress for a clause in the 
1 . United J>tions. J"c":ents of t>E' ~~-~ited :JBtions 
Conference Qll Irternationa_l _O~niz~tion , vol. v, 
(Dnited E~tions Info··,Btion Orc;.,niz?tion, =~e\v 
Y0:' 1\:, 1945), p . 89, "9oc. 30 DC/J (1) 4/27/l~5 
Hence·~o th t is eleven volu,...,e series refe:'re to as: 
m;cro 
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C.bElrter to .c-uc-:"'entee full employr:ent to eve··yone . 
as indeed they ~i·ht consi{erinr the i~possibility 
of' enforcin~ suc.b Cl situation . l Cn t'-e issue of 
A··gen tina ' s par tici T tion He\! ;:eol· nd strongly 
o~-osed her seating, nn e~~itude sbared by several 
other states \i.bich i·:ere utterly unin·~ressed by the 
Argentine record dur in .... the C""~urse of the U?""' . '2 
Tte ~u-bartnn 0~ :s pr8posals, servin~ as the 
basis for the con~erence discussions, o~itteo a 
·"'lre<F b1e . Pri 1e Linister SLluts c1 rev! u: a 'raft3 
Hrich served as tbe l;a s.is for a dis cuss ion ·.;hich 
led to the p~esent teyt . As ·"'in;::;ll" "d~-tn r' tl·e 
-- ~ ......... ' (. .. !-' ....... ' • 
prea~ble to the c~-rter is r m"~es'ic st terrnt or 
the aims of the pe:)ples of the Uniter1 l;C'lt..:.::ms, to be 
ac,:-,ieved tlr ou--h tlleir go7ernoents . l:-
In the draftin~ of the provisions rel~~ing ~o 
:·he GC"ne.:-al i~ sse:!bly. 'us t:r"~ 1 ia served no!-;ice t!1Bt 
she Houlrl see1;: ch0I' es fror1 t1e ~)u:rbarton 0;:'! 1 "S plans 
in order to st,;.'f'nr-then the Asse··b1y. 5 Sbe proposed 
----------------------------------------------------1 . 
2 . 
3-4 . 
5. 
1
'T·Te1· ~.-~.,.·\.. ;,J. ,...,€S II ·~,,.· 1 29 1QL5 "" 29 
- . _....,_ .. . ' - ·- ' . ' !-' . 
Ibl. a' 1.-l'~v 1 10L_r:" n 1 
• ' - .&.{" ..,. ' , t ./ ' ! • 
DTCIO, III, p . 475, Doc . 2 (::::r-) Cr/14/c', 513145 
T~C" C~~~ter is r ~ulti-1-ter~: t~eaty 
cere, I, p . 172, Doc 2C (:;:;;nf) F/6. ·./28/45 
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thett it be e··•:->c-..:ered to consider 811 r::~tters of 
impotE nee thcurh !10: to :ua· ·e repr esen tat ions or 
suggestions on sue: matters \·:bile tl:s ... /.CL'"'Jty 
·.rhen the Sectt:"i'.:y c--. neil indicated it 'J~s "::.r.·.shcd 
0~ it . 1 In larre ~C?SU~e the ~ustr · lian p~D osrls 
10, 11, 12, and 13, of the Charter . The ustrnli8ns 
forum in ~.·'· i ch the CO'"' science o:"' the 
--,e o"les of t~.c wo J.C. should h< vo its 
most ~.o tent e~rrcssion . 2 
t;he :.sse "o"' 'T 1 S 7''"'lt:: 
-... - v ~' 
The ~is~utes ~t :an Francisco over the 
Security Cou~cil centt>red ove:."' t~··e r.1estion of tl:e 
those s :al1e~· ,oHel.'S wro ··..:.shed to de-e~ph<'sise the 
veto as f<=Jr as ·1as possible . The ~·-ustr~., i~n de;_n,..?te 
remnrl:ec-., that 
---------------------------------------------------------
1 . L-:!CIC, III, pp . 5+LI·- 5lt5, Doc 2 G/Ft (1), 5/7!45 
2 . U.: CI<..., I, p . 174, D:Jc ?0 ( nr) F.'6, 41?[ 145 
3. "Hew Yor·r Tiwes," li<=l? 12, 1945, :n . 9 
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The view of the Austr?li~n del~·?tio~ ••• 
hc:Js been that the sco:~<" o·"' tl1c v~to :""rPer 
s ::ould be as res~-lcter' ?<::: nossiblf' so t!1at 
no one c rea t - 0\·Ier C"Uld b~,r it·s :~ndiv.::.,;u<'l 
t . bl .. . ~ .., . ". l ac 1on ~ oc" councl_ ec s1ons . -
In l"is s tronc s ta.rd he hC'!d the su~por t o: I rir:Je !:ini.s ter 
"-"rC'Iser of Ne~: Ze3~_3nd lvho, a t t~-,e fourth plenc?ry 
roo £'or ir:1~:·o ve ent ovc:r: the Dur1b::1rton ''a \:3 pro~osals 
but e.lso t.hat "the veto ••• i s unfEd:: znd inde::'ens c;._, le . 11 2 
the ve~o ou ·h t to be? tenpora-y ~Pvise li 1i ted to ten 
years of ope:::-~tion . 3 However, General J:-:1uts too·~ 
the o'her poin t o~ view in maint8ing th~t the nations 
must reco nize thnt a 
disp:'rity i:~ ·"·mction (".Jct·.!een Great 2nd 
sr"'lJ. '"~OHers) :'ollo"s Bl""l.:::-st as a lo icr:ll 
rest<~.t fror t~-,r> neu :Ju:-den o·" ·-e.,.ce 
in··osed 01., t hem (the Grec>t ·•o· re .,... s) . lL 
Ir. order to i-;eiph t the votes of the 1.ess er powers, 
Ce.nc:1da ::;ro""' osecl t:1? t in non- nrocer' :.Jl'.:>l m.n tter s r}ecis:L ons 
of the Security Co1mc il be ta\::en by a V'"'te inc1 ~'r'ing 
all the perm·~ent me~bers i n the affift a··ve ·oined by 
two- tbir~s o~ the non- permanent rnenbers . 5 Au~tr~lia, 
IT CIL , I, 
6/"0 '45 
"') . 123, Fl'ur""l" S~'>ssion, Co··.-..issi')P III, 
66 
1 . 
2 . 
3· 
4- . 
Ibid ., p . 50~, Doc. 5R ( Jrg) ~/15, 5/2/4-5 
IJ.:lid . , p . 123, ::::'ourth 3P~fioP, Co:-->-~ iss ·on 
rJic' • , 1' . 1+23, Joe . 55 ( .. : f, ) 1/13, 2/4-5 
ffiXIC, I II , Doc 2 G 1~ ( t) 5/~/4-5 
III, 6/20/4-5 
5. 
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reco~nisin~ that the veto -viould have to re:1iain sur~ested 
th8 t 2 lone- • ·i th the permanent five votes t'· e Cn~1..i.1c:.l 
Cllso have to have a three- fifths vote b~r tl1e non-
perm~nent me~bers on matte~s affec~in~ the use of 
sonctions en l mili.tc>ry r!easl.l.:'PS 01s "'dell as .:-e ri onal 
C:JrrPnr:..,ments for en:'o:;."C('!.'H:'nt Lmder the aer-is of the 
Secu. .... i · y Coun cil . l 
The s·~~ ~_l pmier f i~ht to preve::1t 8 p0rty in a 
dispPte f:•o..., voting -..:hen the matter \·Jas to be 
settlec: by -~acifi c "'e~ns JClS fin~ll;- uon , thourh so1e 
conflict re~ains . ArLic le 27 of the C~arter reads 
1 . ::::a c.:-- -ember of t 1>e Securi ty Council 
sh _l h?ve one vote . 
2 . Jec_~s::_o ts o: the Securi .L.y C 11nc"'_l on 
p:·,cedu~·-~1 '\C~Ltcrs sJ-,-11 be. w1e b~- c>n 
af:::'i J'm8'.: ive vote of seve:;'1 0 '·c~s . 
3. l:>cc is lor s o:::' the .:~r Cl'-·i y C 0'';:-"" il on 
A 11 o the .r !l1C1 t t e!' s sh ~ :.1 be ' ?. • o 'l:' an 
affir;~:-tive vote of seven ::enberc .:.T'clucing 
the concu:-ring VC'tes o:2 the - e2.· ':>nent 
QeMbers ; p~ovi~e~ that, in {ecisi~ns 
under C.b..crter VI, ancltmc,er ar·-·::-Pp.b '"~r"'e 
~f Article 52, a ~arty to a dis~ute shall 
C:Jb~tain :~om votinr . 2 
nc~?tive vote? There is no clear ~nswe:' here . 
1 . Ul7C:G, II, p . 605 : :::te~lort of the ia:"': O'"'teur o:::' 
CO'"'-:ission III/1 
2 . ~.he c~·?.:::-tc· o:-: t!1e -:nited Nations, Articl_e 27 
procedure of the C "~'1cil, the invitin "" o.~ non-
Council me; bers to the t~,·le on sneci::'i_c ·wtte.,.,s, and 
the e 1.ectiofi 0.:' the C "nc;.l ·resi(ent ~:"'c p.roccdu.:.~ al 
c::>:.1side l~<''-ions . 1 'rc clc?r up Hh0.._ c'"'nstituted 1'?11 
other rJatters" ::he srwlle:- nations su·~nitte · ~ 
que::.;tionn2ire to the Great Po\Je:-s and _.~r?n ce on the 
natter . The reply was not totally satisnac'-ory . It 
rave t he accc,te~ interp:'etatio~ to :rtic1es 2~ thr~ugh 
32, ?n,.. c:.eorly st.:->-:;cd that ,"l veto ·rould not be used 
to :reven t consi~er~tion and discussion o~ P dispute 
before ti'e Conncil . Houever 
~e:Ton' t' ic; ~oint , r"ocl J.or..s ~nf t'lctions 
"-Jy the 3ecu i ,. Co unci:_ r'.~ y Hell t~ve 
m~:or ~olitic~l conseq~F~ces a~1 ~ay ~von 
i.n·tiate v c:<>in of cvc:.';:s ·;l"~~.ch mi 17ht , 
in ';he e~ ·, req!lire t~"e ScL-rc::.l to invo,\"e 
'le~surcs o" en-"orce.:::en t ll.!lde:· Sec~ion B 
Ct~pter VIII (o: t~e Ju·br:-ton Oa~s 
p:-o:1os;::J.s ) . ~,_,ic:: ~"'r?in of evet1ts be' i.ns 
, :l1 ~n the Council c ecides to n"'~e ?.n 
invest.i.;-<Jti:::i1, o·- dete:--"'ines that the ti~Je 
hac: c0ne to c~ll upon stntes to settle 
thei::- tl.iff e-re c es, or :T ·-es !'CC01":nenda i ions 
to the F?.rties . It is to such decisions 
and <Jcti---ns t'·et unanblity o"~ thc pe::>r;: nent 
--------------------------------------------------------1 . Good:-ic> '"'nc H0"'lb!'o, o~ . cit . , ::' · 221 
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me··1bers e~u:rlies, uit-h :-he ioportC'nt 
p~ ovi so , !'eferr efl to t=l b~ve, f<Jr the 
nbste~tion fr~n votinG by parties 
to a c'is~·uLe . ~ 
'l'he ste'c;:nerr ... c nti:.ues that shoulr 2n inves i2"Btion 
a~cr·vete 2 ~ispute then t~e vet~ c~uld be invc~ed . 
In other ;.rorc' s, the Gren t Poue:' s vJe:·e to j ud r-e for 
the'"1Se,_ves, in e~rv2nce, hm-1 :'Dr a 11 cbt-lin of events 11 
I..Jould ~o e~nd t' us, possibly, bl ock Rction 1:eyond 
the hearing o::' the c~ispute and, inso f8cto, prevent 
all fu~ther action . In rather c~v~lier f~srion the 
stc. tc:ment goes on to e--"'"'l"in tl""~" t five non---,errrr:.ent 
merbers themselves c?n c,nstitute? veto a~d cPlls 
the entire p···oject ?n im:·rovenent u:..,on the ~roce·'ure 
o: the Le"'""Ue, 1.-( ic!1, undoubtedly, it F8s . Houever, 
the st? tr··1ent coulC: not have be ·used P.i~ine Cil:.ister 
EvPtt "lnd he refused, alonr 1-Jith ;.r. --·raser. to 
vote on the Ya 1 ta --. rmola . 2 CP11F'C' 8 crR::lf.ec1 :•er 
position or:~ Ju..11e 11, J.9L~5, anc: s.bifted to su:<po::t ~~he 
Great ?oHe::·s in he.:r attitude3 as lid 3outh :.f!'ic?. . L;. 
CPn8da ~ressefl f~!' the ~nc1usion in the Ch~-ter 
o: <' ''rovj_:'ion thc-d; if the SecDr· ty Council C8lled "'ol"' 
1 . Goodrich, Lelend enri ::o :1bro, SC:vflrd, Charter of the 
United. :-..,tions, lst e 'tion, ( .orlc ~eoce 
7ounc~tion, 3oston, 1946), pu . 126- 1'0 
2 . "He" Yn:.·1 - Ti·:1es 11 June 15, 19ff-5, ~ . 10 
3. I:Jid . , June 12, 194·5, p . 
4- . Ibid . , :flY '22, 19L~5, p . 12 
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the usc of troops or other r·.ili t?.:-;.,r i':-r ces i'ron R member 
decisions of the Council ~eG~rdin~ the usc of t~~t 
The issue of ~erionalisn was r~isef at the 
C~nference . Both A us t:r·ali.., Ctnr~ ~~e.: Ze[' · .:011d ··rCJn tell the 
Chc>rter to s-ecifice1ly arprove of :regional ?Ction . 
Cc:~nr c<1 And tbe l"~ited ::inr;co:J 0"):-'0sed <1ny S'"'cci£> 1 
iru:ntmi ties to such gr oupings . 2 In essence tbe 
Evc>tt -?rase~ fo~ces ~on out witb ? st~on~ h~ost fran 
the United Stetes . 3 
In the r1Cl tter of trusteeshiiJ~ it \•JPS ?-pp8rent thc::t 
, ,. . .... '"'' -u-· . .... d '"' t ... seve:~<'...._ na;J.ons '·Jere '":n J. ~.,e unet'sy • .1.ne 'l1J.Le, u D~.,es , 
1·:?n tec1 to hold on to the isl~nds sl!e r<'ld and ''CJS 
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trusts," i . e . , no interference i'ro~l the cn.ited E2tions . 
The Un.:ted ~ in~dOi'l ·:ws opposedy. and c> 1.so ' ·Jr-s CJ::.[':::~1e~ over 
Conberra i·.r< nted tLe ::-e .:OV ' 1 of 'ngJ.o- Jutcl1- Po:-tu-;t'ese 
----------------------------------------------------------1 . 
2 . 
3-4. 
" I·1e'' Yor'- 'I'~ ~,e~ " 1:"V ":'0 10l•-5 ,..., 1 
< ' > • ' ., ' .C' ~ ' ' 7 I ' .'j 0 Se~ C!lso ~rticle 44 of the Ch<'lrter 
Ibid . , i. a y '23, 19Lr 5, p . 1 
C>_, ·,ter VIII o:: the Ch!'lrter 
":~e- · Yo:;.·:· T::."·es, 11 :·8y j, 191+5, IJ . 10 
inr.uence fron t:..,e Sast Indi c-n islan~'s . A recently 
sirned [!ecu.ri ty "J?ct be t•.-'cen Aust :>:>P 1.i<" <rrd I~e-r.·,· 
Ze- lane loo::ed for.·m:!:'d to e Sout h - Sea s Co~~.::::iss2.on 
anc1 tl:e Briti~h t r.0ught t h e i.ustr<'1li2ns ·rished to 
tie in em :Ses t In•'ian tru ~ t ·.;i th t~'e Co: ,..,is sion . 1 
There ue:-e sever..., l d r afts at Son 7r '"'ncisco of 
the Trustee s ... ~ip c.rv~nrenent s . Ac tuRll~r, the Brit i~h 
end ~ustreli8n docun0nts were qui~e sinilar . The 
present ;;orC. in of Article 73 (b) of the ChC'!l~ter 
is 8 joint ?il.;;:>ino-·~ustra1ian ef:~o.rt 1 oo':inr 
for''t'lr d to the c1evelopment of sel.:'- :.ove:·· ... !11ent ?nd 
free ~olitic-1 institutions for pe~~le in tbe 
t~us t territo~ies . 2 
r.:hen the discussions viere ove:~ ?11 the not.:..ons 
present sine-: t~-e Cha:-ter . ":t!i th t.be EYC0'"~t~_ on of 
a·~ter t!.-'e c:1[':::-ter entered i.nto fo2.· ce . 
called fo:· L:::mdon 5.n 1946 . I'he ti e of · n1t2.r::· •.:as 
t h t . ' . ld b . over, ~.e es ' J..!lg i·JOU . erJ..n . 
l "I:ev Yo;~~ ~ '·'J..' r1eS II '"Jril 20 10b.5 ...... e ' • - _._ ~ •· ' --~ -- 7' / I ' 
2 . Gcor~:'ic'- and J::[>r.:bro, ls t ed . , o:; . cit . , 'J . 229 
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GHAPT~R III 
On April 2, 1947, Sir Alexander Cadogan, the 
United Kingdom Representative to the United Nations, 
wrote to the Acting Secretary-General that 
His Majesty's Government in the United 
Kingdom request the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations to place the 
question of Palestine on the agenda of 
the General Assembly at its next 
regular annual session ••• (His Majesty's 
Government) draw the attention of the 
Secretary-General to the desirability 
of an early settlement in Palestine ••• 
(andJ request the Secretary-General to 
summon, as soon as possible, a special 
session of the General Assemuly for the 
purpose of constituting and instructing 
a special committee to prepare for the 
consideration, at the next regular 
session of the Assembly, of the questiop 
referred to in the preceding paragraph.l 
With this the United Kingdom admitted that it was 
unaule to find a solution to the proolems raised 
by the responsibilities it bore in undertaking, 
on behalf of the League of Nations, the Mandate 
for Palestine. It felt that the time had again come 
to return the matter to the international community. 
By so doing, the United Kingdom initiated an action 
which established the first state sponsored by the 
United Nations and which also managed to split the 
------~--~----~------------------~-----------------~--1. Official Records of the United Nations (henceforth 
referred to as "U.N.W]; 1st Special Session, vol. I, 
Annex I, p. 183.--oDc. A/286 
the Commonwealth on a vital issue. 
The position of the United Kingdom in Palestine was 
not one to make any nations very envious. The area had 
for some time been the center of contention between 
the Arab and Jewish peoples, with a healthy 
contribution from international polities. commencing 
1n 1897, there had been a formal world-wide _ionist 
Movement dedicated to the restoration of the Jewish 
people to their former homeland in Palestine. The 
Movement had undertaken the deliberate introduction 
of Jewish settlers into the area, and had actively 
supported, through funds made available from 
world-wide sources, the development of farming and 
village communities, land reclamation,l and the 
construction of several large communities. Its work 
waa begun when Palestine was still part of the ottoman 
Empire and there were doubts as to any future political 
status for the Jewish population. 
During World war 1 Palestine became a center of 
diplvmatic intrigue, with the United Kingdom heavily 
involved. In 1915, the British High vommissioner 
in Cairo, Sir Henry McMahon, and Sharif rtussein ot 
~--------------------------------------~-----~---------1. Properly the work of the Jewish National Fund 
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Meoca, acting on behalf of the Mid-East Arabs (or 
those in agreement with himJ, exchangett a series or 
letters by which the British agreed to an independent 
Arab state comprising the Levant and Mesopotamic 
areas of the ottoman Empire but excluding 
the districts of Meraina and Alexandretta 
and portions ol' Syria lying to the west 
of the districts of Damascus, Roms, 
Hama, and Aleppo.l 
~act17 what was excluded is rather vague: the Arabs 
have maintained that Palestine, the area west of the 
Jordan and south of the delimited districts, was to 
be included in the Arab state; the ~ritish held that 
Palestine was excluded by direct implication. 
Considering that the vriti&h were reserving areas ot 
the coast, it seems logical they also intended to 
hoid on to the Palestinian stretch of beach. 
The following year, 1916, witnessed the 
negotiation of the ~ykes-Picot Agreement between the 
~ritish and French governments whicn, counter to the 
McManon-Hussein undertaking, divided up the Lands or 
the Fertile ~resoent between the two Western powers 
with Palestine being subjected to 
---~-~-------------------------------------------------
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1. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great 
Britian and Palestine, {R.I.I.A., London, 1946}, P• 5 
a special regime to be determined 
between Russia, France, and Great 
Britain.l 
The matter was further compunded on November 2, 
1917, when the Foreign Secretary, Arthur James 
Balfour, 1n a letter to Lord Rothschild, announced 
that 
His Majesty's Government view with favour 
the establishment in Palestine of a 
national home for the Jewish people, 
and will use their best endeavors to 
facilitate the achievement of this 
object, it being clearly understood 
that nothing shall be done which may 
prejudice the civil and religious 
rights of existing non-Jewish 
communities 1n Palestine, or the 
rights and political status enjoyed by 
Jews 1n any other country.2 
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It will be noted that this Declaration does not mention 
nationhood and clearly leaves undefined what is meant 
by a "national home." 
The British were now 1n the midst of three 
arrangements over a rather small parcel of land, 
strategically situated at the conflux of three 
continents, with the three arrangements more or less 
mutually exclusive. one way out was suggested when the 
Arab leader Feisal ibn Husein and the Zionist chief 
~~----------------------------------------~------------~-1. Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit., 
p. 7 
2. Ashkenazi T., and Locker, Ch., Treaties, 
Pronouncements, Agreements, Palestine, (Kedem 
PUb!lshing Co., Pittsburgh, 1947J, not paged 
Dr. Chaim Weizmann met in Paris and agreed that there 
should be a Jewish home 1n Palestine, it being 
understood by the ~ir, however, that Arab demands 
ror a state must be met.l As these demands for a 
large independent Arab state were not met, the 
Feisal-Weizmann Memorandum was voided. 
Palestine remained 1n British military 
occupation until the League of Nations formalized 
the situation be granting to the London Government a 
Class A Mandate over Palestine (including Trans-
Jordan). The preamole of the Mandate repeats the 
terminology of the Balfour announcement (generall~ 
known as the Balfour Declaration} and continues 
Art. II. The Manaatory shall be 
responsible for placing the country under 
such political, administrative, and 
economic conditions as will secure the 
establishment of the Jewish national 
home, as laid down in the preamble. 
• • • 
Art. Iv . The Adminsitration of Palestine, 
while ensuring that the rights and position 
of other sections of the population are 
not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish 
immigration under suitaule conditions ••• 2 
The task of the British Government was thererore quite 
76 
~-~---------~--~-------~---------------------------------1. Ro~al Institute or International Affairs, op. cit., 
p. 6 
2. U.N., Doc A/292 Which was League of Nations Doc. 
wo:-c.P.M. 466-C. 529, M. 314.1922 VI - C. 667. 
K. 396.1922. VI 
clear. That Government undertook to honor its 
obligations but very shortly ran into implacaule 
Arab opposition to further Jewish immigration. As the 
situation in Palestine worsened the full terror of the 
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National Socialist nightmare in Germany began to emerge. 
Hundreds of thousands of Jews who considered 
themselves at home 1n Germany, and had contriouted 
to all facets of German life, suddenly found 
themselves stateless and persecuted. At this moment 
the British Government severely limited immigration 
into Palestinel in an effort to reconcile the Arab 
world. Upon the outbreak of World War II, Palestine 
became suvmerged in the overall conflict. 
The conclusion of that war brought with it the 
full chronicle of Nazi horrow and the extermination of 
upwards of six million Jews in ~~ope . The few hundred 
thousand remaiuing desperately wanted to leave a 
continent which for them meant only trageuy. Pressure 
increased fu~ immigration into Palestine for these 
displaced Jews. An Anglo-American Commission of 
Inquiry recommended the immediate introduction of 
------------------~------------------------------------1. The 19~9, White Paper on Palestine cut immigration 
to 75,000, over the next five years with nothing 
thereafter. It failed to satisfy the Arabs and 
infuriated the Jews, who refused to accept it. 
one hundred thousand such refugees, a recommendation 
that the British Fo l·eign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, 
flatly refused to accept.l In the meanwhile the 
Jewish community 1n Palestine began to take matters 
into its own hands. It maintained its own defense 
force, the Haganah, which more or less worked 1n 
cooperation with the official Jewish Agency for 
Palestine2 as well as other less responsiole groupa . 
Illegal immigration was actively supported by the 
Jewish population in a move to rescue the remnants 
ot EUrope's Jewry .3 
In the past the British Government had placed its 
hopes in partitioning Palestine, though a well-
ela~orated plan in 19~7, came to naught. During 
the war Prime Minister Churchill continued to favor 
such a scheme as indicated in a note he sent to 
General Ismay 
The Chiefs of Staff seem to assume that 
partition will arouse Jewish resentment. 
It is, on the contrary, the White Paper 
policy that arouses Jewish resentment. 
The opposition to partition will come 
from the Arabs, and any violence by the 
Arabs will be countered by the Jews. It 
----~-~----------------~--------------------------------1. See McDonald, James G., MY Mission in Israel, (Simon and Schuster, New-rork, 195u); pp. 21-26, 
for a discussion of Bevin's anti-Semitism. 
~stablished under the terms of the Mandate. 
The number of illegal entries is unknown but 53,000 
were detained .. Cyrpus. Letter from British 
Information Services, New York, June 25, 1956. 
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must be remembered that Lora wavell has 
stated that, left to themselves, the 
Jews would beat the Arabs • •• l 
.t!..I'nest Bevin determined not to attempt to carry on 
the respunsibi~ities of the Mandate or make any 
effort to reconcile the parties involvea. He 
apparently assumea that the Arabs would take ~alestine 
over and protect British interests in the area. He 
faiied to need Churcnill's acute pr~ctiction. 
As the situation constantly deteriorate4 the 
British increased their forces in Palestine, 
turning the country into an armed camp. Finally 
the decision v~s made to let the United Nations 
deal with the matter. It did, but in a manner 
apparently unexpected by vowning Street. 
The l''irst Special Session of the General 
Assembly opened on April 28, 1947. The item 
"Constituting and instructing a special connnittee 
to prepare for the consideration of Palestine 
at the second regular session" passed the seventieth 
plenary session, but at the next session on May 1, 
1947, an Arab proposal to include an additional 
item entitled The termination of the mandate over 
79 
--~~---------------~------------------------------------1 . Churchill, V, op. cit., p. 689 
Palestine and the declaration of its independence" 
failed by a vote or 15-24-lo.l 
The Arab proposal would, of course, have 
eliminated any serious discussion on Palestine and 
paved the wa7 for the immediate establishment of an 
Arab state 1n that country. It was on t 11is issue 
that the Commonwealth first split over Palestine, 
as among the fifteen members for inclusion of the 
item was India, the other members oppesing. 
On a suggestion by Poland that the Jewish Agency 
present its views to a plenary session of the 
General Assembly, only South Africa lent support 
(the motion failed}. India abstained on a carried 
motion to invite the same Agency to appear before 
the First Committee, an invitation also extended to 
the Arab High Committee.2 
The Special Session on May 15, 1947, adopted a 
resolution establishing the United Nations Special 
Committee on Palestine by a vote of 47-o, the entire 
Commonwealth supporting the motion. The Special 
Committee was to consist of Australia, ~anada, 
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Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, the Netherlands, 
--~---------------~~---~------------~----------~---------1. U.N., 7lst General Assembly Plenary 
2. IOIQ., 73rd and 76th General Assembly Plenaries 
Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and YUgoslavia. It was given 
broad scope to investigate aonditions in Palestine 
and elsewhere and was to report back to the General 
Assembly by September 1, 1947.1 It will be noted 
that the Commonwealth was rather heavily represented 
on the Speeial Committee, the composition of Which 
mainly was of the middle and small powers of the 
United ~ations, a group in which the Commonwealth 
members had taken a leading role from the beginning. 
The Special Committee (referred to also as UNSCoP), 
held the first of sixteen puolic and thirty-six 
private sessions on May 26, 1947. It received the 
collaboration of the Palestine Government in the 
person of liason officer D.c. MaoGillivray and of 
the Jewish Agency through Aubrey s. (later Abba} 
Eban and David Horowitz. The Arab Higher Committee 
held aloof.2 In its travels UNSCvP journeyed to 
Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Trans-jordan, Germany 
and Austria; the latter two in order to visit the 
displaced persons camps.3 
-------------~---------~---------------------------------1. 
2. 
~. 
U.N., 79th General Assembly Plenary, Reso1. 106 (S-1) 
united Nations, Yearbook, 1947-1948, (Department of 
PUblic Information, Lake success, 1948), P• 228 
United Nations, Background PSper No. 47, (Department 
of Public Information, Lake ucceii; ~47J 
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A number o~ matters somewhat extraneous to the 
subjeot at hand also reached UN~COP. Petitions 
regarding the condition of the Jews 1n Yemen and 
Aden, the internees 1n Cyprus, British police 
methods, and requests tor UNSGOP intervention to 
prevent the execution of Jewish underground fighters 
reached the membership.l The majority of these 
petitions obviously were ualculated to throw 
unfavorable light on the United Kingdom authorities. 
The Special Committee was a~le to make a series 
of unanimous recommendations including those that th. 
Mandate be terminated and Palestine be 
independent ~t the earliest practical date, that there 
be a transitional United Nations admiHistration ~or 
Palestine, that the sacred character o~ the Holy 
Places and the riguts o~ the religious communities 
be preserved, that the General Assembly take urgent 
steps to alleviate the plight of ~uropean Jewry, that 
the constitution of the new state or states 1n 
Palestine be democrat ic and protect minorities, and 
that the economic unity o~ Pales~ine be preserved. 
The Sp~cial Committee also appealed to the population 
~--------------------------------------~----------------1. United Nations, Yearbook, op. cit., p. 229 
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of Palestine to settle the existing situation without a 
resort to violence. With Uruguay and Guatemala 
dissenting, the Special Committee also suggested 
that the appraisal of the Palestine Question not be 
considered in the light of achieving a s olution 
of the Jewish Problem in general. 
The Special Committee was unable to agree on one 
plan in regard to the political future of Palestine. 
The majority favored the division of Palestine 
into an Aran and a Jewish state and separate status 
for Jerusalem. Roughly the plan would grant .to the 
Jewish State ~st Galilee, the Coastal Plain and the 
Negev desert. Jerusalem and Bethlehem would form 
an international city under United Nations Administration, 
and the remainder would be a new Arab nation. The 
three political divisions would form one economic 
unit operated by a Joint Economic ooard of nine members 
(three from each of the units and with those representing 
the United Nations enclave appointed by the 
~conomic and Social Council). The plan envisioned a 
two year transitional period dating from September 1, 
1947, with continuing United Kingdom administration 
under the auspices of the United Nations. 
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A minority plan drawn up by India, Iran and 
Yugoslavia would have estaolished in Pal es t ine an 
independent federal state within three years. 
Jerusalem would be the capital of tnis state wnich 
would consist of autonomous Jewish and Arab units. 
The federal government would control defense, 
foreign polic7, currency, immigration, water 
rights, transport, communications, federal taxes, 
and copyrights. The Arab and Jewish states would have 
local self-government in matters of educat ion, justice, 
housing, health, roads, agriculture, industry, 
land, settlement, and inter-state negotiations. 
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At the federal center there would be a bicameral legislature 
with one chamber elected by proportional representation 
and the other chamber composed equally of Jews and 
Arabs. A five man aruitral board of two Jews, two 
Arabs, and one other would set tle disputes between 
the two chambers. ~our Arana and three Jews would 
sit on the federal court. noly Places would be under 
the protection of an United Nations Board. l 
It is rather noteworthy that India opposed 
~------------------------~---------~-----------------------1. ~, Do• • A/364 
partition during that very Summer When the great 
sub-continent was undergoing partition. due to 
religious dirficulties. into two states. 
Indian opinion was consistently hostile to the Jewish 
State, an hostility rather consistent with uoth 
Nehru's general suspicions of Zionisml and Gandhi's 
attitude o1' non-violence. 
While canada supported. the maJor1ty plan, and 
India, the minority scheme, Australia refused to 
support either, maintaining that the Special Committee 
haa no ousiness making such sweeping recommendations 
and that it snould cunfine 1tself to fact-finding 
ror the use of the General Assembly.2 This 
attitude is quite in keeping with the 
Australian contention that the General Assembly's 
functions and powers ought always to be augmented. 
when the Second Sess1on of the Uniteu Natiuns 
convened. 1n ~eptember, 19471 nut one o1' the 
Commonwealth members touched upun the Palestine 
problem in the course of the General Debate, which 
was quite unusual considering the importance that 
the issue already had and which the United Nations 
had already recognized. Considering her awkward 
---~------~---~--------------------------------------1. Eytan, Walter, The First Ten ~ears, lSimon and 
Schuster, New YOrK, 1958);-p. 179 
2. United Nations Background Paper, op. cit., p. 8 
n 
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position of being caught in the middle, 
United Kingdom reluctance to speak out is 
understandable. That her daughter and now sister 
nations were unwilling to embarrass her rather 
stretches one's credibility. 
Upon the suggestion of the Secretary-General, 
as approved by the General Committee,l the 
General Assembly established a special ad hoc 
committee on Palestine to which all matters in 
reference to the Palestion Question were referred. 
Herbert ~vatt of Australia was elected chairman or 
this new committee, a position in which he had much 
need to employ his parliamentary skill, patience, 
forbearance and unusual tact. 
Along with the full membership of the United 
Nations the ad hoc Committee had at its table 
non-voting representavives from the Jewish Agency, 
representing Jewish-Zionist opinion and the views of 
the National Council of Palestinian Jewry, and of the 
Arab High Committee, speaking for the nrab 
populations of Palestine. 
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The ad hoc Committee set up three sub-
committees to deal with the Palestine matter. 
Sub-Committee I, including Canada, Czechoslovakia, 
Guatemala, Poland, South Africa, the United States, 
Uruguay and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics was entrusted with drawing up a partition 
plan in accordance with the majority report of 
UNSCuP. Sub-Committee II, which was composed of 
Afganistan, Colombia, Egypt, Iraq, Lvbanon, 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen, was to 
draw up a plan along the lines of the UNSCOP 
minority Report. Sub-Committee III was to 
arrange a means, if possible, of conciliating and 
reconciling the divergent Arab and Jewish viewpoints. 
Sub-Committee I received co-operation from the 
United Kingdom and the Jewish Agency but nune from 
the Arab Higher Committee. It modified certain 
technical aspects of the UNSCuP majority Report, 
proposed termination of the Mandate on btay 1, 1948, 
and the estaulishment of the new states three months 
later. 1t suggested that partition be implemented under 
guidance of the Security ~ouncil and several General 
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Assembly commissions, to ensure orderly transition.l 
It later modified the timing to August 1, and october 
1, for the end of the Mandate and the establishment 
of the new states and suggested an international 
regime for Jerusalem rather than an International 
Trust . 2 
Sub-Committee !I in its Report3 recommended, 
firstly, that there be a ruling from the Internat ional 
uourt of Justice on the right of populations to 
determine tneir own governments, on the validity 
of the various pleages made between 1915, and 1918, 
the validity of the Mandate itselr in regard to the 
Jewish Nativnal HOme , the question as to whether the 
Mandate remains in effect when the League has dissolved, 
and the right of the United ~ations to either draw up 
or enforce a plan of partition. Secondly, the 
Sub-Committee recommended that the ~urvpean countries 
take back their Jewish displaced persons and that those 
not so repatriated be absorbed by member states 
according to a quota to be set up by a General Assembly 
special committee . Tr1irdly, the Heport recommended 
-----------------------~---------------------------------1 . U.N. , Doc . A/AC . l4/34 
2 . ~ea Nations, Yearbook, op. cit . , p. 24U 
~ . ~' voc . A/AC . l4/~2 
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that Palestine become an unitary state with a 
legislature elected by proportional representation 
and the official recognition of rtebrew in Jewish 
areas as a state language. 
As might well have been expected, the Conciliation 
sub-Comm~ttee reported on November 19, 1~47, that it 
haa been unable to make any progress whatsoev~r.1 
Meanwhile, in the regular sessions of the ad noc 
Co~ttee the United K~gdom made it very evident that 
it would not implement any plan which was not 
acceptable to uoth parties, though it did endorse 
the UNSCuP Report in so far as it recommended 
termination of the Mandate and the recognition of 
international responsibility toward the displaced Jews .2 
The United Kingdom delegate amplified this 
view to Sub-Committee I on November 13, 1947, When 
he stated that his government would not act against a 
decision by two-thirds of the Assembly nor obstruct the 
task of a Commission engaged in carrying out partition, 
the functioning of provisional councils or the land 
and immigration policies of the Jewish state.3 
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2. U.N., 2nd Session, ad hoc Committee on Palestine, 
september 26, 1947 
3. United Nations, Yearbook, op. cit., p. 239 
l 
The Arab Higher Committee on September 30, 1947, 
informed the ad hoe Committee that the Arabs would 
detend Palestine at all cost. The Arab statement 
rurther went on to denounce the Mandatory power, a 
denunciation which seems to have had a slightly 
hollow ring 1n view of the tacit support the British 
had been giving to the Arab cause. The Arabs accused 
the ~iouist Movement of ha ving strategic designs 
on }alestine as a place from which to base their 
designs and ambitions and attacked them for refusing 
Uganda in 1904.1 The UNSCOP Report could not be a 
basis for discussion under any circumstances.2 
The Jewish Agency made its statement on 
october 2, 1947. The Agency was dissatisfied with 
the Arab attitude, finding it strange that they should 
ask United Nations support for an unitary state while 
refusing to cooperate with the United Nations on the 
matter under discussion. The Agency made it clear 
that it found the UNSCOP Report not really satisfactory. 
Under it only one-eighth of the area originally 
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~-~---------------------------------------------------------1. The British Government offered Uganda as a Jewish 
homeland in 1904, without consulting either the 
~uropean settlers there or the African population. 
The Zionists rejected the offer out of hand. 
2. United Nations, Yearbook, op. cit., p. 233 
promised in the Balfour Declarationl would be turned 
into a Jewish state. The Agency also wanted Western 
Galilee and those portions of Jerusalem which were 
Jewish in the state. Nonetheless, the Agency was 
willing to aecept the Report as necessary in order 
to create the state and begin the immigration of 
displaced Jews . 2 It made it clear that the proposed 
boundaries were the minimum that could be accepted. 
. The Commonwealth nations actively participated 
in the ad hoc Committee debates, with the 
exception of Australia which held the Chair . Their 
views were varies and may be summarized rather 
briefly. 
Pakistan held that the Balfour Declaration was 
invalid and that while there was an immediate need to 
relieve the plight of the Jewish refugess Palestine 
and a Jewish state were not the answers.3 India 
felt that the Jewish refugee problem could not be 
connected with the future of Palestine. New Dehli 
supported the idea of an unitary state with wide 
-----------------------------------~--------------------1 . The Zionists believed that both Palestine and 
Trans-jordan were included. 
2 . United Nations, Yearbook, op. cit . , P • 2~5 
3 . tr. R. , 7th session, ad hoc Committee on Palestine 
october 7, 1947 
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autonomy ror the Jews . l Canada agreed with the 
majority Report of UNScop2 as did South Africa, 
which also threw in a good word, one of the few, 
for the progress made in Palestine by the Mandatory 
power . 3 New Zealand rather resignedly found that 
there simply was no solution other than partition.4 
The views expressed indicateu a split in 
Cemmonwealth thinking. The Pakistani statement is 
totally understandable considering that nation's 
close links with the Arab world through the 
medium of religion. Also, Pakistan presuma~ly 
wanted Aran League support for herself during her 
disagreements with India . The statement was 
reasonable and carefully avoided the rancor and 
distortions of the views expressed oy the Arab 
delegations . 5 
----~-~---------------~--~---------------------------------1 . U. N. , 11th session, ad hoc Committee on Palestine, 
uotober 11, 1947 
2 . Ibid. , 16th session, Octuber 14, 1947 
3. Ibid . , loth session, October 16, 1947 
4 . Ibid. 
s. The Arab delegations went so far as to argue that 
~uropean Jews were desoend~nrs of Mongol hordes 
converted to Judaism. Apparently this argument was 
based on the conversion of the Khazar Court 1n the 
twelvth century . It would be foolish to argue 
auout the ethnic purity of the Jews after two 
millenia ct dispersion but the argument was both 
incorrect and irrelevant. It raises the issue of 
a 11 Jewish race" and it would be best to leave that 
matter and settle for the phrase "Jewish people." 
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India's attitude is less comprehensiule, unless 
it was due to Nehru's general dislike of uio4~sm. 
His own country was the creation of an absurd 
partition. India certainly should have felt greater 
compassion for the refugess, considering the millions 
then housed 1n India. 
The older dominions accepted the ma Jority views 
and eyed the entire problem with greater sympathy, 
from the Jewish viewpoint. They refused to follow 
the British lead and simply hold aloof. One might 
conjecture as to why they took the attitudes they 
did. Possibly they were willing to make amends to 
the remah!ing Jews of ~urope after the Na zi 
holocaust -- and possibly avoid having to accept 
Jewish refugees. In the final vote on partition 1n 
the ad hoc Committee and approval of the UNSCuP Report 
Australia, Canada and South Africa voted for, 
India and Pakistan against, and ~ew ~ealand and the 
United Kingdom abstained. The New ~ealand abstention 
was explained by its delegate as being without 
prejudice to its vote 1n the General Assembly and due 
mainly to provision in regard to implementation of 
the plan. As a wnvle, the ad noc vommittee approved 
the matter by a vote of 25-13-17.1 
The General Assem~ly began its debate on the Report 
of the ad hoc vomm1ttee embracing, with slight 
alterations, the UNSCvP Report at its plenary 
session ef November 26, 1947. The Canadian 
delegate maintained that an Arab unitary state was 
out of the question 1n view of the ~alrour 
Declaration, the terms of the League ~ndate, the 
previvus encouragement of Jewish immigration, and 
the Jewish investment of ~6oo,ooo,uoo 1n Palestine. 
~~hile Canada would prefer a federal state 1n 
Pales tine, and she herself was an example of 
federalism applied to two nationa~ities, it 
had to be remdmbered that Palestine was not vanada 
and that the only feasible solution was partition.2 
The United Kingdom delegate announcea that 
It is with deep regret tnat my Government 
recognize that an acceptaole settlement 
has not ueen found. (H.M.G. is makingJ 
way for an United Natiuns authority ••• 
and it wil~ navural~y not obstruct the 
carrying out of any o.ecision which the 
General Assemoly may taKe ••• 3 
---~---------------------------------------------------1. 
3. 
U.N., .1<'1nal session, ad noc liOmmittee on Palestine, 
November 25, i947. vOmm1ttee Report Vvc. A/Slb 
Ibid., 124th General Assdmuly Plenary 
November 26, 19~7 
Ibid. 
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J:iis Majesty's Government was simply uot going to be 
of heip~ which was not reassuring to the other delegations. 
The ~akistani delegate continued his opposition 
to partitiun. He advocated, again~ a Jewish national 
home 1n a fre~ and independent Palestine, to ~ 
immediately proclaimeu. He was arch~J sarcas~ic 
auout th~ lack of efforts by Australia, vanada and 
the United ~tates to take in Jewish refUgess, ana one 
rather thinks his sarcasm was well directed.l 
The Arab de~egatiuns continued their IUrious 
assaults on the partition plan. They were joined by 
several states which frankly feared for the safety 
of the Holy Places in view of the inevitable conflict 
the Arabs were promising. on November 29, 1947~ the 
General Assembly took its final vote on the Plan of 
Partition and ~conomic Union (with separate status 
for Jerusalem}. The Plan carried by a vote of 
~3-13-lu. Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South 
Africa supported the majority. India and Pakistan 
opposed, and the United Kingdom abstained.2 
--~~-~----------------~---------------------~~~----~-~~----1. U.N., l26th General Assem~ly Plenary, 
November 28, 1947 
2. Ibid., J.28th General Assembly PlenaJ.·y, November 
29, 1947. Resolution 118 (II) A. 
Immediately the vote having been taken several 
delegations from the Arab world denounced the 
decision of the Assembly. To this dissent Pakistan 
gave its support, stating that 
Pakistan decides to wash its hands of all 
responsibility for the decision that haa just now been taken. It will, therefore, 
take no part in the election of the 
United Nations Commission whi ch will be 
set up to implement that decision.l 
Thus Pakistan abdicated its responsibilities as a member 
of the international community simply because 
it found itself una~le to agree to a decision it 
disliked . This attitude crume close to being a 
violation of the Charter and most certainly violated 
its spirit . 
The United Kingdom announced that it hoped that 
the United Nations Commission would co-ordinate its 
plans in regard to implementation of the Resolution 
with the time-ta~le of British withdrawal from Palestine . 
London also stated it would not obstruct the 
implementation of the Partition Plan, SUvject to the 
limits of its a.~ounced policy . 2 This was tantamount 
to stating that His Majesty's Government would not 
--~--------------~~--------~-~---------------------------1 . U.N. , op . cit. 
2 . unfted Nations, Yearbook, op. cit., p . 247 
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help the United Nations at all, as the Arab world 
refused its assent to the scheme and thus invoked 
that previously announced policy. Somehow, hiding 
behind diplomatic niceties or language was 
ill-becoming a majvr world power and certainly 
atypical of the former union leader at Number 
11 Downing Street . 
The Palestine Commission, composed of Bolivia, 
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Panama ahd the Philippines 
found that it could not carr.y out its 
responsibilities 1n regard to the implementation 
of the Plan or Partition as it received 
no co-operation from the Arab Higher 
Committee and, more important, it received none 
from the Mandatory Power . Thus, without armed 
assistance, it simply could not properly function . l 
The Commission did attempt to do its work as far as 
possible, warning of the constantly deteriorating 
state of conditions in Palestine . As the time of the 
termination of the Mandate approached also ended many 
of the essential services of government . 2 The lack 
---------------------------------------------------------1. 
2 . 
United Nations Background Paler, op. cit., p . 12 
For example, all postal serv ce to the outside 
world was suspended in April, 1948 
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or co-operation between the Mandatory and the 
Commission was equalled by a similar lack as 
between the Jewish authorities and the ~ritish 
Government in Palestine. 
On December 2, 1947, the ~ecretary-General 
submitted to the Secur i tyuCouncil the Plan ot 
Partition and invited that body to implement it,l 
an invitation which was never fully accepted. As 
conditions steadily worsened the Palestinian 
country-side was ravaged by open fighting but the 
british Government simply informed the ouncil it 
would not assist in implementing a decision not 
acceptable to both Jews and Arabs.G The Jewish 
Agency informed the vouncil that partition was an 
irreduciule minimum and that the Jewish population 
was now defedning itself against Arab military action.3 
The United Kingdom abstained when t11~ Security Council 
voted on March 5, 1948, to appeal to all governments 
to prevent and reduce disorder in ~ales~ine.4 
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2. !hid., p. 4o4 
~. Ibid., p. 405 
4. Ibid., p. 407. Resolution S/.691 
On March 19, 1948, the United States delegation 
suddenly startled the Security uouncil by proposing 
that a special session of the General Assembly be called 
over Palestine, that the Security Council instruct 
the Palestine Commission to cease implementation 
of partition, that a trusteeship over Palestine ne 
established, and that the United Nations determine 
that it did not necessarily inherit all the 
pro~lems of the League.l These proposals at the 
two hundred and seventy-first session of the 
Security Council were i n complete contradiction 
tv previous United States' views. Until this 
point the Washington Government had been an araent 
supporter of Partition. The United Kingdom 
immediately concurred with the American stand2 
and Canada followed through on March 24, 1948, at 
the Council table.3 
The Second Special Session of the General 
Assembly opened on April 16, 1948, following upon 
the request of the Security uouncil. The United 
States immediately proposed the establishment of a 
temporary trusteeship, with a governor-general 
~--------------------------------------~----------------1. United Nations, Yearbook, op. cit., p. 4u9 
2. Ibid., P• 411 
3. Ibid., p. 4lu 
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ruling by decree . l The United Kingdom attacked the 
Partition Plan and suggested second t .... oughts 
ought to be taken by the . United Nations on the matter . 2 
The Jewish Agency accused the Mandatory Power of 
obstruc ing the implementation of Partition and the 
Arab states of violating the Charter by arming and 
aiding Palestinian Araos . It found the United 
States plan entirely untenaule and announced that on 
MaY 16, 1948, a Jewish Government would oegin to 
function .:ti 
Australia, New Zvaland, and South Africa, joined 
by such nations as the Soviet Union, Uruguay and 
Guatemala argued at the Bpecial Session that 
partition must be carried out . The ~ommonwealth 
mations all announced that they were willing to 
lis ten to a:ny plan which would secure a just and 
reasona~le peace but that the Plan of Partition must 
be implemented.4 ooth New Z alanct and Australia asked 
why the Assembly might be willing to carry through 
a PalestL_ian trusteesnip by force but not Partition. 
They could see no reason for the one and not the 
other . 4 
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2 . ~ed Nations, Yearuook, op. cit., p. 260 
3 . Ibid. , p. 262 
4 . Ibid. , P• 26~ 
Canada, India and Pakistan were willing to study 
a trusteeship plan, and the latter nation joined Syria 
and ~gypt in suggesting that other nations take 1n 
Jewish refugees . l The Commonwealth split was 
thus widened with ~anada supporting the ~sian members2 
in contrast to her position of several months earlier. 
The lateness of ~anada•s switch, however, invites 
speculation to whether pressure from London or 
washington was, perhaps, the determining factor . 
Meanwhile, the Trusteeahip ~ouncil was considering 
a draft Statute for Jerusalem, under the terms of the 
November 29 , 1947, Resolution . Australia was 
particularly concerned over the protection of 
Jerusalem but the Arab Higher Committee flatly refused 
to consider any proposals and thus the efforts to draft 
a statute were of no avail. However, the Trusteeship 
Council did secure a temporary truce in the old 
Walled City on May 2, 1948 .~ 
At six o•olock in the afternoon of May 14, ~948,4 
the Mandate formally terminated and the Jewish State 
of Israel, prociaimed eight hours earlier in 
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4 . New York City time 
deference to the Jewish Sabbath, came into being . 
At the moment the General Assembly was still debating 
the trusteeship proposal. Word reached the floor that 
the proponent of that plan, the United States, had 
recognized the State of Israel, and the United States 
delegate shortly confirmed this . l Partition was a fact 
and the trusteeship idea was dropped. 
A roll-call vote was then taken in regard to 
organizing a special regime for Jerusalem. Supported 
by New Zealand and South Africa, opposed by Pakistan, 
and with the remainder of the uommonwealth abstaining, 
the proposal was lost . 2 Finally, a First Committee 
resolution (A/C.l/299) seeking a truce in 
Palestine and suggesting an United Nations Mediator 
be chosen passed the Special Session by a 31-7-16 
vote (with Australia abstaining) . 3 The Special Session 
then adjourned, having failed to ease a most difficult 
situation. 
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The matter then went into the hands of the Security 
Council as war broke out between Israel and her 
invading Arab neighuors . Several truces were obtained. 
------~-----~-~~~-~---~-----~---~~-------~-----~~------~ 1 . U. N., l35th General Assembly Plenary, May 14, 1948 
2 • 'I"'5!'<< • 
3. Ibid. 
Both the United Kingdom and Canada were on the Security 
Council during the Summer of 1948, and both took 
exception to a reference by the Council president 
to the phrase "the representative of the State of 
Israel" on July 7, 1948. 1 
For several months beyond the date of its 
independence no Commonwealth nation other than South 
Africa recognized Israel; the Pretoria governme.ut 
granted ~ facto recognition on May 24, 1948. 2 
Canada extvnded similar recognition on December 24, 
1948, 3 and by the end of January, 1949, New Zealand, 
Australia, and the United Kingdom followed suit . 4 
Diplomatic representatives were shortly exchanged 
by these nations with Israel . India eventually 
recognized the new state but has refused to maintain 
relations above the consular level. 5 Pakistan has refused 
recognition. With the post-1949 members of the 
Commonwealth Israel has established generally friendly 
relations, with the exception of Malaya. 
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January 25, 1961 
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In the period of British non-recognition a rather 
difficult situation arose vis-a-vis the British consul 
in Haifa and the Israel Government. The consul was 
used by his governaent to convey messages to the 
Israel authorities but addressed such messages to 
"The Jewish autoorities, Tel Aviv." They were returned, 
unopened. It was an action 1n keeping with the 
blind position held by London 1n regard to both 
partition and Israel. 
On September 16, 1948, C~u.~t Folke ~ernadotte, the 
United Nations• Mediator in Palestine submitted to 
the Gvneral Assembly a progress Report carrying with 
it certain recommendations regarding Isra~l and the 
Arab states. The Report first of all admitted that 
the Provisional uovernment of Israel is 
today exercising without restriction on 
its authority or power, all the attributes 
ot full sovereignty ••• Above all, the 
Jewish state needs peace.l 
The Count, who was assassinated twenty-four hours after 
his Report was made, suggested several serious frontier 
changes, the major ones being the giving of all of 
Galilee to ~srael and the Negev area to the Arabs. 
104 
---~---~-------~----------------~----~--~----------------~--1. ~, Document A/ 648 
He suggested that the Arab states do what they wished 
with the Arab designated areas, and apparently did not 
really conceive of an independent Arab state in 
Palestine . l 
The United Kingdom endorsed the ~ernadotte Plan 
and suumitted a draft resolution to the First 
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Committee that would basically implement the proposals, 
It is noteworthy that even as late as November 18 1 1948, 
the London Government referred to the "Jewish State" 
~d not to "Israel . "2 The Australian reaction was 
diamentrically opposed. Canberra submitted a 
resolution ignoring the Proposals and simply asking 
the Se_urity Council to give sympathetic action and 
consideration to the application for admission that 
Israel eventually would make of the United Nations.3 
The attitudes of these two generally close Commonwealth 
governments could hardly have been more varied. 
Israel informed the Secretary- General that 
the Bernadotte plan cannot be accepted 
by the State of Israel as a basis 
of discussion . 4 
~----------------~-~~----~~-----------~-------------------1 . U. N., op . cit . 
2 . !"6'icl. , Document A/C . /:t>94 and First Committee, 
November 18, 1948 
3 . Ibid., Document A/C .l/~96 
4 . Ibid . , Document A/C . l/360 
Israel flatly refused to give up the Negev, which she 
considered as her future area of development. Also, 
Foreign Minister Moshe ~harett informed the First 
Committee that Israel needed access to the Gulf of 
Aqaba.1 His government were very snortly thereafter 
to effectively and militarily occupy this area awarded 
to Isra~l under the Partition Plan. 
The Bernadotte Plan never won the approval ef 
the United Nations. While the argument for 
contiguous frontiers was a strong one these frontiers 
came into being through military operat ions, anyway. 
Certain features, such as giving Jordan the free use 
of the Port of Haifa have since been incoporated into 
various Israeli peace offers to her neighvors. 
Israel first applied for admission to the u~~ited 
Nations on November 29, 1948. The Security vouncil 
vote was 5-1-5 (with the United Kingdom abstaining) 
and the motion was not carried. The request was 
renewed on February 24, 1949, and on March 4, 1949, 
by a vote of 9-l-1 (again the United Kingdom abstained) 
the Security Council vuted to recommend to the General 
Assembly that Israel be admitted.2 
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The Israel application was discussed by the ad 
hoc Political Committee beginning on May ~, 1949. 
Pakistan led the opposition to Israel's admission 
maintaining that the abstention by the Unitea Kingdom 
voided the affirmative action or the vouncil on the 
basis of Article 27 or the Charter, which reads, 
inter alia, 
........... 
~. Decisions of the Security ~ouncil on 
all other matters (than procedural} 
shall be made by an affirmative vote of 
seven members including the concurring 
votes of the permanent members ••• 
The Pakistani delegate went on at great length to 
insist that there was no legally binding recommendation 
and that therefore the General Assemb~y ought not to 
consider the matter. Unlike the delegations from 
the Arab states he never ~uwered the tone and dignity 
or the debate with unsound reproaches and irrational 
arguments.l 
The Canadian delegate at the same session 
maintained that the Pakistani view was untenable. The 
vouncil had acted and such action haa been certified by 
the Secretary-General. The Committee and the Assembiy 
were not concerned with t he manner in Which the Council 
reached its decisions. 
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The United Kingdom itself maintained that the 
Security Cuuncil could act without all five permanent 
members voting affirmatively . The only time it was 
prevented was when one such member voted in the 
negative. In other words, abstention was not a veto 
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nor was ~t a bar to action. The United ~ingdom had 
absta~ed as it opposed Israel's admission at the present 
time but was unwilling to block action desired by a 
majority of the members in a matter dealing with 
admissiona . 1 The United Kingdom would abstain 
further in the voting as it wanted clarification on 
certain matters from Israel regarding boundaries, 
holy Places, refugees, and the like . 2 In the 
Committee vote a recommendation passed that the 
Assembly admit Israel . The vote was 33-10-13, with 
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand for, India and 
Pakistan opposed, and South Africa joining the 
United Kingdom in abstain1ng . 3 
The General Assembly discussion on May 11, 1949,4 
--~-~~---------~---------------------------------------~ 1 . U. N. , 43rd session, ad hoc Political Committee, 
~4, 1949 
2. Ibid. , 51st session, May 9, 1949 
3. Ibid. , Document A/855 
4 . Ibid . , 207th General Assembly Plenary, May 11, 1949 
round Canada speaking in ravor of Israel's admittance 
and maintaining that Article 4 of the Charter was met 
in tnis accord. Canada trusted that Israel would aoide 
by the 0harter and its obligations and further that 
Israel would make a major contribution to the United 
Nations in the future of the organization. New Zealand 
also supported Israel's admission and congratulated 
her on her statehood. The Wellington delegate 
assumed Israel would respect all decision of the United 
Nations. By a vote of 37-12-9, the General Assemoly 
~dmitted Israel to membership of the United Nationa, 
thus fulrilling an obligation to a state to which 
it had given the legal basis of existence. South 
Africa joined the older commonwealth countries in 
approving the measure. India and Pakistan again 
demurred and the United Kingdom continued its sulk. 
The admission of Israel basically terminates the 
Palestine Question at the United Nations. Th~ 
Trusteeship Council shortly found itself unaole to 
implement any form of separate status for Jerusalen and 
lsrael moved its capital to that city. Jordan 
incorporated its sections and there the matter rests.l 
---------~---------~------------~------------------------1. ~~t~, op. cit., pp. 65-86 
109 
llO 
Matters relating to armistice violations have, of course, 
plagued the Security Council ~ut have generally been 
quickly settled. As part of the entire Suez Incident 
(see Chapter VIJ, Israel, Palestine and the ~rab 
states would again be a matter or serious United Nations 
consideration. 
The creation or Israel created a split within the 
Commonwealth. T.he opposition of Pakistan, consistent 
and strong, sprang from that nation's close affiliations 
with the Arab world and her hope for that world's 
support in her dispute with India. Indian opposition 
has already been attributed to Nehru's personal feelings. 
The United Kingdom was basically nostile as at stake were 
here friendships with the Arab League, Middle-~st oil, 
and the strategic area of the Sinai peninsula vis-a-vis 
~alestine . Loyally, Australia and New Zealand stuck to 
their original positions of support, generally aided 
by South Africa. Canada tended to follow the lead of the 
United States as is evident by her shifts in polioy. 
While the split over Palestine did not cause anv 
great rift in the commonwealth, and would not until the 
Suez Incident, it did emphasise that there were strong 
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differences of opinion in the Commonwealth and 
conclusively proved that Commonwealth unity in international 
affairs is not necessarily existent. ~ach nation saw 
the situation itself as it affected its own interests 
and acted ac cordingly. However, it is of interest to 
note that the speeches at the United Nations made by 
the Commonwealth delegates avoided recriminations 
at each other. 
One might have expected at least one member to 
ease the situation of another but there seems to be 
no indication of, say, Pakistan attempting to aet 
as ''honest broker" for the United Kingdom in 
explaining the awkward ~ritish position to the 
Arab states. Perhaps that would b~ too much to expect 
pf a state already embroiled with a fellow member or 
the Commonwealth. 
CHAPT~R IV 
The question of the rights of persons of Indian 
descent in South Africa was raised by the Government 
of India in 1946, at the United Nations. The issue 
is a co •• sequence of a long history of Afrikaaner and 
South African legislation 1n regard to the Indias, 
legislation that has been discriminatory in failing 
to give the Indians the same rights as given to 
Europeans. It was the first issue solely between 
members of the Commonwealth to be heard by the 
United Nations and the only intra-commonwealth 
struggle pitting the pre-world War II members 
against the post-War states of the commonwealth at 
the international forum. 
Indians first entered the Natal District of 
the Cape Colony on Nov~mber 15, 186o,l under the 
terms of the Cape Colony Law Number 14 of 1859.2 
These Indians came as indentured servants for a three 
year period of service, later raised to five years. 
In 1866, the Indian Government stopped their 
emigration due to extremely poor working conditions 
112 
~~------~------------~~~---------------------------~-----1. State Information Office, Indians 1n South Africa, 
{Pretvria, 1955), p. 9 --
2. Galpin, G.H., Indians 1n South Africa (Shuter and 
Shuter, Pietermaritzburg, 1949), p. 4 
but it was resumed six years later.l Despite later 
South African statements to the contrary, it would 
appear that the entry of these Indians was viewed as 
somewhat permanent, for a ratio of forty women for 
every one hundred men imported was maintained . 2 
A study commission in 1886, reported that 
••• we must observe that the competition 
(of the Indians in business} is 
legitimate 1n its nature and it 
certainly has been welcomed by the 
general eommunity. 3 
The entrance of these Indians therefore was 
c _nsidered to be part of the South African stream, 
or so it would appear . By 1891, there were 
~5, 76~ Indians in the Cape and Natal, compared 
to 461 788 Europeans . 4 The indians were admitted to 
the holding of the franchise for parliamentary and 
municipal elections in the Cape on a rather 
reasona _le basis . After 1883, anyone earning over 
~96 per annum, holding property world ~50 or paying 
rents over ~10 per annum, and capable of app~y1ng 
~--------~-~--------------·----~------~----------~-----1 . Kajee, A.i., Father, P.H . , and Christopher, A. , 
Treatment of Indians in South Afriea, {South 
Atrlcan-"Tndfin CongresS'; 1946J 1 p . 6 
2 . Galpin, op . cit . , p . 8 
~ . Kajee, et al, op. cit. , P • 7 
' · Caipin, op . cit . , p . 10 
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for permission to vote in either ~nglish or Dutch 
1 
could vute. Nonetheless, a feeling was growing to 
restrict the rights of the Indians, an attitude which 
met the firm opposition of the imperial Government 
when Colonial Secretary Joseph vhamberlain wrote 
1n 1893, 
We ask you to bear in mind the tradition 
of the bmpire, which makes no 
distinction in favour or against race 
or colour, and to exclude, by reason ot 
their race, all Her Majesty's indian 
subjects would be most painful, I am 
certain, to Her Majesty to have to 
sanction 1t ••• (they1 are as loyal to 
the vrown as you are yourselves ••• 2 
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In Natal, with a rapidly growing Indian community, 
events took a more seriuus turn. In 18~~, Natal 
tined all Indians remaining in the area ~25, a sum 
lowered to ~3 by the Imperial Government.3 By 
1897, the Indian parliamentary franchise in Natal was 
lost and the municipal franchise would be gone by 1924 . 
The Natal Government also Lnvalidated Indian marriages 
not properly registered with the autnorities, a move 
calculated to harass the inaian community.4 
----------~------------~-----------------------------------1 . ca~pin, op . cit., p. 12 
2 . Ibid . , P • 18 
3 . Statt:l Information vft·ice, op. cit . , p. 10 
4 . Ibid. , PP • 11-12 
The Indian question was non-ex1stent in th~ 
vrange ~ree ~tate, as una~r legislation passed in 1891, 
no Asians at all were admitted and those already 
dwelling there were deported without compensation . ! 
In the Transvaal the Indian was not welcome, 
despite the te~ of the London vonvention of 1881, 
which provided that 
••• all persons, other than natives, 
conforming themselves to the laws of 
the South African Republic a) will have 
full liberty • • • to enter, travel or 
reside in any part of the South African 
Republic; b1 will be entitled to hire or 
possess houses, manufactories, warehouses, 
shops, and premises ••• 2 
However, by Law v of 1885, promulgated in 1887, the 
South African Repuvlic prohioited all Asians f rom 
enjoying burgher rights and limited their future land 
ownership to fixed areas, basing such legislation on 
sanitary necessity.3 
Following the South Africa Act , 1909 1 the issue 
of the Indians became, of course, a matter for the 
central Union Government . The Act itself preserved the 
Indian Cape franchise . Restrictive legislation then 
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continued. In 1913, the Immigrants' Regulation Act 
restricted the movement of Indians from province 
to province.l A scheme to have the Indians 
voluntarily repatria te themselves to India failed 
in 1920-1921, when less than 5,000 chose to go to 
a country which was not thei r home.2 
In 1924, the Hertzog Government introduced 
legislation that \>rould have es tablished class areas 
for the Indian and native populations and restricted 
fur ther imnigra tion: the Areas Reservation, 
Immigration ~nd Registr ation Bill of 1924. It was 
based on the AfrikPaner point of view that the Indians 
were an unwelcome part of t he South African scene. As 
the later prime minister Dr . Malan stated in 
Parlia ment that year 
I must say that this Bill frankly starts 
from the gener al supposition that the 
Indian as a race in t his country is an 
alien element in the popula tion and that 
no s olution of this question vTill be 
acceptable to the country unl es s it results 
in a very consid e~able reduc tion of the 
Indian population in this coun t ry.3 
The Bill failed of pass age but led to an uproar 
by both the South African Indian population and the 
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Government of India. Negotiations took place between 
the Indian and South African Governments resulting 
in the Cape Town Agreement of 1927. This Agreement 
will be cited by later Indian Governments as one 
reason for claiming that the entire question of 
Indians in South Af~ica falls under international 
law. It provided that 
1) South Africa can use all just and 
legitimate measures for maintaining 
Western standards of life; 
2) The Union recognizes that Indians 
domiciled in South .A frica ivho are 
prep a red to conform to \1es tern 
standards of life should be enAbled 
to do so; 
3) Those wishing to emigrate to India 
will be assisted; 
4) The Government of India recognized 
its obligation to look after such 
emigr C'lnt s; 
5) An Indian Government Agent would be 
appointed to South Af rica.l 
The Agreement basically accepts the South Afr ican 
premise that the Union is a Western nation and 
strongl y i mplies that the Indian usu:> lly does not 
measure up to Western standards. It certainly 
looks for\-rard to a reduction of the Indian population 
through an assisted sche e of emigration, a scheme 
of which only 15,000 Indians t ook advantage .2 
------------------------------------------------------~ 1. State Inf ormation Office, op. cit., pp . 15-16 
2. Ibid., p. 16 
The Agreement was re-enforced by a similar one 
five years later, following another Round Table 
Conference be t\-Jeen IIrlia and South Africa . 
However, the matter toJas far from set t led and 
the South Afr ican Government continued to push on 
in i ts process of restriction. During the decade 
on the 1930s ~ strong tide of national feeling 
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swept throu?h the Union, particularly after the 
pass ~ge of the Statute of Westminster. South 
African nationalism is generally equivalent to strong 
racial feelings, and time only aggrava t ed the 
tensions between the Euroryeans, the Indians and 
the Afri can n~ tive populations. 
In 1943, the Smuts Government passed the 
Trad i ng and Occupation of Land (Transvaal and 
Natal) Restriction Act, generally kn own as t he 
" Pegging Act ."l It pegged the land situation for 
three years. In intr oducing the legislation General 
Smuts stated that he regretted doing so but that 
the Indi ans had forced it on themselves . The Act 
was suspended in Durban, having proved impractical 
of application in a city of 110,000 Indians and 
120,000 Euro'')eans. 2 
~----------------------------------------------------1. 
2. 
State Information Office~ op. cit., p. 18 
Figures based on t he 194o Census 
The Indians meanwhile were a roused and demanded 
fuller rights in the face of Governmental 
prescription. The South African Indian demanded 
full parliamentary and municipal franchises on a 
common roll with Europeans .1 T~·lha t they got 
instead was the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian 
Representation Act of 1946. It was t his measure 
\vhich precipitated the issue into the United Nations. 
The Act 
1) Replaced the 1943 "Pegging Act;" 
2) Scheduled free areas in Natal where 
Indians could reside and own property; 
3) Restricted Indian ownership and 
residence elsewhere; 
4) Gave the Indians the right to have 
representation (by Europeans) in the 
Natal Provincial Council; 5) Gave the Indians the right to elect 
one sena t or (an Europe an) to the Union 
Senate from Natal and Transvaal, and 
empO"~:Tered the Governor-General to 
appoint an European sena tor to also 
represent the Indians; 
6) Gave the Indi?ns the right to elect 
three Euro ~eans to represent them in 
the House of Assembly; 
7) Provided that to be on the communal 
roll the Indian needed an educat ion u·-.. 
to StAndard IV (l ater rF-is ed to VI), and 
an income of ~84 per2annum or immova ble property worth ~250. 
In one sense the Act was an advance as the IndiPns 
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for the first time in the Transvaal received the vote 
and Par liamentary represen ta tion. The Indians 
viol ently obje cted , however, to receiving such 
representation through Euro·•eans elected on a sepc:l rate 
roll, feeling that such a roll was, of itself, 
discri minatory . The land limitations also met 
with strong and virulent opposition. The limited 
Indian franchise pr ovision of the Act was repealed 
in 1948.1 
At the present time (1961) the elec t oral 
situation l eaves the Indians entirely off the 
voting rolls in the Transvaal and Or?nge Free 
State . In Natal a few select Indians hold the 
vote.2 In t he Ca pe the Indi ans ar e on the 
Coloured Voters' Roll \·There they are in ? minority. 
There the Coloured Roll returns four Euroueans to 
the House of Assembly and the Governor-General 
(now the President of the Republi c) nominates 
one Senator for the Coloureds and Indians.3 
The Asiatic Land Tenure and Indians Representation 
Act of 1946, was bound to cause inte~national 
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repercussions. General Smuts hims elf stated 
I am the last pers on to minimize the 
importance f~' Om the international 
point of view of this Bill but 
essenti8lly it is an internal measure . 
Essentially it is an attempt to 
provide social peace and the good 
order of our society here in South 
Africa ••• It deals \<Ti th an internal 
question which affects the peace and 
the good order of our society ••• That 
is all we intend in this Bill --
fair play ~nd justice to our Indian 
fellow ci ~izens, but we do not want to 
change the structure of South African 
society and to have condi ~ ions here 
which may in t he end jeopadize the 
s true tu:~e on ·•.;Jich we have built ••• 
\t.Je do stand for human ri r ht •• • V.le 
must preserve the European basis of 
our society ••• That is the fundamental 
issue in this Bill.l 
The South African attitude was set: there would be 
international complications but the issue was a 
domestic one and the Union was doing its best for 
its Indian inhabitants. 
The 1946 measure was followed by others which 
\orere added to the growing list of Indian and 
Pakistani compl 8ints at the United Nations . Act 
49 of 1949, prohibited mixed marriages between 
Europeans and non-Europeans. Act 21 of 1950, 
----------------------------------------------------1. State Information Off ice, op. cit., p . 3 
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the Immorality Amendment Act, prohibited sexual 
relations be~reen Europeans and Indians.l The 
Population Registration Act, NQ~ber 30 of 1950, 
classified everyone in South Africa as white, 
coloured, or native; the classification to be made 
by the Director of t he Census by ethnic lines. It 
was possible but impracticle to object to one's 
classifica t ion and future generations were thus 
pre-as ~ igned to lists.2 
The most nota ble of the 1950 legisla tion was 
the Group Areas Act , Number 41 of 1950 , which now 
exists as the Consolidated Act Number 77 of 1957. 
Under it individuals may be restricted to pro perty 
in cer tain areas on the gr ound of race, compelled 
to move to particular areas on governmental order, 
and they may lose inheritance rights in areas 
reseTved for o ther r aces.3 Despite disclaimers by 
the Union Government the act operates to the 
detriment of the non-European . It is par t of t he 
policy of a partheid, the physical separation of the 
ethnic lines of the population. 
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The Group Areas Act paved the way for the 
introduction of a further question on South Africa 
at the United Nations, that of its general racial 
policies. However, this ch8pter is only concerned 
with the Indian problem (which is, of course, 
also entangled wi th the Group Areas Act) as a 
specifically intra-Commonwealth problem. 
Union legisl ation is based, apparently very 
honestly , on the Afrikaaner belief in the 
superiori ty of men of white color. Thus one is 
dealing not simply with political end economic 
problems here but also with an emotional matter. It 
is not just enough to maintain that the Indi an is 
an economic threat to the South African white 
middle-class; he is seen as a threat to an entire 
way of life. Without condoning this attitude it 
should be borne in mind when assessing the situation. 
The Question of the Indians in South Africa was 
included on the agenda of the First Session of the 
United Na tions over the protests of South Africa. It 
was dis cussed by a Joint Committee of t he First and 
Sixth Committees. Mme. Pandit, speaking for Ind ia, 
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maintained that the United Nations was compe tent to 
discuss the issue since the legislation of the 
Union (the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Repr esentation 
Act) was contrary to the objectives of the Cha r ter, 
had compromised the rela t ions of two member states, 
and had led to the s everence of Indo-South 
African relations . 
General Smuts, arguing for t he Union, told the 
Joint Committee that India was exploiting a domestic 
issue for political reasons. He maintained that 
the Union had not infringed upon any elemental 
human rights, drawing a dis t inc tion, quite sharp 
and fine, between fundamental r i ghts and privileges. 
The i mpression was that the right to live was the only 
fundamental right involved.l 
Canada and the United Kingdom both ur ged that the 
issue of competence be referred to the In ternational 
Court of Justice. The Uni t ed Kingdom regretted that 
an issue dividing t he Commonwe~l th had been r aised at 
the United Nations , ~ s it would have pref erred that 
family disputes be settl ed quietly . 2 
---------------------------------------------------------1. 
2. 
U.N., 1st session, Joint First and Sixth Committee, 
Nove ber 21, 1946 
Ibid., 2nd session, November 25, 1946 
At its fourth session the Joint Committee passed 
a resolution based upon the Indian dr Pft resolution 
as amended by France and Mexico, recor1111ending that 
the trea t ment of Indians in the Union 
be in conformity ~ith the international 
obligations under the agreements 
concluded between the two governments 
and t he relevant provisions of the 
Charter.l 
At the fiftieth General Ass embly Plenary, General 
Smuts suggested that the matter of United Nations 
competence be submitted to the International Court 
of Jus tice. He maintained it was a matter of 
domestic jurisdiction. To Mme. Pandit going to the 
Court '"as "late in the day and is farfetched." She 
then appealed to the other Commonweal th nations 
not ·ng that 
The Government of the United Kingdom has 
all along , through statements made by 
Secretar ies of State and others, deprecated 
the discrimination against Indians in 
South Africa. The United Kingdom and her 
Dominions, wilili the exce':l tion of South 
Africa, at the Imperial Conference in 
1921, expres ~ly passed a res olution to the 
effect t ha t Indians in any of the dominions 
should not be discrimina ted against ••• I 
trust they will live up to the professions 
made in the past and lend full support to 
the recommendation of the Joint Committee ••• 
I ask for the verdict of this Assembly 
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on a pr oven violation of the Charter ••• 
on an issue the decision on which must 
make or mar the loyalty and confidence 
which the common people of the world 
have pl ;:~ c ed in us . l·iine is an appeal 
to a conscience -- to the conscience 
of the , .... or ld which this Assembly is . 1 
It was an eloquent address and brough t to bear a 
delicate point, the Common\oreal th's recognition of 
its obligations as sta ted in the past coupled with 
the polite threat of i nter nPtional response if 
I nd ia did not get its way . 
The United Kingdom delegate, Sir Hartley 
Shawcross, argued that 
this of all matters is one to be dealt 
with coldly and dispassionatel y ••• It is 
that a denial of this a ppeal (to the 
I nter nEtiona l Court) would do far more 
h~ rm ••• than it will ever do good to 
the Indians in South Africa ••• 2 
In other words, the United Kingdom was looking for 
a way out, a way to avoid an outright decision on 
the Assembly floo~ which would make obvious a split 
in t he fabric of the Commonweal th. 
Mme . Pandit was bi tter 
When I s poke yesterday , I expressed a hope 
that the British Commonwealth would at least 
remain neutral in this c~ntroversy , which 
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vitally concerned two of its most important 
members . But Sir Hartley Shacross' speech 
has shattered my hopes . He has spoken in a 
manner which I consider entirely t o be 
partisan . 
Sir Hartley had also drawn a comparison in his speech 
between the South African matter and the Indi an communal 
problem, a comparison t he Indian delegate found 
not ••• in good taste (for referring to 
these differences) which he knovs, or 
should knmv, have been brought about 
largely by the role which the British 
Government has Dl Ayed ••• He has referred to 
these differences with evident and 
unconcer ned glee ••• l 
Mme . Pandit wa s putting the United Kingdom and the world 
quickly on guard t hat she WQuld defend India's interests 
as she sa·,; them. India then pressed for a vote on 
the Joint Committee's resolution by a simple ma j ority , 
to obviate an uncertain two-thirds vote. On this 
she l osy 29-24-1 with the entire Commonwealth opp~sing 
her and thus indirectly defendL~g South Africa. The 
Joint Committee's draft resolution itself passed by a 
satisfactory two-thirds ma j ority, with Australia 
abstaining, India for, and the rem~inder of the 
Common· ealth voting in the negative. Resolut ion 44 (I) 
--------------------------------------------------------1. U.N., op . cit. 
2. Ibid. 
thus marked a victory for India and international 
interference in vrhat had previously been intra-
Commonwealth affairs . As it called for a Report to 
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the Assembly by the governments concerned, the issue 
was again before the United Nations at its next session. 
The passF ge of the Resolution was met with an 
outburst of outrage in the Union, as exemplified 
by General Smuts' comments on July 20, 1946, 
There is no equality in any country on 
God 's earth ••• Jinnah, vTho represents 
lOO,ooo,ooo people, says there is only 
one solution for India -- partition and 
an exchange of populations ••• Is that 
equality? If vre do these things in 
South Africa it is called 'a ghetto.' 
I mention this today to show you the 
unre? lity there was Pt the United Nations.l 
The discussions on South Afri ca were resumed at 
t he Second Session of the United Nations. The First 
Committee on November 12, 1947, heard Mr . Lawrence of 
South Africa maintain th8t the Union did no t consider 
itself bound by Resolution 44 (I) as the 1927 and 1932 
Agreements were not international obliga t ions. He also 
s tated that India only wished to negotiate with the 
Union as if it were a defendant and that the Union 
strongly r esented the economic and trade embargo that 
1. "New York Times," December 21, 1946, p. 2:5 
India had imposed against it. He maintained that 
the legislation of South Africa did not infringe 
upon fund cmental rights.l 
Mme. Pandit attacked certain speeches of General 
Smuts in which he denounced the United N?tions and 
then stated thP. t her government was willing to 
negotiate with the Union on the basis of the 1946 
Res olution.2 She received backing from the Pakistani 
delegate who believed the South African Indians 
(including those whose families had come f rom what 
now vJas Pakistan) ought to have full rights.3 
New Zealand maintained that the General Assembly 
should not intervene . If the Indian comple.int was 
proper then it was equally proper for any nation to 
compla in at any time about the treatment of 
129 
individuals in other st~ tes who were not their nationals, 
as the Indi~ns in South Africa were not nationals of 
India nor of Pakistan, but of the Union.4 
-----------------------~----------------------------------1. U. N., 106th session, First Committee, November 
12, 1947 
2. Ibid . 
3. Ibid., 108th session, November 14 , 1947 
4. Ibid., 107th session, November 12, 1947 
The United Kingd om found satisfaction that t his 
year the Debate involving three members of the 
CommonFealth had been on such a high level. The 
delega te noted that the distinction between 
discrimination and protection depended upon one's 
point of view. He felt it ought to be ~ossible to 
satisfy India and Pakistan as ·,.;ell as South Africa 
and therefore supported a Five Power (Belgium, 
Brazil, Denmark, Cuba, NorvTay) draft resolutionl 
which called for direct negot i 8t ions and t hen, if 
that failed, an appeal to the International C1urt 
in regard to competence. 
The Committe voted f irst on the Indian draft 
resolution which a) reaffirmed the 1946 Resolution, 
b) c8lled for a Round Table discussion and c) called 
for a Report to the Secretary-Gene ral on the results 
of the discussion.2 Except for Austr ~lian and United 
Kingdom a bs tent i ons on point "c" the entire Commom1eal th 
opposed India and Pakistan on the draft . Nonetheless 
it passed as did the Five Power draft and both 
resolutions went before the General Assembly .3 
--------------------------------------------------------1. 
2. 
3· 
At this stage a Three Power draft. 
U.N., Document A/C .l/244/Rev.l 
Ibid., 112th session, First Committee, 
November 17, 1947 
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In the General Assembly South Africa maintained 
her position that the matter of Indians in the Union was 
a matt er essentia lly 1tTi thin the domestic jurisdiction of the Union of South 
Africa, and therefore beyond the 
competence of this General Assembly.l 
Mme. P8ndit addressed herself s pecifically to 
the Members of the Commonwealth in no uncertain terms 
May I say a word at this stage to the 
members of the British Commonwealth --
to request them to reflect very seriously 
over the cert8in consequences all over 
Asia and Africa of voting do1tm a resolution 
of this character (the Indian draf t). The 
Charter will lose its me?ning for millions 
of people throughout the world, and the 
foundations of the United Nations will be 
weakened by a denial of the very 
principle which we are so fond of quoting 
from this ros t r urn. 2 
India could only see .her O'·-n side in the matter but the 
war ning \'las clear and in the light of subsequent events 
in both Asia and Africa pronhetic : the time had come 
to drop the idea of white supremacy and pave the way 
for the attainmen t of t he legitimate aspirations of 
the colored peoples . 
Nevertheless, in t he voting Aust!'alia, New Zealand, 
South Africa and the United Kingdom opposed the 
Indian resolution which had Pakistani support (Canada 
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1. U.N. , 119th General Assembly Plenary, November 20, 1947 
2. Ibid., !20th General Assembly Plenary, November 20, 
1947 
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did not vote at all) and the milder Five Power Resolution 
had Indo-Pakistani opposition but the approval of the 
other Commonwealth members . The Indian resolution 
carried but , lacking a t11o-thirds vote, was not passed . 
The Five Power Resolution lacked even a majority.l The 
Assembly therefore took no concrete action on the 
problem at its Second Session. 
India and Pakistan again raised the iss ue at the 
Third Session of the General Assembly . At the debate 
over the inclusion of the item on the Agenda, V~ . Eric 
Louw of the Union argued that the matter was domestic 
and to hear it would be a violation of Article Two, 
par ~ graph seven of the Charter2 
Nothing conta i ned in the Jresent Cha~ ter 
sha 11 authorize the United N"' tions to 
intervene in matters which are essentially 
i-·Jithin the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state o~ shall require the Members to 
submit such matters to settlement under 
the present Charter; but this principle 
shall not prejudi ce the application of 
enforce~ent meP PUres under Chap ter VII.3 
The same vie1v was taken on the Assembly floor by :tv'J.r . 
Louw without effect and the matter went to the First 
Commit tee . 4 India's delegate maintained t hat 
1 . 
2 . 
~ : 
U. N., 12lst General Assenbly Plenary, November 20, 1947 
Ibid., 43rd Meeting , General Co~~ittee, September 
22, 1948 
The Cha~ter of the United Nations 
U. N., 146th General Assembly PlenBry, September 
2'r,l948 
Articles Ten and Fourteen gave India the right to 
raise the issue, Article Fourteen reading, in part , 
Subject to the provisions of Article 12, 
the General Assembly may recorrmend 
measures for t he pea ceful Adjustment 
of any situation, rega dless of origin, 
which i t deems likely to impa i r the 
general welfare or friendly relat ions 
?mong nations ••• l 
In the c~urse of the First Committee's hearings 
India com•'la ined of the humiliating discrimination 
practiced by South Africa and maintained t hat the 
Union Government had not resuected human riohts 
and fundament ~l freedoms . 2 South Africa coun tered 
that All India \..ranted to do was to incite animosity 
against the Union . It reminded the other members of 
the United Nations that the principle of national 
sovereignty was at stake and that the Union was 
defending this i deal.3 
New Zealand , in good form, regretted the dispute 
between t\·10 nations t>lith whom she 1>1as friendly. New 
Zealand could not support any resolution condemning 
the Union G~vernment and suggested sim- ly that a plan 
of mediation be offered . 4 Australia found the issue 
----------------------------------------------------1. 
2 . 
~ : 
The Charter of the United Nations 
U. N., 263rd session, First Committee, May 9 , 1949 
Ibid., 265th session, l.fay 10, 1949 
Ibid. 
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extremely complex and thought the only hope was to 
bring the parti es together . She would sup~ ort a 
Se,-Tdish- Danish Resolution (A/ c.l/463) asking 
the parties to seek an answer . l 
The Pa1 ~ istani delegate f :J und that South Africa 
was ad~itting she was wr ong in merely sticking to 
the legal arguments of the case. The Karachi 
Government sincer ely hoped the Union would 
accept the Resolutions of the United Nations in good 
faith . 2 
Canada thought that a happy balance ought to be 
struck between Articles Seven , Ten and Fourteen of 
the Charter . vlhile Canada approved of t he moderation 
being shown by the Indian delegation and its new draft 
resolution, it would support the Scandinavian draft. 3 
The United Kingdom announced it would abs t ain in this 
unhappy con trove ~ sy. It had grave doubts as t o the 
competency of the Assembly and t hus could not support 
the Indian draf t "rhich v1ould establish an United 
Nat ions Comm ission . However, it w-uld support t he 
Swedish-Danish-(and now) Australian draft . 4 
1. 
2. 
~ : 
U. N., 266th sessi ~n, First Commi t tee, M~y 10, 1949 
Ibid. , 267th session, Hay 11, 1949 
Ibid . 
Ibid., 268th session, May 11, 1949 
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The United Kingdom never got around to voting on 
the Three Power draft as it was withdrawn follovdng 
the passage of the Indi an draft res8 l ution. On that 
vote Indi ~ and Pakistan were in the affirma ti ve, 
South Africa, the Uni ted Kingdom and Aus t r elia 
in the negative, and New Zer land and Canada abstained.l 
A Franco-Hexican draft calling for a Round Table 
Conference of India, Pakistan and South Africa 
also passed the Commit tee ,.,ith Nev1 Zealand, Pakistan 
and Canada for, South Africa and Aus t r alia opposed, and 
India and the United Kingdom abstaining.2 
In the General Assembly the Franco-Me· i can draft 
was passed as Resolution 265 (III) by a vote of 47-1-10 
with India, New Zealand , A~straliF , Canada and 
Pakistan in favor, South Africa opposed, and the 
United Kingdom abstaining,3 Australia was able to 
support India in t his as a Round-Ta ble Conference 
would be outside the aus pices of the United Nations . 
India dropped her own draft resolution. 
Preliminary conver sations occured at Cape Town 
between t he ~hree concerned parties in February, 1950. 
Unfor tunately the full Conference v1as not held as 
1. U.N., op . cit 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid ., 212th General Assembly Plenary, May 14, 1949 
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India refused to attend unless South Africa wi thhe ld 
enfo r cemen t of the newl y passed Group Areas Act, 
which the Union refused to do. 
Indian aga ;_n raised the issue at the Fifth 
Session of t he General Asseobly. In t he ad hoc 
Committee South Africa again took iss ue over United 
Nations' comr etence and lost on a vote on this 
35-3-~7, with India and P~kistan for compe t ence, 
Australia and South Africa voti ng no, and t he 
United Kingdom, New Zealand and Canada abstaining .l 
Without discussion the General Assembly passed the 
ad hoc Commi~'s recommended r esolution which 
1) denounced racial segregat ion or apartheid, 2) 
again recommended a Round Table Conference, 3) 
recommended the formation of a Commit t ee of Three 
to assist in a solution, if necessary, 4) referred 
to a hope to pr event enforcement of t he Group Areas 
Act, and 50 pl a ced the ite~ of the next Agenda .2 
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This Resolut i on 395 (V) passed 33-6-21 with I nd ia and 
Pakistan in favor, Aus tralia faithfully voting no with 
South Af r ica , and the r est of •he Commonwealth absta ining.3 
1. U.N., ad hoc Commi t tee session 41, November 14 , 1950 
2. Re"S''lution 395 (V) of the General Assembl.y 
3. U. N., 315th General Assembly Plena r y, Dec embe r 2 , 1950 
At the Sixth Session of the Gene~al Assembly the 
discussion followed tradit i nal lines. Resol ution 
511 (VI) calling for anothe r United Nations Commission 
and the sus vension of the Group Areas Act was pas sed 
with India and Pak istan for, and, in a notable switch, 
the United Kinfdom, Ne\·J Zealand, Australia and Canada 
all abstaining (though there "ras an ..... utright 
condemnation of South Afr i can legisla tion) and t he Union 
abs enti nf itself from the voting session.l 
In the Seventh Sessions the Indian Question had, 
for a companion, the rtace Conflict Ques t ion in the 
Union . However, no attempt was made to join the two 
issues and discussions proceeded separately. The Union 
returned to the ta ble to oppose placing the Indian 
Ques tion on the Agenda and to a!Ul ounce that she '"as 
willing to discuss t he matter on t he basis of the 
preliminary agreements of 1950, reached at Cape Tmvn. 
India found no reason to omit the item.2 In the 
ad hoc Committee hearing South Africa held that India 
really had shown no inclination to sett le the issue and 
was exploiting it for political reasons. 
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1 . U.N. , 360th General Assembly Plenary, J anuary 12 1952 
2. Ibid., 380th General Assembly Pl enary, Oc ~ober 16, 1952 
3. Ibid., 8th meeting , ad hoc Committee, Novembe r 3, 1952 
Mme. Pandit f ound that the struggle in South 
Africa was a symbol of the wo ::;ld-wide str uggle to 
maintain the dign i ty and worth of the human person.l 
Aust ralia and New Zealand again doubted the 
competence of the United Nations and felt that asking 
the Union to suspend the Group Areas Act was 
interference in domestic matters.2 Pakistan saw 
a sign of the times in the number of co-sponsor s of the 
Indian draft res : lution.3 
Resolution 615 (VII) passed the ad hoc Committee 
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and the General Assembly~ with India and Pakistan for, 
South Africa opposed, and the remainder of the Con:rrnonvieal th 
still abstaining. It called for the establishment of 
an United Nations Good Offices Commission named by the 
President of the Assembly, the suspension of the 
Group Areas Act, and the insertion of the issue on the 
Agenda for the next year. 
The rnual continued at the Eighth Session of the 
General Assembly. Ad hoc Committee and General Assembly 
votes5 by the Commonwealth on that Session's draft 
-------------------------~-------------------------------1. U.N., op. cit. 
2. Ibid., lOth meeting, November 5, 1952 
3 •• Ibid., 8th meeting, Nove ~ber 3 1952 ~ Ibid., ~Olst General Assembly Plen~ry, December 5, 1952 5. Ibid., ~57th General Assembly Plenary 
resolution were the same as in the previous year. The 
Resolution in the Eighth Session added a denunciation 
of South Africa for passing legislation contrary to 
the Universal Declaration of Human Ri ghts along with the 
other, by now, standard provisions. 
At the Ninth Session of the General As s embly the 
Indian draft resolution 1) expressed the thanks of 
the Assembly for the work done by the Good Offices 
Commission (it had vrritten a few letters), 2) called 
for direct negotia t ions between South Africa, India 
and Pakistan, 3) suggested any agency or government 
might assist in reaching a solution, lt) asked that 
the Secreta ryQGeneral nBme a mediator if nothing 
occured within the next six months, and 5) placed the 
issue on the Agenda for the next Session. l On the crucial 
second point South Africa and the United Ki ngdom 
abstained though the remainder of the Commonwealth 
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gave its app r oval. On the entire draft India and Pakistan 
were '\>lith the overv.r.helming majority, South Africa voted 
no, alone, and the remainder of the Cormnom·tealth 
abstained.2 
------------------------------------------------------------1. U.N., Document A/2784 
2. Ibid., 497th General Assembly Plenary , November lt, 1954 
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At the Tenth Session , and the ninth time the issue 
was raised, South Africa, in the course of the General 
Debate which had been harking back to the spirit of 
San Francisco, this being the anniversary year of the 
United Na tions, stated 
A return t o the spirit of San Francisco of 
1945 must also mean tha t full recognition 
is given in \>lord and in deed to a basic 
factor governing f riendly rel~tions between 
St? tes, namely, non-intervention in one 
~nether's domes t ic affair s. 
Havinr st:- ted t hi s the Union Again invoked Article Two, 
paragraph seven of the Charter, without success.l 
South Africa found that negotiations with India 
were impossible due to New Dehli's attitude and that 
therefore 
As far as South Africa is conce r ned, the 
question of persons of Indian origin in 
the Union of South Africa is r egarded as 
defini ' ely closed.2 
The Indian delegation retorted that 
No inter na t ional obligation can live 
apart from the domestic sphere. International 
obliga tions are imperceptibly interwoven 
in the domestic texture of any state.3 
South Africa refused to attend the sess i ons of the 
ad hoc Committee, havi ng walked out over t he Race 
1. 
2. 
3· 
U. N., 528th General Assembly Plenary, Sep te~ber 29, 1955 
Ibid. 
Ibid., 530th General Assembly Plenary, 
September 30, 1955 
Conflict issue. Resolution 919 (X) passed through 
the Committee with Canada joining Indi a and Pakistan 
and A us tre~lia, Ne'·' Zealand and the United Kingdom 
abst 2ining . In the Assembly no roll-call was taken 
and the measure passed by a large m?j ori ty.l 
In the Eleventh Session, and the last one 
with which this disser tati on will deal, South t.f r ica 
again objected to the inclusion of the Indian Question 
item. India expressed delight that South Africa was 
back in the General Assembly. 2 On the roll-call vote 
to : nclude the item the vote was identical to that 
in the previous year, with newly admitted Ceylon 
vo t ing with India , Pakistan and Canada .3 
In the hearing held by the Speci al Political 
Committee Pakiste~n regretted the absence of South 
Africa.4 India hoped t he Commonwealth would support 
her in this issue regarding human righ ts . 5 Aus tr alia 
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1. 
2. 
U.N., Meeting 33, ad hoc Committee, December 8 , 1955 
Ibid., 577th General Assembly Pl enary , November 
15, 1956 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Ibid., 578th General Assembly Plenary, November 
1 5, 1956 
Ibid,, Meeting 7, Special Poli t ical Committee , 
Januar y 7, 1957 
Ibid, 
held the fort for South Africa and argued t hat the 
United Nations lacked competence.l The United 
Kingdom maintained that i t would not take sides at 
this late date and would abstain . 2 Ceylon thought 
South Africa ought to be cond emned . 3 The Committee 
and then t he Assembly passed Resolution 1015 (XI) 
noting 
l) the readine ss of India and Pakistan to 
negot iate with South P~rica ; 
2) that it regretted that South Africa 
would not negotia te; 
3) tha t it ap~ealed to South Africa 
to negot ia te . 
Meanwhile , furious over the inclusion of the 
Indi an r nd Race Conflict items on the Agenda , South 
Africa wa lked out of the United Nations and cut its 
repr esentation t o a skeleton staff . 5 The activi t ies 
of the United Nations had failed to give redress to 
the Indians in South Africa and t hat nation was in 
open and f l agrant defiance of the world oreanization. 
~---------------------------------------------- -----~-1. 
2 . 
3· 
4. 
5. 
U. N., op . ci t . 
Ibid . 
Ibid ., Meeting 9 , Special Political Commit tee , 
J onucry 8 , 1957 
Ibid ., 11th Session , Annex, Agenda Item 24 
Ibi d ., 597t h General Assembly Plenary, 
Nove~ber 27 , 1956 
142 
The voting and attitudes taken by the various 
Cornmomveal th nations are not difficult to account 
for in many v!Ays . The obvious interest of India and 
Pakistan in the issue accounts for their steadfast 
stand, though India's reluctance in 1947, to have 
direct negotia t i ~ns raises some doubt as to India 's 
overall sincerity in raisin[ the issue . 
The United Kingdom found itself in a difficult 
and awkward situation, trying not to step on the toes 
of any Commonv•ealth member but managing to irritate the 
two largest membe.rs of the Commom·lea l t h. It was an 
unpleas?nt si t uation. 
The Canadian delegation seems to have been 
influenced first by its close ties wit h the older 
members of the Commonvrealth and then, in later debates, 
by i ts ties v:i th the United States which, after 1949, 
began opposing the South African stand . Ottawa was 
unable to be a lynch- '"~ in bet,'leen Ha shington and the 
Commonwealth C<'lpitals in a situat ion where the 
Commonwealth i t self vras split . 
Australia's full support of the Union is l ogical. 
Australia itself was enforcing a rigid and discriminatory 
policy in regard to immigration. Consistency alone, and 
an apparent i dent ic view on matters of race brought 
about a closeness of attitude between Canberra and 
Pretoria. 
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New Zea land generally abstained . While concerned 
over the domestic jurisdiction issue, Ne \oJ Zealand 
herself was an example of a two-racial society 
dwelling together in harmony. To have suppor ted 
South Africa to an extreme would have been an 
insult to t he Maori peoples . 
On the whole, however, the older Commonwealth 
nations lent good support to South Af r ica. Ties 
of sentiment, uneasine ss in the changing world 
picture, and concern over the ma tter of domestic 
jurisdiction were common t o all of them. 
The raising of t he is sue has not alleviAted the 
conditions of the Indians in South Africa. If anything, 
matters have become worse as f urther restr ict i ve 
legisla tion was passed . The United Nations was unable 
to solve the matter as one of its members simpl y defied 
it. 
As for t he Commonvieal th it \olas able to sur vive this 
serious division during the per i od covered by this 
dissertation. However, the admission of newer 
Members after 1957, and the alteration in the racial 
composition of the Commonwealth, coupled with the 
increased racial discriminatory oolicies of the 
South African Government finally led to the wi t hdrawal 
of that Government from the Commonwealth in 1961. 
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CHAPTER V 
Within the first f i ve years of its existance the 
United Nations had gradually slipped from its hoped-for 
position as the arbiter of the international 
community. Following upon the heels of the Allied 
victories in 1945, the workings of international 
politics had split the 't•rorld in to two power blocs, 
one headed by the Government at Moscow, the other, by 
the Administration in Washington . As the United 
Nations was established 't'f'ith the idea that the major 
p01<1ers v1ould act in concer t the split between the 
two largest powers seriously limited its functions. 
Then, in early 1950, the Soviet Union refused to 
take part in the work of the United Nations, apparently 
because it felt that the Chinese nations was not 
properly represented. 1 In the midst of these attitudes 
and crises the United Na tions was called upon to meet 
its sternest test to date -- the issue of Korea. 
Korea had, at one time, been an independent 
Asian nation jutting into the Sea of Japan. Its very 
---------------------------------------------------------1 . The Central Peoples' Government of the Peoples' 
Republic of China, located at Peiping was 
est~blished on October 1, 1949. It controlled all 
of mainland China. The government which it 
overthrew, the Republic of China, retired to Taiwan, 
an island formerly held by Japan under an 1895 
Treaty and over which she renounced sovereign ty in 
1951. 
position made its nationhood precarious, as it lay 
between China and Japan . A great deal of confusion 
over the exact relationship of Korea to China exists, 
but for Western purposes Korea was sover eign in the 
nineteenth century.l That sovereignty was extinguished 
in 1910, when a short-lived J8panese protectorate 
was transferred into outright annexation. 
While Japan developed Korea economically, albeit 
for her own purposes, many Koreans did not appreciate 
Tokyo's efforts and an independence movement was 
originated, under the leadership of t he American 
educated Syngmann Rhee . Nothing came of his plans, 
however, until World War II was well in progress. 
Late in November , 1943, President Roosevelt, Prime 
Minister Churchill, and China's Chiang Kai-Shek met 
at Cairo to discuss the war against Japan. On 
December 1, 1943, they announced that 
••• Japan will also be expelled from all 
other territories which she has taken by 
violence and greed. The aforesaid three 
great powers, mindful of the ensl8vement 
of the people of Korea, are determined 
---------------------------------------------------------1. For an illuminating discussion of Far Eastern 
political relationships see Nelson, M. Frederick, 
Korea ~ the Old Orders 1n Eastern As$4~ (Lousiana 
State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1 ,). 
that in due course Korea shall become 
free and independent ••• ! 
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Thus the three po\orer s took upon themselves a moral 
and politicPl responsibility for the Koreans . Military 
events made it impJs sible for any of the three 
signa tories to the Cairo Declaration to land troops 
in Korea prior to the surrender of Japan on August 14, 
1945. 
The Soviet Union entered the vmr aga i nst JapAn on 
August 8, 1945, and t\vo days later her troops 
entered Korea .2 Prior to this there had been some 
talk of a four- power trusteeship for Korea,3 but 
no provisions for actual occupa tion. The rapid 
mili t ary movements of August, 1945, finally brought 
about a strictly military a greement for the division of 
Korea between occupying Soviet and the now arriving 
American military forces at p~raellel thirty-eight 
4 degrees north latitude. This split Korea geographically 
into two almost equal portions but placed twenty million 
of her t'\venty-nine million people in American control. 
1. 
2. 
4. 
Bartlett, op . cit ., p . 661 
McCune, George M., K~r)a Tod~v , (Harvard University 
Press, Cambr idge, 19 0 , p . 3 
Truman, Harry, Hemoirs 1 vol. 11, "Years of Trial and Hope," (Doubleday and <.;o. , Inc. , Garden City, New 
York, 1956), p. 317 
McCune, op. cit., p. 44 
The .~erican occupation was strictly military at 
the outset. Korean moves to establish an independent 
government were immediately squelchedl pending an 
agreement between the United States, the Soviet Union 
and other powers concerned for the establishment of an 
unified stRte. Steps in that direction were t aken in 
December , 1945, by the Moscow Agreement of that month 
which established a Joint American-Soviet Commission. 
That Commission got nowhere. American proposal s 
to set up a Korean provisional government in the 
Autumn of 1947, were rejected by l4oscm·T.2 
The American Government next laid the issue before 
the United Nations General Assembly. That body , by 
a 43-0 vote on November 14, 1947, resolved that 
••• in order to facilitate and expedite 
such partici pation (by Korean representatives) 
••• there be forthwith established a United 
Na tions Temporary Commission on Korea • •• 
3 . Further recommend that as soon as 
possible after the elections, the Na tional 
Assembly should convene and form a 
National Government • • • 3 
The Commission included Austral ia, Canada and India from 
the Conmonweal t h. K. P. S. l1enon of India was chairman 
of the group, which found itself unable to enter 
1. 
2. 
3· 
McCune, op. cit., pp. 45-47 
Truman, o · . cit., p. 320 
Government of New Zealand, New Zealand and ~ Korean 
Crisis, (De partment of E::·ternal Affairs, Publication 
No . 96, Government Printer, Wellington, 1950), p. 11 
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North Korea. l The Commission carried out its manda te 
in the southern sectors of the country and observed 
what were considered fair el~ctions on May 31, 1948 . 
Ahead of an United Nations resolution to give 
independence to Korea, South Korean le -- islators 
established the Republic of Korea on August 14 , 1948. 2 
The North Koreans countered on August 25, 1943 , 
by calling elections for a Supreme Peoples' Asse ·:tbly, 
and reser ving 360 seats for South Korea out of a total 
of 572 . 3 On Senternber 10, 1948, at Pyongyang, the 
Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea was established . 4 
On December 30, 1948, the Soviet Union announced the 
withdrawal of its troops from the area.5 
The Republic of Korea, at Seoul, under the 
presidency of S;:ngmann Rhee, ' ·ra s fo:-ma lly recorni zed 
by the United Nations General Assembly on December 12, 
1948, as t he only Government in Korea established under 
United Nations RUspices . However, the Resolution 
carefully avoided giving the impression that the 
1 . 
2 . 
~ : 
5. 
McCune, op. cit . , p. 223 
Ibid., p . 230 
Ibid. , p . 247 
Ibid . , p . 22 
Truman, op . cit. , p. 328 
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United Nations recognized it as representati ve of anything 
or anyone outside of South Korea, and implied str ongly 
that it could certainly not clain to represent the 
people of North Korea where United NP.tions supervised 
elections had not occured.l The Uni ted Nations 
maintained its presence in Korea t hrough the Uni ted 
Nations Commission on Korea, pending a unification 
of the nation . 
Relations between Pyongyang and Seoul were non-
existant, except f or occasional border fights between 
their military units along the frontier so 8bruptly 
drawn. A military build-up in the Spring of 1950, in 
North Korea was noted, some time after the withdrawal 
of all American troops. American Central Intelligence 
had no idea as to when , or even if, North Korea t-ras 
planning aggression,2 nor, would it appear, did 
Republic of Korea intelli gence. Hm·1ever, on the 
evening of June 24, 1950, President Truman was 
notified that South Korea had been invaded by North 
Korean forces. His infor man t, Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson, recommended that the United St a tes request 
----------------------------------------------------------1. Government of New Zealand, op . cit., p. 12 
2. Truman, op. cit., p. 331 
the United Nations Security Council to declare that 
an act of aggression had occured.l 
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The Council met promptly on Sunday, June 25, 1950, 
and by a 9-0 vote 
••• Noting with gr~ve concern the armed attack 
upon the Republic of Korea by forces from 
North Korea; 
Deternines t ha t this action constitutes a 
breach of the peace, 
1. Calls f or the immediate cessation of 
hos t ilities; and calls upon the authorities 
of North Korea to 1-Ti thdraHl their ~rmed 
forces to the thirty-eighth parallel ••• 
3. Calls upon all members to render every 
assistance to the United Nations in the 
execution of this res olution and to refrain 
from giving assistance to the North 
Korean authorities.2 
The Council was able to act since the Soviet dele ga te 
was not present, having left the Council in January. 
It can be assumed that otherwise the Soviet 
representative would have vetoed the resolution. 
Yugoslavia abstained on the vote and India, the elected 
Commonwealth member on the Council, voted in favor. 
A Yugoslav resolution in draft form was presented 
which named no aggr es sor and simply called for the 
cessation of hostilities. This met defeat by a vote 
of 1-6-3, with India among the abstainers. The 
1. Truman, op. cit., p . 332 
2. U. N., ~73rd Meet1ng, Security Council, June 25, 1950, 
Doc. S/1499 
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Indian delegation made no statement at this crucial 
meeting though the United Kingdom del egate , Sir Terence 
Shore, denounced the aggression.l 
The Counci l resumed its sessions on June 27, 1950. 
Sir Benegal Rau of India, serving as pres i dent for the 
month, presented the Council wi th a challenge 
A terrible burden therefore rests upon us 
as the body charged with the prime 
res ponsibility for the maintainence of 
intern8tional peace . The people of the 
world are weary of ltTar and ru1nours of war, 
and we must try our best not to fail them.2 
The Security Council next passed an United States 
sponsored resolution which repeated the call for 
a cessation of hostilities and withdrawal by North 
Korea and 
Recommends that the members of the United 
Nations furnish such assistance to the 
Republic of Korea as may be necessary to 
repel the 8rmed attack and to res tore 
international peace and security in the area.3 
The vote was 7-1-2, with India abstaining. At the next 
Council session the Indian delegate announced that he 
had r bstained for lack of instructions but that 
The Government of India therefore accept 
the second resolution of the Security 
Council ••• The Government of India ea rnestly 
----------------------------------------------------------1. 
2. 
3· 
U. N. , op • ci t • 
Ibid., ~74th Meeting, Security Council, J une 27 , 1950 
Ibid., Document S/1508/Rev. 1 
hope that even at this str-ge it may be 
possible to put an end to the fi ghting 
and to settle the dispute by mediation.l 
The Indian move was 'varml y received by the nevr British 
delega te, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, 
My delegation greatly welcomes the 
decision of the Government of India to 
accept the resolution of June 27 ••• 
It is all the more important since it 
represents the considered view of a 
great Asian Power .2 
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To the call for assistance by the Security Council 
the reply of t he Commonwealth nations v1as i mmediate. 
As the United States had already actively intervened 
in the area the Commonwealth generally re r c ted with 
an acknowledgement of American command . 
Prime Minister Attlee, s peaking in the House of 
Commons on June 28, 1950, remarked 
The House will , ,•ish to know what action 
His Majesty's Government is taking ••• 
We have decided to support United States 
action in Korea by immediately placing 
our naval force s in Japanese waters at 
the disposal of the United St ~ tes 
authorities to operate on behalf of the 
Security Council in support of South 
Korea . Orders to this effect have already 
been sent to the Na val Commander on the 
s uot. Notification of thi s action is 
being made to the Security Council, 
1. U.N., 475th Meeting, Security Council, June 30, 1950 
2. Ibid. 
United St 8tes GJvernment, Government of 
South Korea, and al l Com:nonwealth 
Governments .1 
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The announcement was well received by the House . The 
United Kingdo~ thereupon immed ia tely placed the 
fol l owing vessels under United Ka tions PUspices: 
1 aircra ft carrier, 6 destroyers, 8 or 9 friga t es, 
assorted minesweepers and an hos pital ship. 2 
From Canberra the res ponse , stated by the 
Prime Mi nister, was equally r eassur ing 
The Commonwealth Government ••• has decided 
to support the resolution of the 
Security Council in rela tion to Korea by 
i mmedi Ate ly placing the ships of the 
Royal Australian Navy now in Ja pPnese 
wa ters at the disposal of the United 
N~ t ions through the United States 
authorities, in suppor t of the Republic 
of Korea . This decision has also been 
communicated to the Government of the 
United Kingdom. 3 
Ne'\·T Zealand announced its i mmediate support of the 
United Nations resolution and on July 1, 1950, an 
official statenent recorded that 
1 . 
2 . 
~ : 
The Prime Minister announced this evening 
that ••• the Government had given order s for 
the two New Zealand f r i gates H. N. N. Z. S. 
11Pukaki" and "Tuti ra 11 to sail for Hong Kong 
en route to the Korean area . These t'\·IO 
vessels will leave Auckland on Monday. ~ 
Government of Ne'\·1 Zealand, op . cit ., p. 15 
"Nevi York Times, " June 29, 1950, p . 1 :7 
Government of New Zealand, op . cit. , p . 15 
I bid . , p . 17 
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Canada announced her ships were to be sent to the 
\ves te!'n Pacif ic to be at the service of the United 
Nations . 1 India already announced her support of 
the Security Council's Resolution, and Pakistan did 
likewise . 2 South Africa also supported the action 
and on August 4 , 1961, announced she 1o1ould send a 
fighter squadron to Korea as her military contri bution 
to the effort . 3 
As the si tuation in Korea worsened, it bec~me 
necessary to send further troops. The United Kingdom, 
Australia and New Zealand all rather eagerly joined 
in this effort . Canada also did so, though with 
more deliberation, nossibly due to the rather heavy 
isolationist feeling maintained by the French-
s peaking citizens of that nation. 4 The total 
Commonwealth contributions will be found in the 
appendices . 
The immedi e te response from Australia and New 
Zeal and is underst andable . Both nations are in the 
West Pacific area and might well vievr t he situation 
in Korea a.s a threat of the Communist world (i.e., 
1 . ~ op. cit., and Document S/1538 
2 . Ibid. and Document S/1539 
3 . 11 Nevr fork Times," August 5, 1950, p. 2:4 
4. "The Round Table," No . 161, December, 1950, (The 
Round Table Ltd. , London, 1950), pp. 83-84 
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those areas under the sway of the Soviet Union) which 
vrould eventually embrace them. ~·iith its world-wide 
committments and ties to the Uni ted States, the United 
Kingdom took an obvious stand . Canada's attitud e was 
similar as she, too, was thoroughly con~itted to 
the defense of what is called 11 the Free vlorld, 11 due to 
its national outlook , historic and political attitudes, 
and the North Atlan tic Treaty Organization alliance . 
India and Pakistan reacted with s omewhat of a 
difference. Paldstan never offered fo ·-ces, ~resumeably 
because hers were all pledged to Kashmir . Opinion, 
both official and popular , in Pakistan was also 
somewhat cynical about the Korean episode . Many 
Pakistanis noted that where American interests were 
involved the United Nations reacted quickly, but that 
in such matters as Ka shmir or Palestine the reaction 
vra s not quite so clear . Some suspicion that the 
organization was too much Western-orientated at the 
time see ~s to have influF.nced Pakistani reaction.l 
The Indi an attitude ,.,as a combina t ion of 
denour cing aggression and, apparently, wishing it had 
never occured . India refuser to suppl y troops, 
1 . 11The Round Table," No . 160, Septe:!lber, 1950, (op . cit.), 
p . 372 
wanted friends hi p with all blocs, and was disturbed 
over its lengthy bor der with the Chinese sta te . The 
Indian position was gene ~ally f irm -- opposed to war 
and making an honest effort to mec iate the problem. 
For all of its efforts, India gene~~ lly found itself 
atta~{ed on all sides . 
The mili t ary situa t i on in Korea f or the United 
Nations was extremely grave when, on July 7, 1950, 
the Security Council recommended 
••• that all members providing military 
forces and other assistance pur suant to 
the aforesaid Security Council 
resolutions make such f or ces and other 
assi stance available to a Unified Command 
under the United States; 
4. Reque s ts the Uni t ed States to designate 
the cow~ander of such forces; 
5. Authorizes the Unified Conmand at its 
discre "ion to us e the United Nations 
flag in the c ~urse of operations ••• l 
1~ 
The United States i~medi a tely n~med General of the Ar my 
Douglas MacArthur as Commander-in-Chief of the Unified 
Command. 
The idea of unified commands soon exuanded . On 
August 21, 1950 , the United Kingdom and Aus t ralia 
aP~ounced that a British Commonwealth force, of units 
-------------------------------------------------------1. U.N., 476th Meeting, Secur ity Council, July 7, 1950, 
Document S/1587 
from both nations, would be set up.l However, the 
First (Commonweal th) Division of forces of the United 
Kingdom, Australia, C8nada and New Zealand was not 
formally org 2nized until Nay 2, 1951.2 Thus , for 
the f irst time in their t otally independent 
capaci ties3 me!:J.ber s ta t es of the Commom..rea 1 th united 
in the face of a common enemy. I t is note-vrorthy 
that the formation of the unit occur ed under the 
auspice s of the United Na tions Command . The division, 
aside from fi ghting units of the four member states 
mentioned, also included the 60th Indian Field 
Ambulance Unit (India vJa s willina to send such units 
to Korea but no t comba ttants). rhe Command was 
exercised by Major-General J. E. Cassels of the 
United Kingd om, assisted by Comm~nwealth officers . 
\4Jhile the older Comrn nweal th members made ·;p the 
fighting units the Asian and newer unit was the one 
dedicated s olely t o the saving of lif e. 
Gradually the United Nations took the upper hand 
in the Kor ean fi gh ting and by September, vlhen the 
General Assembly was to meet, it appear ed that 
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1. 
2. 
3· 
"New York Times," August 22 1950 p . 9:1 
Letter from Embassy of New ~ealand, \·lashing ton, 
containinr the May 2, 1951, announcement; June 21, 1961 
Austr~lia ?nd New Zealand did not formally acce~t the 
Statute of Westr. inster, 1931, until the 1940s . 
victory wa s at hand . With the Soviet Union back at the 
Security Council table in Aur ust in time to assume its 
turn at the presidency, a month had been lost in 
procedur al wrangles . 
At the Assembly ' s Ses sion, in the course of t he 
general debflte , the representatives of the Col!llon•·Jeal th 
all priased the great effo~t of t he United Na tions 
in Korea . Foreign Secretary E!'nes ,._ Bevin rema -·ked 
The last few months have s hown with what 
credit the United Nations has emerged 
from a period of great t r ial . It has 
proved itself ca·•able of doing ivha t many 
doubted whether it could do : it has 
displ ?yed t he unity of deter mination 
required to take promut and effec t ive 
a c t i on against aggression . l 
Never wou 1 d Mr . Secre tary Bevin know how very much 
one of his succes s ors in the Foreign Office would wish 
that the United Nations not take 11 prompt and effective 
action11 in a future event . 
Zafrulla Khan of Pakis tnn noted that 
I n these circums t?.nc es , the du ty of the 
Security Council was clear , and for the 
first time in its history the c ..... uncil 
gave an immedia t e re~ly to the challenge , 
so grave and i mpudent to the authority, 
nay, to the ver y existence of the 
Un1ted Nations . Z 
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-------------------------------------------------------------1 . 
2 . 
U. N., 283rd General Assembly Plena~y , September 25, 
1950 
Ibid. 
Khan's words ,.,ere strong but the reac t ion of his 
Government, of all the member states of the Commonwealth 
in the United Nations, ,.,as the weakest. 
Sir Benegal Rau quoted his own Prime Mini ster 
Our policy is, first, of c ~ urse, that 
aggress ion has t~ken pl~ ce by North Ko rea 
over South Korea . That is a wr ong act 
that has to be conde"med , that has to be 
resi s ted . Secondly, th~ t so far as 
poss ~ble, the war shoul d not spread 
beyond Korea. And, thirdly, that we 
s r ould explore means of ending this war . 
The fu t ure of Korea must be decided entirely 
by the Kor eans themselves.l 
This atti t ude is in full ra pp ort wi th most Indi an 
positi ons L~ international affai r s . Aggression is 
wrong Cth0ugh over Kashmir this gets clouded) and 
v!ar must be limited . The inheri t~nce of pacifism 
fr om Gandhi and the traHitions of his people are 
involved in Nehru's attitude . 
The deleg2tes of South Africa, Australia , 
Canada and New Zealand2 all cont inued along the same 
lines of condemning aggression and hoping for ·ea ce , 
along vli t h an united and independent Korea . 
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The main issue in regard to the war was the question 
1 . U.N. , 286th General As s e~blyPlenary, Sen tember 27, 1950 
2. Ibid., 282nd, 280th, 287th, and, again, 280th 
Genera l Assembly Plenaries, 25, 21, 27, and 20 
se .... tember, 1950 
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of the objective of the United Nations for ces. Should 
they cross the thirty-e i ghth parallel vlhen they reached 
it in their march back northvTards? The North Korean 
f orces were ranidly retreating after the brilliant 
Inchon landin ~s. On Se~ tember 30, 1950, Nehru was 
quoted as opposing such a crossing until 
all other means of settlement have been 
exnlored ••• I am no great admirer of 
President Rhee, anyhow ••• I am very 
glar that a ggression has been defeated . l 
On Oct ~ ber 1, 1950 , F1reign Minister Chou of 
the Central Peoples 1 Governr1en t t-Jarned that China 
\muld "not stand aside" if North Korea were 
invaded. 2 The warning was repea ted by India ~~o days 
later.3 India l r ter announced tha t she wanted a united 
Korea but also wanted North Korea t o h8ve a chance to 
cease hostilities prior to an United Nations crossing 
of the p~ rallel .4 
Meanwhile the General Assembly, without a roll-call 
vote, a ppr oved a resolution on October 7, 1950, by 
which it 
1. Recommends that (a) All appr opr i a t e r te ps be t aken to ensure 
--------------- -- ------ ------ ------- ------------------~---1. "Nevl Yor:'" Times, 11 September 30, 1950, p. 4 : 3 
2. Ibid., October 2, 1950, p . 3:1 
3·. Ibid., October 4 , 1950, p . 1 :6 
4 Ibid., October 13, 1950, p . 6 :6 
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condit i ons of stability throughout Korea; 
(b) All cons t ituent acts be t 8ken, including 
the holding of e l ections, under the auspices 
of the United Nations, for the establishment 
of a unified , independen t and democratic 
Gove~nment in the soverei gn State of Korea; ••• 
(d) United Ne tions f~rces should not remain 
in any pE~ r t of Yore a other dse the! n so far 
as nece ss ry for ?chieving the objectives 
s pecified in subpr ra r raphs (a) and (b) 
above ••• 
and esta blished the United Nations Commission for the 
Unific ~tion and Rehabilita t ion of Korea, on which 
AustraliP and Pakistan sat . l 
The October 7, 1950, Reso lution was a cl ear 
approval of the cro ssing of the parallel, for how else 
could the objec tives specifi ed be carr ied out? 
The crossing ~ra s made and the predicated :-esult ob tained. 
On November 6 , 1950 , General Ma c A.,., t hur reported "alien 
Reds " fi fh ting in Korea.2 After liberating almost all 
of Korea the United Nat ions forces were for ced back from 
the M"nchurian bo-der area in a swift attack by f orces 
of Chinese troops. 
The Chinese in tervention made a marked change in 
the Kore?n situation. The United Nations first attempted 
to concili ~, te the Chinese and prevent any large- scale 
1. U.N., 294th General Assembly Plena ry , October 7, 1950 
2 . "New York Times, " Nove mber 6 , 1950, p . 1: 8 
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inter vention thr ough a resolution ]assed on December 6, ~ 
1950, v!h ich sta ted, inter ~' 
The General Assembly, ••• 
Affirms that it is the policy of the United 
Na tions to hold the Chinese frontier with 
Korea inviolate and fully to protect 
legitimate Chinese and Korean intere sts in 
the frontier zone; 
Calls attention to t he grave d~nger which 
con t i nued intervention by Chinese f orces in 
Korea would entail for the maint 0 inence of 
such a policy ••• 
The Resolution ,,.,a s reassuring but India W8nted more done . 
Upon her suggestion t he Assembly passed Resol uti on 
384 (V) on December 14 , 1950, wtich established 
a Group on Cease-Fire in K0rea to seek a means of 
implementing a cease-f ire with the Chinese and North 
Korean fo~ ces.2 
Unfortunately , the Group was unable to obtain 
a cease- fire . Over strenuous Indian objections the 
Asse~~1bly formally condemned Peoples ' China as an 
a ggressor on February 1, 1951. India ma intained that 
the action would only prolong hostilities and that it 
was basically unfair as a proper ex~ mination of the 
facts had never been made.3 India also thought it 
was poor logic t o conde~m Chi na and then provide for 
--------------------~~-------------------- ----- ----------1. U.N., Document A/C .l/638 
2 . !Did., Document A/1426 
3. Ibid ., 327th General Asse~bly Plenary , February 1 , 1951 
a Good-Offices Y~ssion to obtain a cease-fire in the 
same Resolutio~ . The rest of the Commonweal th refused 
to support India, t hough Pakistan abstained. 
Shortly a f ter this t he bat t le-line stabAl ised 
at about Pare~llel Thirty- ei~th degrees North and 
remaineC ther e . In June of 1951, the Soviet Union's 
dele gate t o the Uni ted Na +- ions, Yt=~kov Nalik , in 
a broadcast in Ne .. York set in motion events leading 
to Korean ~ruce talks . For almost t wo years the 
nego t iations continued . These discussions have no 
pl t=~ ce in a su! vey of Co.r.monuealth reaction to the 
Korean incident . Only one ma j or incident involving 
the Commonwealth occured in the negotiations . Indie~ 
intervened in a manner which made possib ' e the 
non-for cef ul repatriation of pr isoners of war .l 
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For her humanitarit=~n effort here India won a denunciation 
from Chinese Foreign :tt..inister Chou as " the running 
dog of British imperia l ism,"2 an accusation that 
as t oni shed the Indians and the \·.rorld in general . 
An important side-issue to the Korean Incident 
was t he opening of the question of Chinese repr esentation 
1. These ta l lts e~re c overed i n Va tche r, \vill i am, 
Panmunjom, (Frederi ck A. Praeger, Inc ., Publishers , 
New York, 195 ") ) 
2 . "The Round Table," No. 170, Ma rch, 1953, (op . cit.) 
at the United Nations . Following the establishment of 
the Peiping Governmen t A number of nations opened 
diplomatic relations '\vith the new regime, or extended 
to it diplomatic recognition, including Indi R Bnd the 
United Kingdom. To t hese sta tes the Peiping regime 
was in de fac t o control of t he Chines e nation and the 
ques tion of recognition was one of prac tical politics . 
The A· erican government viewed the matter differently. 
Washington viewed the organization of Peoples' China 
as a bitter defeat for all the suppor t t hat had been 
lavished upon the Koumingtang regi me of Chiang Kai-
Shek, end recognition 'l.vas quite out of the question. 
Also, domestic politics rather t ied the hands of 
American diplomats v.!ho were \villing to fa ce reality. 
After t he Chinese in te rven t ion in Korea the matter of 
recogni t ion could not even be enter- tained by Washing ton. 
On Se r te mber 1~· , 1950, Nehru stated t hat 
To consid er any Asien problems without 
Peoples' Government of China being 
properly represented in the \vorld body 
shows an eyt reme lack of wisdom. l 
Three days l~ter he continued in the same vein 
If the United Nations is still dreaming 
of the old China, which is more or less 
-----------------~-------~----------------------------1. "New Yor1r Times," September 19, 1950, p. 9:1 
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defunct n~w, ±t is shuttinr its eyes 
to the facts . 
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India follovred up with the submission of a draft 
resolution to the General Assembly on Sep t ember 19, 
1950, the onen i ng day of the Fifth Session . It read 
The General Assembly, 
Noting tha t the Republic 8f China · s a member 
of the United Nations and of va r ious o· gans 
ther eof, 
Considering thCl t the oblig<=>ti ons of ~ Ne , ber 
under the Charter of t he United Nati 0ns 
cannot be carried out exce~ t by a government 
which, with a reas onable ex~ ectency of 
permanence, actually exercises con t rol over 
the territory of that Member Clnd commands the 
obedience of its people, 
Recognizing that the Central Government of the 
Peo~les' Republic of China is the ~nly such 
goverr~ent functioning in t he Republic of 
China as now cons t it uted, 
Decides t hr. t the aforesaid Cen t ral Government 
through its Head or its Mi nister for Foreign 
Affai~s or its accredited represen t a "ives 
as the case may be, shall be en titled to 
represent t he Republic of China in t he General 
Assembly and 
Reco~~ends that the other 0r pans of t he United 
Nations adopt similar res~lutions . 2 
The doc ument 1o1as carefully '..:orded and clear in meaning and 
i ntent . After all , the question of Chinese re ·,resen ta tion 
is a matt er of credentials . China already is i n the 
United Nations , merely her credenti~l s are to be 
considered . There can be no question of vetoing her 
1 . 
2 . 
"New York Times," Septe::nber 22, 1950 , p . 19:4 
U. N., 277th General As sembly Plena ry, Sep tember 19, 
1950, Document A/1365 
admittance as she is already there. 
Surprisingly the Soviet Union also introduced t'\>10 
draft resolutions dealing with the same question. The 
first simply withdrew recogni tion of the credentials 
of t he Republic of China, or the rrKoumingtang Group. nl 
The second invited the Central Government to take part 
in the work of the Assemb1.y and other or gans.2 The 
Indian pToposal was fa r more reasoned and 
comprehensive . Jus~ what the Soviet Union had in mind 
is uncl ear but its actions give some ground t o the 
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belief that their suppor t of Peiping was simr ly pro forma . 
India suppo r ted her proposal as sim~ly being 
logical . Of the remainder of the Co~onwea l th only 
Australia spoke on the draft res olution and denounced 
it as 
Certainly t he Austr alian del e gation at this 
moment is not sa t isfied that the People's 
Republic of China if admitted to t his 
Assembly would advance the cause of peace . 3 
In the voting the Soviet drafts were rejected by 
votes of 10- 38- 8 and 11-37- 8 . The Indian proposal was 
lost 16-33-10. On the roll-call vote on that proposal 
1. ~' op. cit . 
2. Ibid ., and Documen t A/1370 
3 . Ibid. 
the Comm~·m·lealth s pli t ivith India, F ~ kistan and the 
Uni ted Kingdom f or, Australia, New Zealand and South 
Af r ica in opp os i tion, and Canada abs taini ng.l The 
vote \·Tas lo gical : Indi.a, Pa'-i s t Pn and t he United 
Kin fdo~ all had r ecogni zed Pe 2pl e 's China; South 
Africa and Aus tralia wer e noisily anti -Communist and 
Ne\·l Zea l end us ually wen t alon - wi t h ;._us t r al ia on 
Far Eas tern matters (and both were looking forward to 
a defense ~r et wi th the United St Ptes) . Canada was 
caught between t wo politic al real i t ies: the actual 
situation in China and t he pre ssur e of her s out hern 
nei ghbor . 
The Gene r al Assembly, acting on a Canadian 
proposal, established a Committee of Seven to weigh 
the pros and c ons of t he Chinese r epresen ta t i on issue . 2 
This only pu t the ma t t er off, a policy still (Sep tember 
15, 1961) be i n g followed. 
\vhen the Comm onioJe al th Prime Hiniste r s me t in 
London in 1951, they found t hemse l ves in agreement in 
wishing to quick ly sett le t he Korean conf l i ct around a 
--------------------------------------------------------1 . U.N., op. cit. 
2 . Ibid., Document A/ 1371 
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conference table and without a major war with China. 
In their communique they stated 
••• We do not seek to interfere in the affairs 
of the Soviet Union or China or any other 
country; we are simryly determined to retain 
the rna s tery of our o·.m affairs, ,,Ji thout 
fear of aggression. 
It is with these c ~nsidera ions in mind that 
in the last few days we have directed cur 
effor ~ s to the securing of a cessation of 
hostili t ies in Korea, so that around the 
conference tFble the grea t powers 
concerned may compose their differences on 
a basis which will strengthen the United 
Nat i ons and fulfil l the purposes of the 
Charter ••• 
Our own support of the ~nited Nations needs 
no reaffirma t ion. The Commonweal t h and the 
United Nations are not inconsis tent bodies. 
On the contrary, the existence of the 
Commonwealth , linked together by ties of 
friendship, common purpose and common 
endeavor is a source of power behind the 
Charter .l 
Commonwealth efforts in the United Nations helped 
the latter organization meet a severe t est . Common 
purpose held aggression a t bay. Over the later events 
the CommonvTeal t h had little control, nor did the 
United Nations . 1-/hen the Chinese \vere ready they 
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agreed to a t r uce . The failure of a political sett lement 
was due to Sino- American differences . But this does not 
weaken the stand the Commom·Teal th and the United Nations 
took. Of this they may justly be proud. 
----------------------------------------------------------1. "The Round Table," No . 162, l-1arch , 1951, (op . cit.) 
CHAPTER VI 
In a world in which one can easily wr ite of the 
rrrising tide of nationalism" the Suez Canal Crisis of 
1956-1957, is a prime example of in- rushing vra ters. 
At times the waters are considerably mixed with the 
silt of othe r problems, but the res urgence of the 
peoples of Asia and Africa provide the waters of the 
main flow, a flow which threa tened to run over and 
submerge the Commonwealth in waves of bitter 
recriminations and cast a wrecked international 
community upon the shores of antipathy and distrust . 
The Suez Canal wa s constructed under an 
agreement between the Egyptian Khedivial Government 
and the Compagnie Universelle du C~nal Maritime de 
Suez.l Two Acts of Concession granted to M. de Lesseps 
of the Company form the legal framework for the 
Canal's oper Btion. The first Act , that of November 30, 
1854, provided that there was to be no discrimination 
of ships in the transit of the waterway.2 The 
second, of January 5, 1856, specifically declared, in 
Article 14 , that the Canal and its ports were to be 
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--~---------------------------------------------------------1. 
2. 
Hereinafter referred to as "The Company" or "The 
Suez Company." 
Avram, Benno, ~ Evolution of, the Su$8 Canal 
Status, (Libraire E. Droz, Geneva, 19 ), p. 23 
always an open neutral passage exclusively for ships 
of commerce, without distinction, exclusion, or 
preference of nationality.1 
However, as the Khedive was not fully an 
independent sovereign his overlord, the Ottoman Sultan, 
had to ratify the Acts and, o~ February 22, 1866, 
His Imperial Maj esty confirmed the grant, guaranteeing 
freedo m of transit to merchant ships . 2 The Canal, run 
by a private company, passing through the territory 
of one povrer but connecting t\'TO bodies of international 
waters, opened in 1869. 
In 1875, the British Government bought f r om the 
Khedive the largest bulk of shares of the Suez 
Comp any3 as a sh~reholder in a private corporation . 
This purchase, together with the impo rtance of the 
Canal for communications with the Indien Empi r e made 
Egypt an area of preeminent concern for the London 
Government . Seven years later, in 1882, follovring 
preliminary Anglo- French a ction, the actual military 
occupation of Egypt by British forces took place. 
1 . 
2 . 
3· 
Avram, op . cit. , p. 25 
Ibid • 2- p . 27 
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In 19)6 the United Kingdom Government held 196,034 
of 437 , 002 capital shares (44. 8%) and 157,470 
of 363,998 ordinary shares (43. 3%) of the Company 's 
stock. See Connell, John, T~e ~ I~portant Countrx, (Cas sell and Co . , London, 19 7), p. 9 
This last action placed Egypt in an awkward political 
position, it being an autonomous Turkish province in 
allegiance to the Sultan occupied by British troops and 
under actual political control from t he banks of the 
Thames. 
The question of the status of the Canal was 
disturbing the chancelleries of Eur~pe, now that 
British occupation had occured and seemed to be 
permanent . The Canal remained open to belligerents of 
both nations during the Franco- Prussian Nar under 
Article 14 of the Firman of 1856, but it was recognized 
that this was a concession of the Ottoman Government, 
not a guarantee, and thus subject to variation.l 
After extensive diplomatic preparation the 
Constantinople Convention of 1888, was signed between 
Great Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary , Spain, France, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Russia and Turkey, who 
voulant consacrer par un acte a 
conventionnel, l'establissement d 1 un 
regime definitif, destine a garantir, 
en tout temps et a toutes las Puissances, 
le libre usage du Canal Mariti~e de Suez 
et completer ainsi le regime sous lequel 
la navigation par se Canal a eta le Firman 
de Sa Ma jeste Imperiale le Sultan , en date 
du 22 Fevrier (2 Zilkade, 12 ~2), sanctionnant 
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-----------------------~----------------~----------------1. Avram, op. cit., p. 29 
les Concessions de Son Altesse le Khedive ••• "l 
The Convent i on is very specific in regard to the 
use of the Canal. 
The Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free 
and open, in time of \liar as in time of peace, 
to every vessel of commerce or of war, without 
distinction of Flag. 
Consequently, the High Contracting Par ties 
agree not in any way to interfere with the 
free use of the Canal, in time of war as in 
time of peace . The Canal shall never be 
subject to the exercise of the righ t of 
blockade.2 
••• 
The MaritLme Canal remaining open in time 
of war as a free passage, even to the ships 
of war of belligerents, according to the 
terms of Article I of the present Treaty, 
the High Contracting Parties ~gree that no 
right of war, no act of hos t ility, nor any 
Act having for its object to obs truct the 
free navigation of the C~nal shall be 
comoit ted in the Canal and its ports of 
access, as well as wi thin a radius of three 
marine miles from those parts, even though 
the Ottoman Empire should be one of the 
belligerent powers.3 
••• Similr rly, the pr ovisions of Article IV, v, 
VII, and VIII shall not interfere vlith the 
measure which His Majesty the Sultan and His 
Bigness the Khedive , in t he name of His 
Imperial Majesty, and \·li thin the limits of 
the Firmans gr?nted, might find necess ary to 
take for securing by their own forces the 
defence of Egyp~ and the maintenance of 
public order ••• 
1. Preamble of the Convention, Avram, op. cit., p . 33 
2. Article I of the Conventi on; Watt, D.c., Documents 
on~~ Crisis 1 (Royal Institut e of International Affairs, London, 1~57) pp . 34-35 
3. Article IV of the Convention; Ibid., p . 35 
4. Article X of the Convention; Ibid., p. 37 
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The Canal was thus always to be left open, raga rdless of· 
the belligerents involved, never to be blockaded , and 
open in time of war or of peace even to warships . It 
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cannot be considered that Article X really interferes with 
the clear provisions of Articles I and IV, and t he 
sovere i gn power is clearly enj oined from exercising 
the usual rights of war within t he Canal and its port s . 
In the Italo-Turkish \'Jar of 1912, the Ottoman 
Government honored the Convention scrupulous l y, 
permitting the '":~ assa g e , unmolested , of Italian ships . l 
In \·Jorld War I Great Britain mC~na ged t o kee}: the 
ships of the Central Powers out of the Canal by 
exercising belligerent ri ghts beyond the limits of 
t he Concession . 2 However, the attit udes of Br i tish 
~rize Courts during t he WAr in regard to ships brought 
to Canal ports appear to be a violation of the s pirit , 
i f not the letter, of the Act of 1888 . The United 
Kingdom also used the war to terminate Tur ki sh 
suzerainty over Egypt . 3 
In 1922, Great Britain proclaimed Egypt's 
independence, with sever al large and strong strings 
attached . The relationship was modified in 1936 , 
----------~-- -- -------------------------------------------1 . Av ·am, op. cit. , p . 36 
2 . Ibid., p. 35 
3. Ibid., p . 68 
through the c~n clusion of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 
Alliance. British troops remained in the Canal Zone 
as defined by that Treaty to protect the Canal and aid 
in the defense of Egypt.l During the course of World 
War II it may be s tB ted that the only defenders of 
Egypt against invasion were British and Commonwealth 
troops. The Convention w2s violated by the United 
Kingdom on at least one occasion when the Italian 
ship ss/Verbania was seized on June 11, 1940, and 
towed into harbor.2 
The emergence of the State of Israel caused 
the use of certain practices in regard to the use of 
the Canal which violated previous practices . At the 
same time the B itish posit ion in the area was becoming 
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precarious. However , the Canal Zone was considered vital 
by London. 
Egyp tian nationalist feeling was quite bitter against 
the continued presence of British troops in the Zone 
and demonstrations started on January 25, 1952, resulting 
in the Lurder of, among ot hers, the Canadian trade 
------------------------------------------------------------1. 
2. 
Eden, Anthony,~ Circle, (Houghton- Miflin Co., 
Boston, 1960), ~9 
Avram, op. cit., p. 93 
Commissioner . l By the end of that year the British 
Headquarters, l1iddle-East Command, h<'! d been shifted to 
Cyprus,2 as maintain ing a base in hostile territory 
was proving fool-hardy. Nonetheless, the Canal was of 
vital importance to Great Britain for its trade 
connections with the Commonwealth in As ia . The British 
Government could not leave it entirel y unprotected 
and negotiated the 1954 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty which 
a brogated that of 1936, foresa'\>T the evacu<tion of the 
Zone within twenty months and provided for a seven 
year period in which the Base at the Canal w~s to be 
kept in fi ghting condit ion by technicians in t he event 
any nation of the Arab League or Turkey became involved 
in a \>Tar \>lith the Soviet bloc . The 1954 Treaty also 
specifically upheld the Constantinople Convention of 
1888. 3 
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The importance of the Suez Canal as an inte rnational 
WAterway cannot be overestimated. In 1955 , the last 
full year of service prior to its cha.nged status, 
the Canal vras tr ~versed by 14,666 ships with a total 
------------------------~-----------------------------------1 . Eden, op . cit., p . 2' 5 
2 . Ibid . , p. 271 
3 · Ibid. , p. 289 
tonnage of 155,756,398 tons.l The greatest use of the 
Canal is for tankers to supply the oil needs of 
\-!estern Europe. In 1955, 75,856,393 tons of tankers 
passed the Canal, of which 52,369,298 tons \'lere for 
Western Europe. 2 That year 5,358 ships using the 
Canal flew the Union Jack . Receipts of the Canal 
totalled ~32,176,60o3 making its importance 
not only one of use but of considerable finance . 
One country did not sh~re in the use of the 
Canal: Israel. From the outset of the Israeli-
Arab conflict Egypt had closed the Canal to all 
Israeli shipping, in direct violation of the 
Constantinople Convention. Egypt invoked the grounds 
of self-defense in so doing, though the Italo-Turkish 
War episode nega ted this argument . Also, it can be 
ar gued that no formal state of war has ever existe d 
between Israel and Ehypt , as Egypt could not declare 
war on a state she claimed did not exist. The Canal 
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remained closed to Israeli shipping after the General 
Armis i· ice Agreements were signed . Conside"ing that no 
formal decBration of war was issued the Armistice 
Agreements might very well be considered to restore peace4 
---------------------------------------------------------~-1. 
2. 
~: 
Avram, op. cit., p . 15 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid., p. 136 
and leave Egypt vri th no cause nor any good pre text to 
keep the Canal closed. However, the Egyptian attitude 
hardened and the Cairo governmen t began stopping 
vessels flying the flags of other nations from using 
the Canal to import or export merchandise to and f rom 
Israel . An appeal was brou:'"ht to t he United Nations 
and the Security Council ruled in strong terms in favor 
of complete resumption of the use of the Canal by 
all nc; tions : 
The Secur ity Council, 
1 . Recalling t hat in its Resolution of 
August 11, 1949, r el ating to the conclusion 
of Armistice Agreements bet\>Ieen Israel and 
the neighbor ing Arab Sates, it drew attention 
to the nl edge s in those Agreements "against 
fur t her acts of hostility betvreen the 
Parties" ••• 
4. Further Noting •• • tha t t he Egyptian 
Government has not complied with the earnest 
plea of the Chief of Staff made to t he 
Egyptian delega tion on J une 12 , 1951, 
that it desist from the present p: actice of 
interfering 'd th the passage thr ough the 
Suez Canal of goods des tined for Israel ••• 
5. C~nsider ing t hat s ince t he Ar mistice 
r egime whi ch has been in exi stence f or nearly 
two and one half years i s of a per manent 
character neither Party can reasonably assert 
that it is actively a Belligerent or requires 
to exercise the r i ght of visit, search, and 
seizure for any legitima te purpose of self-
defence; 
6 . Finds that the maintenance of the ~ractice 
mentioned i n paragra ph 4 above is inconsistent 
with t he objec tive of a peaceful settlement 
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between the Parties and the establ ishment 
of a permanent peace in Palestine set forth 
in the Armistice Agreement; 
7. Finds further t hat such practice is an 
abuse of the exercise of the right of 
visit, search and seizure; 
8. Further finds that practice cannot in 
the prevailing circumst~nces be justi fied on 
the g:-ounds that it is nece ss ary for self-
defence; 
9. And f urther noting ••• that these 
restrictions together with the sanctions 
applied by Egypt to certain ships which have 
visited Israeli ports represented unjustified 
interference with the ri ghts of nations to 
navige te the seas and to trade freely with 
one a~ other, including the Arab Sta tes and 
Israel; 
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10. Calls upon Egypt to terminate the 
r estrictions on the passage of international 
commercial shipp ing through the Suez Canal 
wherever bound and to cease all interference 
with such shipping beyond that essential to 
the safety of shipping in the Canal itself and 
to the observance of the internat ional 
conventions i n force . l 
The Resolution of September 1, 1951 , passed the 
Security Council by a vote of 8- 0-3 , the United Kingd om 
voting for and India, though a heavy user of the Canal, 
tied by sent iment to Egypt, abstaining . Egypt sim~ly 
did not comply with the Resolution and a further 
attempt to pass a similar one was vetoed by the Soviet 
Union in 1954. That same year the Israelis tried to 
invoke the 1951 Resolution and sent a merchant ship , 
1. U. N., Document S/2298 , as quoted in Avram, op . cit., 
pp . 128- 129 
the ss/Ba t Galim to the Canal. The Egy'"' tians seized it 
as contraband and there the matter rested.l 
The other direct sea approach to the East for 
Israel lay through the Gulf of Aqaba into the Red Sea . 
In 1949, Egypt placed guns at Sharm el-Sheikh, which 
controlled the southern entrPnce to the Gulf. An 
American enquiry as to what it was all about was met 
by a Cairo reply that 
it goes without saying that the passage 
(through the Straits of Tiran2) will 
remain free as in t he past in conformity 
with internation~l practice and the 
r eco gnized pr inciples of international law.3 
However, the Egyptians r ef us ed to permit passage to any 
ship headed toward sou ther n Israel and thus tightened 
the blockade of Israel. 
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It had been the hope of the \!/estern Powers to ..., r event 
a further conflict bet,·Teen Israel and the Arab St c=l tes, a 
hope which involved the maintenance of certain arms 
levels in the Near East. On May 25, 1950 , the 
United Kingdom, France and the United States issued a 
Tripartite Decl .:-~:~a tion that 
--------------------------------------------------------------1. 
2. 
Eytan, op. cit., pp. 100-101 
3-
Another nP-me for the southern entrance. 
Isr ael Office of Info· mation, 'Gulf of Aqaba " 
(Israel Office of Inf ormation, New York, 1957), pamphlet 
they recogn ize that the Arab Sta tes and Israel 
a l l need to maintain a certain level of armed 
forces for the purposes of assuri ng their 
internal security and their legitima te self-
defence and to permit them to play their part 
in the defence of the area as a whole ••• 
The Three Governments take this 
opportunity of declaring their deep interest 
and their des ire to promote the establishment 
and t he maintenance of peace and stablili ty in 
the area and their unalterable opposition to 
the use of force or the threat of force between 
any of the sta tes in that area . The Three 
Governments, should t hey find that any of 
these St Ptes was prepared to viol ate frontiers 
or Pr mis t ice lines, would, consis tently with 
their obligations as Members of the United 
Na tions, i mmediately t ake action, b; th within 
and outside the United Nations, to prevent 
such viola tion.l 
This Declaration was aimed at maintaining the status quo , 
a sta tus quo which was shortly drastically upset . 
Switiching from its support of Israel, manifested 
in 1948, the Soviet Union decided to gamble on the Arab 
states. Diplomatic support was s hortly fol l owed up by 
military support . In the early Autumn of 1955, Egypt 
concluded and carried out an ar rangement with 
Czechoslovakia, ?cting for the Soviet bloc, for the 
pur chase of arms . These purchases included fifty 
Stalin III tanks, one hundred fifty T.34 tanks, two 
hundred armored troop carriers, one hundred self-
1 . Eytan, op. cit., pp . 140-141 
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propelled guns, one hundred twenty MiG 15 jet fi ghters, 
fifty Ilyushin 28 jet bombers, twenty Ilyushin jet 
transports, ~vo destroyers, two submarines , and 
assorted other war material . Syria received, among 
other ma terial, one hundred T.34 tanks and an equal 
number of MiG 15s.l 
To these heavy pur chases can be added thirty-two 
Centurion tanks, two hundred Archer tank destroyers, 
and thirty Vampire jets2 which reached Egypt from 
regular purchases made from the United Kinrdom.3 It 
could hardly be maintained that such heavy arms 
purchases were ma de by Cairo for intern ~ l use. The 
balance of power in the area was violently wrenched 
and the Israel Government was extraordinarily upset. 
It immediately be gan searching for meRn s of combatting 
this strength. 
In the i n terval relations between Egypt and t he 
Western r owers rapidly deteriorated . A project for t he 
construction of the Aswan High Dam, vitally needed by 
Egypt for c ontrol of the Nile to aid her in feed ing her 
rapidly growing popul a tion was dependent upon aid from 
--------------------------------------------------------1. 
2. 
3. 
Henriques, Robert, One Hundred Hours 12 Suez , (Viking Press, NeiV York , 1957), p. 27 
Sent f~om Italy to Syria and transhipped to Egypt 
Henrique s, op . cit., p. 26 
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foreign pmvers . Both the United StE~tes and the United 
Kingdom made generous offers of aid for the first stages 
of construction.l These offers were suddenly ~ithdr awn 
in the early Summer of 1956 , apparentl y due to the 
West's impatience with Colonel Nasser and his attempts 
to play off t he East against the vies t . 
The i mmediate reaction of Egypt \·Jas one of national 
anger . On July 26, 1956 , President Nasser announced 
the n ationalization of the Suez Canal in order to use 
the funds from the revenues for the new Aswan dam. 
Egypt would do it herself . The Alexandria speech 
immed i ately was followed by the nationaliza tion law 
In the Name of the Nation, the President of 
the Republic ••• promulgates the following Law : 
A~ticle I . The International Company of the 
Suez ME~ritime Canal (an Egyptian joint stock 
compE~ny) is here r y nation ~ lized ••• 
The shareholders and Holders of Founder 's shE~res 
will be c ompens c:< ted for the stock and Shares 
\'lhich t hey own on the basis of their clos ing 
price on the~aris Bourse i mmedia t ely preceding 
the date on ·t1hich t his La\v enters in to 
force (July 26, 1956) ••• 2 
~·Jhile no one cA n argue \vi th the ri f'i' t of a nation 
to nationalise a company org?nized under and operating 
vlithin the frc:< me,rork of its la \·ls, the seizure of the 
1 . 
2 . 
The United S t ~ tes promised $562~00,000 and the United Kingdom , $14,ooo,ooo. ~en, op. cit., p. 469 
Watt, op . cit . , p . 40 
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Suez Canal Company struck as a thunderbolt, particularly 
to the British. Eden maintained that Nasser could not 
be permitted to 11 have his thumb on our windpipe . "l 
In this he W8S suppo~ted by the Leader of the Opposition, 
Hugh Gaitsk ill who 
deplore(d) this high handed and 
totally unjustifiab le step by t he 
Egyptian Government . 2 
There was a strong feeling tha t Nasser '"as a t temp ting to 
blackmail the Wes t into building his dam for him and, also , 
that once in Egyptian control the Canal would be 
ar bitrarily closed agai nst those whom Nasser disliked 
(and there was precedent for it, without much protest, 
i . e . , the case of Isr~el) . 
The ma j or users of the Canal began frantically to 
devise schemes for regaining control of the Canal, or at 
least a say in its management . The British Government 
immediately blocked Egyp tian Sterling in London and 
delayed the sailing of four Egyptian destroyers from 
Haltese harbors . The London Government, accor·ding to 
Prime Minis t er Eden decided to exert full poli t ic ~ l 
pressure on Egypt to relent, and quietly began planning 
military action in the event of being in extremis over 
the rna tt er • 3 
---------- ------------------------------------------------1 . Eden, op . cit. , p. 473 
2 . Ibid . 
3. Ibid ., pp . 476-478 
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The United States wanted to bring moral pressure, 
the American SecBtary of State being an ~dvocate of the 
uses of either morality or, conversely, totally 
destructive massive retaliation. American attitudes might 
also have indicated some nervousness over the Panama 
Canal, though the t reaty situations were not analagous . 
However, Eden maintains that Secretary Dulles was not 
adverse t o milit ~ry action, quoting him as saying 
It should be possible to create a world 
opinion so adve ~se to Nasser that he would 
be isolated. This is a military operation 
had to be undertaken- it would be more apt 
t o succeed and have less grave repercussions 1 than if it had been undertaken precipitately. 
However, the United States preferred not to be 
specif ically informed about Anglo-French military plans, 
and they were not. 
Talks meanwhile pr ogressed, and a Marit ime Conference 
opened in London on August 15, 1956, of the signato ies 
of the Const antinoryle Convention and sixteen prime users 
of the Canal, except for Egypt and Greece. The majority of 
Powers agreed to have an internati onal board run the 
Canal, a plan supported at the Conference by Australia, 
New Zealand, Pakistan and the United Kingdom, among others. 
1. Eden, op. cit., p. 487 
India and Ceylon favored simply a board to advise Egypt 
on the Canal . l The Australian Prime Minister, Menzies, 
undertook to bring the proposals of the maj or ity to 
Cairo, where the suggestions met a rebuff . 
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Nonetheless, an Users' Association vras establi shed, 
in the hope of having Egypt work with it and thus mai ntain 
some vestige of international control. Under the 
chairmanship of Secretary-Gene~al Hammerskjold secret 
tallts proceeded bet.,reen Egypt, Britain and France. 
The Security Council on October 12, 1956, voted 
in favor of six principles in regard to the futur e of 
the Canal which, in sum, were 
1 . There should be free and open transit of 
the Canal without any discrimination. 
2. The sovereignty of Egypt should be respected. 
3. The operation of the Canal should be 
insulated from the politics of any country. 
4. The manner of fi ··ing tolls and charges 
sh~uld be decided by agreement between Egypt and 
the users. 
5. A fair proportion of the dues should be 
alloted to development . 
6 . In case of di sputes, unresolvec affair s 
be~veen Egypt and the Suez2canal Company should be settled by arbitration. 
Negotiations continued for achieving a set t l ement, tho ugh 
chances seemed dimmer, particu~arly after the Soviet Union 
------------------------------------------------------------1 . Eden, op. cit . , p. 504 
2. Ibid . , p. 562 
vetoed a draft resolution in the Security Council 
for negotiPtion on the already a ppr oved Si x Principles . l 
On October 24 , 1956, the Indian Government proposed 
a settlement be made on the following basis 
1 . Recognition of the Canal as an integral 
part of Egypt and as a waterway of 
inter national importance . 
2 . Free Pnd uninterrupted navigation of the 
Canal . 
3. Equitable and non-discriminatory tolls. 
~ . Proper maintenance of the Canal. 
5. Cooperation between Egyptian authorities 
and t he Suez Cana l Users' Associa t ion. 
6 . Compulsory arbitration of dis~utes over 
the i nterpretation of the 1888 Convention and 
its revision . 
7. Use of United Nations eyr.erts to advise 
the Egyptian Canal Authority; and the United 
Nations to receive reports from the Author it~ 
for three ye~rs on the running of the Canal . 
These proposals were not acceptable to t he British 
and French 111ho, by t hi s point, wanted the C;mal at least 
under regular inter national supervision. 
The Middle East had also been filled wi t h military 
movements for some t ime . In July, the British 
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Government began calling up certain reservists3 and, on 
August 2, the H.M. S. Jamaica (a cruiser) arrived at Cyprus . 
The French Mediterranean Fleet was ordered to assemble 
1. Watt, op. cit . , p . 19 
2 . Ibid . , p . 23 
3 . Eden, op . cit. , p. 496 
at Toulon, French women and children were ordered to 
leave Egypt by the Embassy at Cairo.l Repo ts 
circulated in the Israeli press of Anglo-French 
concentrations on Cyprus.2 
Throughout the year Egyptians had been using 
guerilla tactics against Israel, employing fedayeen 
from the Gaza St rip \vho i nfilt rated acr oss t he 
armistice lines and destroyed lives and property. The 
Egyptian Government ad~itted res ponsibility for these 
attacks as early as 1955, 
Egypt has decided t o dispa tch heroes ••• 
The Egyptian fedayeen have begun the ir 
actions ins id e t he territory of Israel 
after re peA ted clashes on t he border ••• 3 
The Is rael Government also became aware of 
t remendous Egyptian troop concent rBti ons in t he Sinai 
peninsula as Egyptian propaganda prepared for a sec ond 
round against Israel. On February 15, 1956 , the 
Commander of the Third Infantry Division, Egy-~ tian 
Army in Sinai, informed his f ~rces that 
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Every c ~~mander must prepare himself and his 
soldiers for the important battle with Israel 
in which we are fully immersed, with the aim 
--------------------------------------------------------1. Connell, op. cit., p. 107 
2. Articles in the 1ITerusalem Post" issues of Augus t , 1956 
3. U.N., 562nd General Assembly Plenary, November 1, 1956, 
Israel Amba ssador Eban quoting Egyptian dis patches. 
4 . Connell, op. cit., p . 155 
of realizing our lofty traditions, that is to 
overpower and de stroy Israel in the shortest 
possible time and 1:1l th the greatest 
brutali ty and bestiality in battle • •• l 
On October 23, 1956, an unified Egyp t .~an-Syrian-Jordani 
Command was established 11 in a supreme effort to 
tighten the death noose11 around Israel, acco:- ding to 
the Cairo daily 11Al Gomhouria . n2 
The I srael Government decided to take action 
against the fedayeen bases in Egypt and prevent an 
Egyptian attack on Israel, as well as to open the 
Gulf of Aqaba and end t he Suez blockade . 3 On the 
afternoon of October 25, 1956 , Israel mobilized its 
troops and reserves . Three days later it decided to 
strike against Egypt and early on the morning of 
October 29, Israeli parachutists floated down over 
the Mitla Pass in the Sin~i des ert . 4 
The war was rather unusual . I srael's best troops 
were de ployed along the Jordan frontier and the Israel 
Air Force was prohibited from attacking the Egyptian 
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air space west of the Canal or to fire upon enemy aircraft 
unless attacked first . Within four days the Israel 
------------------------ ----------------------------------1 . Connell, op. cit . , p. 128 
2. Eyt8n, op . cit . , p . 149 
3. Henriques, op . cit., pp. 46-47 
4. Ibid ., p . 21 
Army under the leadership of its Chief-of-Staff, Rav- Aluf 
Moshe Dayan, had cleared the Sinai and by November 5, 
occupied the Gaza Strip . As an aside the Israel Navy 
captured at sea an Egyptian destroyer, the first such 
naval event in almost a century . Israel lost 180 
killed and 4 prisoners against 1000 Egypt ians killed 
and 6000 prisoners taken, including 202 officers, 
a rather high ratio . l 
The Is~aeli actions brought immediate reactions 
from various quarters . The French Ambassador in 
Israel, M. Gilbert, expressed his government's 
deep concern at the gravity of 
the situat ion which might develope2 
upon hearing that Israel had mobilized . There is some 
question as to whether or n~ t France knew all along what 
Israel had planned and many charges of collusion between 
Israel and France were aired in the months following 
the invasion . It appears impossible to de termine just 
what occured between Jer usalem and Paris in the absence 
of documentary evidence . One can safely say that France 
was pleased with the eff ort to diminish the position of 
the Egyptian dictator-president . 
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2. Ibid . , p. 39 
Anthony Eden writes that he was convinced Israel 
might very well attack Jordan, rather than Egypt, and 
was having nightmares about this, as Jordan would have 
invoked the Anglo-Jord2ni Treaty of Defence, which 
would have pitted the United Kingdom against Israel.l 
The United States advised its nation~ls to leave the 
area upon hearing of the Israeli mobilization.2 
The American delegation to the United Nations 
brought the Israeli invasion of Egypt to the attention 
of the Security Council, immediately. At the Council 
Australia 1velcorned the American action 
\'ie have all along felt that the violence of 
the (Israeli) reprisals on various occasions 
has not been justified by the particular 
events that have led to them ••• 3 
The Australians were plea sed to have an opportunity to 
discuss the situation in the Near East in detail . 
The Israel Ambassador , Abba Eban, rose to defend 
his Government's actions in a lengthy recitation of 
various fedaveen attacks on Israeli lives and property. 
He also quoted the Chief of Staff of t he United Nations 
Truce Supervisory Organization to the effect that if 
--------------------------------------------------------1. 
2. 
3· 
Eden, op. cit., p . 571 
"New York Times," October ~9 , 1956, p. 1:2 
U.N., 748th Meeting , Sectrity Council, October 30 , 
19;b. Document S/3706 
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the fedayeen raids were organized by Egypt, then Egypt 
was the aggressor . l 
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At the resumed meeting of the Security Council the 
British representative, Sir Pierson Dixon, ann ounced that 
••• Her Hajesty's Government have called upon 
both sides to stop all warlike action ••• and 
to withdraw their military fo r ces to a distPnce 
of ten miles from the Canal ••• we have also 
asked the Egyptian Government to a gree that 
Anglo-French forces move temporarily, I repeat 
temporarily, into key positions at Port 
Said , Ismailia, and Suez ••• 2 
This ultimatQ~ of the British, in which they were joined 
by the French, presumably was to keep the Canal Zone 
clear of all military actions . On the very face of it, 
however, it would allow Israeli occupation of the Sinai. 
The British therefore opposed an United States draft 
resolution to end the fighting and for tbe withdrawal 
of Israeli forces to the a~mistice lines, as well as for 
the cessation of all military, economic or fin ~ncial 
aid to IsrAel until Israel complied . 3 
A further reason for the Anglo- French opposition 
to the American draft resolution was tbat it wo uld have 
forbidden any nation t o take any military action in the 
area. The British argued that only their joint plans 
1 . U.N., op . cit . 
2 . Ibid., 749th Meeting, Security Council, October 30, 
1956 
3 . Ibid . , Document S/3710 
could possibly save the situation. Australia asked that 
a vote on the draft resolution be delayed pending 
inst r uctions f rom Canberra, a nlea that i·Tent unheeded 
and resulted in Australia's abstention in the c ::->nsequent 
voting . l As Britain and France both voted no on the 
draft, the measure failed despite a 7-2-2 vote. 
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A Soviet draft resolution wasthen offered calling 
"upon all parties concerned" to refrain from all actions . 2 
Australia opposed this wording until it was modified 
to specify only Egypt and Israel as the parties called 
upon to cease action . Even as modified by a Chinese 
amendment the draft failed , again due to Anglo-French 
vetoes . 3 
On October 29, 1956, the British Admiralty confirmed 
reports that the main units of the British Mediterranean 
Fleet had sailed from Malta the previous day .4 Reports 
of Anglo- French troop movements gained currency on 
October 305 at the same time Egypt was rejecting the 
Angl o-French ultimatum. 6 \'lith Egypt , the United States 
and the Soviet Union all pressing for action the 
1 . 
2 . 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
U. N., 749th Meeting, Security Council, op. cit . 
Ibid . , Document S/3712 
Ibid. , 750th Meeting, Security Council, October 30 , 
1956 
"New York Times," October 30 , 1956 , p . 4 :3 
Ibid . , October 31 , 1956, p . 1 : 5 
Ibid., p. 3:1 
Security Council, invoking the non-vetoable "Uniting 
For Peace" Resolution of 1950, summoned the first 
Special Emergency Session of the General Assembly.l 
In the meantime , t he British Foreign Minister , 
Selwyn Lloyd, announced that combined units of the 
Royal and French Air Forces had co~~enced the bombing 
of strictly military targets and airfields in Egypt .2 
It was strongly intimated the bombing was a preliminary 
to the actual invasion of the Canal area of Egypt. 
The Allied action stirred world-wide reaction. 
There ware many who believed that the United Kingdom, 
France and Israel had together determined upon the 
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attack upon Egypt, using the occasion of the Soviet 
intervention in Hungary and American preoccupation with 
national elections as an opportunity to take swift action . 
In many instances reaction in the various Commonwealth 
nations was one of shock. 
Prime Mi nister Nehru of India issued a statement 
a~king for the cessation of "aggression against Egypt." 
He \vent on 
The Government of India learned with profound 
----------------------------------------------------------1. ~' 751st Meeting, Security Council, October 31, 1956 
2. "New York Times ," November 1, 1956, p. 1:2 
concern of Israeli aggression on Egyptian 
territory and the subsequent ultimatum 
delivered by the United Ki~gdom and France 
to the Egyptian Government, which was 
followed by the Angl~-French invasion of 
Egyptian territory. 
They consider this a flagrant violation 
of the United Nations Charter and opposed 
to all the principles laid down by the 
Bandung, Indonesia, Conference. This 
aggression is bound to have far-reaching 
conse quences in Asia and Africa and may even 
lead to war on an extended scale . 
The Government of India are conveying their 
views t o the governments concerned and 
earnestly trust tha t even at this late 
hour this aggression will be halted and 
foreign troops "'i thdrawn from Egyptian 
territory . They hope the world community, 
a s represented in the United Natio£s , will 
take effective action to this end . 
The Indian Government invoked the Charter as \vall as 
Afro-Asian fears of rene\>led colonialism against the 
senior member of the Co~~onwealth and the two nations 
it considered as co-conspirato~s . Very strangely, 
the Indian Government did not express its concern 
over events in Hungary or its regrets f or the use of 
force in its own dispute with Pa~istan . It is rather 
difficult to accept the moral attitude of the Nehru 
government in these circumstances . 
1. "New York Times ," November 1, 1956, p . 14-:3 
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The Canadian reaction was far more moderate . The 
Ottawa Government ceased all arms shipments to Israel, 
especially a projected removal there of twenty-four 
Sabre jets. While the Canadian Parliament was not 
summoned , the Government, through Secretary for 
External Affairs Lester Pearson called "deplorable" the 
Anglo-French rejection of Security Council efforts to 
obtain an immediate cease-fire. Pearson went on to say 
that the decision of the two governments to land troops 
was 
a very distressing one for any Canadian ••• 
we regret that the United Kingdom and France 
took this action. It is a most unhappy one 
from our point of view.l 
The Canadians would soon have concrete proposals for 
consideration , again exercising their moderating 
influence in Co:-:-111onweal th and world councils. 
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The Austra l ian r eaction apparently caused difficulty 
in the Canberra Cabinet, as there seems to have been 
considerable delay in sending instructions to the 
Mission at the United Nations. Finally, however , the 
Australians backed the British action, which one might 
have anticipated from remarks made in the previous Augus t 
------------------------------------------------------------1. "New York Times, 11 op. cit., p. 9:4 
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by Prime ~{inister Menzies 
To leave our vital interests to the whim of 
one man would be suicidal . We in Austr8lia ••• 
cannot accede either the morality or the 
leg?li ty of what Nasser has done . l 
In addressing the House of Commons on Nover1ber 1, 1956, 
Prime Mi nister Eden was able to cite support from both 
Australia and New Zealand .2 
Ceylon announced its intention to remain neutral in 
the dispute but Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike 
urged Anglo-French wi thdrawal before the situation 
altered for the worse . The leftist Opposition 
parties in the Ceylon Parli ament wanted to "seal" all 
British bases in Ceylon during the duration of the 
crisis.3 Opinion in Pakistan was bitter, feeling 
a sense of betrayal by the West, to which Pa~istan 
was bound by treaty obligations. The association 
with the Wes t appeared to be a costly liability in 
building up Pakistan's prestige in the 1\rab and 
Asian world.4 
On November 3, 1956, Israel announced her control 
of Gaza and of the Sinai5as nlans for the actual 
1. Connell, op. cit . , p. 124 
2. "Ne\·I York Times," November 2, 1956, p. 8 :5 
3 •• Ibid., p. 13:4 ~ Ibid., Nove :ber 4, 1956, p. 4 :2, Section IV 
5. Ibid., November 3, 1956, p . 1:8 
Anglo-French landing proceeded . The British now 
announced that they would ensure an Israeli evacuation 
from the Sinai once the Anglo-French "police action" 
was completed and the Suez saved.l So, the official 
eycuse against any outside intervention in their 
plans by the Anglo-French Allies was to protect the 
Canal. 
The major scene of the Suez engagements, outside 
of the actual fighting zones, was along the East 
River of New York City and the glass and marble United 
Nations buildings. There on November 1, 1956, 
the Egypt i an permanent representative, Omar Loufti, 
denounced the attack, stating that his country 
is the victim of combined premeditated 
a ggression by Israel, the United Kingdom 
and France. According to our informa tion 
the aircraft of the a ggressors have sunk 
an Egyptian vessel in the Canal. This act 
of war committed by Franc e and the United 
Kingdom in the Canal is a violation of the 
United Nations Charter~ the Constantinople 
Conven tion of 1888, ana the principle of 
free passgae, even in time of war, guaranteed 
to all states under article four of that 
Convention.2 
M. Loufti 's statement is extraordinary. The char f e 
of premeditated aggression by all three powers has never 
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---------------------~------------------------------------1 . "New York Times, 11 November 4- , 1956, p . 1:3 
2. U.N. 56lst General Assembly Plenary , November 1, 1956 
been proven and, considering the st · te of relations 
betv1een the United Kingdom. ~md Is!'ael , extr "moly 
unl i kely . The charre tl1at Br- tain and : 1rctncc 
deliberatel y blocked t~e Canal is absurdly not in line 
wit~ t heir desire to keep the ranal onen and nost 
doubtful , especially as leter sinkings were done by the 
F.fyptio.r s . That F.g~rpt involred the '"Jonstanti· onle 
Convention in order to m.aintai n a case for kceyinh 
the C·m· _ open is ah~ost fantastic , co~ siderinp, tl!at 
she had closed the Canal due to a state of claimed 
bell i ge r ency acainst Israel . To s ~y the least her 
arpm1 'nt l acked lor ic and any consistency . 
The first non- belliGerent povmr to a ddress tho 
Special !'~orcenc.; Session v: s Ceylo,., . N'bassaoor 
Gunevmr ene ' s nords had an esnecialy l'earing , c o ling 
as the:' did frcrr. ,,_n Asian m.mnbcr of t~e Co.- .10m;eal th 
As n neF.b'"'r o~ t~o CO""l:"lo:t, •e nl th , an 
association of nat ions dericat0d to thP. 
cause of eace ar.d interna tiona.l h r:-.10ny , 
it is with profound sorror• th'lt I express 
IilY Governncnt ' s stronF" dissent and 
dis~rn~oval of t~e actions of a fellow 
menbcr of the Co 'l10mJoal th \!i th v ich v1e 
have had cordi'll tics of friend~hip . 
It is to ne a matter of profound rief that 
I S 1'0uld have to perfoFl t- L .> duty . T have 
nl•ays b~en a stout uphol der of t~e concept 
of the co m,..,nweal th as one of t-~e rca test 
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contri buting forces fostering international 
peace and the principles of liberty and justice ••• 
In the view of many responsible nations, the 
action of t he United Kingdom and France is 
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a continuation of the tr~dition of colonialism. 
It does not require much f oresight to see that 
no nation, ho\-rever powerful, can turn back the 
cl ock in Asia and Africa, and resist the 
inexorable march of events ••• It would be 
exped i ent ann dignified for the colonial 
pot'lers to accept the change with grace . In 
this connexion I have no hesita t ion in 
applPUding the United Kingdom Government 
for its timely reco gnition of the clamour for 
freedom and self- determination in India, 
Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon ••• I would appeal 
to the United Kingdom even at t his late stage 
not to jeopardize this well of earned goodwill 
in the pursuit of an ob jective f raught with 
disaster. May I also address a similar appeal 
to the Governments of France and Israel . l 
The Ceylonese Ambassador also read to the General 
Assembly a message from his Prime Minister strongly 
urging an Israeli-Anglo-French withdrawal . 
The Ceylonese statement was forthri ght, carefully 
warning the ~est, and particularly France and the 
United Kingd om, of the consequences of Afro- Asian opinion. 
It was also a moderated plea for continued toleration 
and understanding among all nations, and lacked the 
bitter tone that the Indian Government had undertaken 
to use. Certa inly, Ceylon \vanted the preservation of the 
1 . U. N. , op. cit . 
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Commonweal th, and was evidently concerned about that tie 
in view of the British action. 
The United Kingdom delegate, Sir Pierson Dixon, 
then undertook a lengthy defense of the Anglo- French 
position and ma intained t ha t the United Nations could 
not have taken effective action 
We did not, however, consider that the cour se 
of action proposed by the United States, 
without consultation with Her Majesty 's 
Government, could effectively achieve the 
twin objectives of separating the 
belligerents a t once and of safeguar ding 
free passa ge through the Canal.l 
Sir Pier son then became angry about Egypt 's continual 
defiance of the 1951 Security Council Resolution 
in r egard to Israeli passa ge of the Canal (S/2322). 
However, he made clear the British atti tude in rega r d 
t o the Israeli action 
We do not and could not condone this Israel 
action, which is cl early in violation of 
the Armis tice Agreement and aimed at the 
occu;a tion of pos itions i n Egyptian 
terri to r y . It was indeed precisely because 
of this very serious Israeli violAtion that 
we judged it necessary ourselves to intervene.l 
The Anglo-French action was therefore a police action as 
The action of France and the United Kingdom 
is not aggression ••• our purpose is peaceful 
1 . U. N. , op . cit . 
not warlike . Our aim is to re-establish 
the rule of law, not to violate it; to 
protect and not to des troy . What 1ve have 
undertPken is a temporary police action . l 
In view of the previous months of activi t ies by the 
British and French in attempting to thwart the 
nationalization of the Canal, and in vievr of troop 
and naval movements pre-dating the Israeli attack , 
Sir Pierson's defense of his government fell on 
rather unattentive ears. 
The United States delegation introduced a 
draft resolution under which 
The General Assembly, 
Noting the disregard on many occasions by 
parties to the Israel - Arab Armistice 
Agreements of 1949 ••• and that the armed 
forces of Israel have penetrated deeply 
into Egyptian terr itory ••• 
Noting tha t the armed forces of Fr ance and 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland are conducting military 
operations a g8inst Egypti an territory, 
Noting that traff ic through the Suez Canal 
is now interrupted to the serious prejudice 
of many nations, 
Expressing its grave concern over these 
developments, 
l. Urges, as a matter of priori ty, that 
all parties ••• agree to an i mmedi ? te cease-
fire and , as part thereof, halt the 
movement of military fo~ces and arms into 
the area . 
2 . Urges the parties to the ar1ristice 
1 . U. N. , op . cit. 
203 
agreements promptly to withdraw all rorcea 
behind the armistice lines, to desist from 
raids across the armistice lines into 
neighboring territory, and to observe 
scrupulously the provisions of the armistice 
a greement. 
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3. Recommends that all Member States ref rain 
from introducing military goods into the area 
or hostilitiea and in general refrain from 
any a cts which would delay or prevent the 
implementa tion of the present resolution. 
4. Urges that upon the cease-fire being 
effective, steps be taken to reopen the 
Suez Canal and resvore Svcure rreedam or 
navigation ••• 1 
Upon the plea or ~ew Zealand, in opposition to Pakistan,2 
an immediate vote was delayed and debate held. The 
Israeli Ambassador, Mr. Eban, strongly defended 
his nation's actions as an 
object to eliminate the bases from m1ich 
armed ~gyptian units under the speoia~ care 
and authority of Mr. Nasser invade Israel's 
territory ror the purpose of murder, 
sauotage, and the creation of permanent 
insecurity to peacei·ul li1'e ••• 
Mr. Eban also denouncea the failure or the United ~ationa 
to offer Israel the minimal of daily 
security enjoyed by all its other Members 
1n nearly every sector of their national 
lives.3 
The same theme was taken up by the French delegate, 
.M. de Guiringaud, who asked 
Who in a~1 honesty can dispute the 
-----~------------------------------------------------------1. U.N., Document A/6256 
2. ~., 562nd uenera! Assemb!y Plenary, ~ovember 1, !956 
3. Ibid. 
fact that ten years' work by the United 
Nations ••• have been powerless not only 
to eliminate the danger of war in the 
Middle-East, but even to prevent that 
danger from increasing to the point where 
it became a threat to v10rld peace?l 
M. de Guiringaud also defended Israel's ri ght of 
passage of the Suez Canal . Of cour se, he defended 
the entire Anglo-French action in terms rather 
similar to those of Sir Pierson , but also more 
protective of Israel's actions. 
Mr . Vlalker of Australia asked that Britain and 
France be accepted at face value when they maintain 
that they acted in the interests of world peace. 
He also announced that Austra l ia could not accept 
the terms of the American dr?ft resolution.2 
Sir Leslie Munro of New Zealand i nformed the 
General Assembly that 
My Prime Mi:;.· i ster yesterday issued a 
statement in which he expressed full 
confidence in the intention of the 
United Kingdom in moving forces into 
the Suez Canal ••• May I add one word in 
particular about the position of the 
United Kinedom , with which our ties 
are never closer than in time of stress 
and danger . Hy Government does not 
accept any charge or imputation of 
insincerity in the motives of the 
Government of the United Kingdom.3 
-------------------------------------------------------1 . U. N. , op. cit. 
2 . Ibid . 
3 · Ibid. 
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So, as always in the past, New Zealcnd stood loyally by 
Great Britain, despite the attitude of any other nation. 
However, like the London Government, Wellington denounced 
the Israeli action, but mitigated the denunciation 
by recognizing that 
various past events which are part of the 
whole unhappy story contributed to the 
incursion of Israel forces into Egypt . l 
Mr . Arthur Lall of India ended the several spee ches 
of Commonwea lth loyalty to Great Britain by lashing 
out at the triple invasion of Egypt and extending 
his government's sympathy to the people of the Nile. 
He also quoting his p~ime minister in calling 
the Israeli move as "naked aggression . "2 
In the vote on the American draft resolution 
the Commonwealth SDlit . India, Pakistan and Ceylon 
voted for the document . Australia , New Zealand and 
the United Kingd om opposed, and Canada and South 
Africa abstained . As Resolution 997 (ES-I) the 
measure passed the General Assembly 64-5-6.3 
Secretary Pearson explained Canada's abstention 
in these words 
1 . U.N. , op . cit. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. France and Israel also voted negatively . 
Belgium, Laos, the Netherlands and Portugal joined 
the abstainers . 
The Resolution • • • is inadequate to achieve 
the purpose which we have in mind in this 
session • • • ! regret the use of milit ary 
force ••• but I regret also that there was not 
more time, before a vote was taken, for 
consideration of the best way to bring 
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about that kind of a cease-fire 1oJhich \'rould 
have enduring and beneficial results ••• It 
does not provide for any step to be t rken by 
the United Nations for a peace settlement • • • 
I ••• would have liked to see a provision in 
this resolution -- and this has been 
mentioned by previous speakers -- authorising 
the Secretary-General to begin to make 
arrangements with Me@ber States for a United 
Nations force large enough to keep ••• 
peace while a political settlement is being 
1vor 1.~ed out ••• Hy Government would be glad 
to participate in such an United Nations 
force, a truly international peace and police 
force . l 
Canada saw no point, therefore, in a return to the 
status quo ante and hoped that out of the conflict 
some good would come . She obviously viewed the 
United Nations as a progressive and ever forward 
moving organization rather than as an organization 
dedicated to leaving matters where they were . Canada 
was also offering a means of the United Kingdom, 
France and Israel of wi thdra1ving from an impossible 
situation in honor. 
The South African delegate, Mr . Sole, announced 
that his delegation had abstained as it l Pcked instructions 
1 . ~' op. cit. 
though he noted that his Government had the closest of 
ties with the United Kingdom and France and cordial 
relations with both Israel and Egypt . l Abstaining 
under such circumstances had its merits. 
At its session on November 3, 1956, the General 
Assembly had before it four draft resolutions . Two 
were proposed by the United States; one, A/3272, asked 
for the establishment of a Committee of Five to make a 
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new effort to end t he Israel-Arab disputes; the second, 
A/3273, asked that the Suez Canal be re-opened on the 
basis of the Six Principles previously adopted by the 
Securi ty Council . 2 
fm Indian draft resolution, intr oduced on behalf 
of nineteen Afro-Asian nations had the General 
Assembly reaffirm 
its resolution of November 2, 1956 , and 
again call(s) upon the parties concerned 
to comply with the provisions of the 
said resolution ••• 3 
1. ~' op. cit . 
2 . Ibid . , 563rd General Assembly Plenary1 November 3, 1956. The Resolution dated November ~ passed during 
the 562nd General Assembly Plenary which started on 
November 1 and continued into the morning of 
November 2, but which is dated in the Official Records 
by the earlier day of the month. 
3 . Ibid . 
Following his address at the 562nd Plenary, }tr . 
Pearson introduced the folloFing draft resolution 
The General Assembly, 
Bearing in mind the urgent neces s ity of 
facilitating compliance with the 
resolution of November 2, 1956, 
Requests, as a matter of priority, the 
Secretary-General to submit to it '\'li thin 
forty-eight hours, a plan for the setting 
up, with the consent of the nations 
concerned, of an emergency international 
United Nations force to secure and supervise 
the cessation of hostilities in 
accordance i·li th the terms of the 
a~orementioned resolution. l 
In t he deb r- te i·lhich followed, Israel announced 
its agreement to an i nmediate cease- fire if Egypt 
agreed . Israel also stated her desire for direct 
peace treaty ne gotiations \·lith Egypt . 2 
Of the Commom·mal th na t ions only Ceylon spoke 
at length on the Cana dian proposal . She supported t he 
i dea but honed that troops from the disputing nations 
would not be included in the force .3 The draft 
resolution of Canada passed the Asse~bly 57-0-19 , 
with Canada , Ceylon, India and Pakistan in favor, 
and the remainder of the Commonwealth along with 
Israel, France , Egypt, Portugal, Aus tria and t he 
Soviet bloc abstaining . ~ 
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------------------------------------------------------------1 . 
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~: 
~' Document A/3276 
Ibid., 563rd General Assembly Plenary, November 3, 1956 
Ibid . 
Ibid. 
Sir Pierson Dixon announced that the United 
Kingdom had abstained because Her Majesty 's Government 
had not sufficient time to study the proposal . 
Australia's delegate announced th~ t though his 
nation had abs tained his Government 
will await the concrete development of 
Mr. Pearson's helpful proposal for an 
international police force with most 
sympathetic interest . l 
The Indian draft resolution re-iterating the 
previous withdrawal request saw Canada join with the 
Asian members of the Commonwealth in voting 
favorably, but with Australia, New Zealand, the 
United Kingdom , joined by Israel and France, still 
opposed, and South Africa among the abstainers . 
However, that resolution passed 59-5-12.2 The two 
American draft resolutions were not put to the vote. 
The discussion in the General Assembly continued. 
On November 4, 1956, the Pakistani delegate , Hir lilian, 
denounced the aggression of Israel and the subsequent 
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actions of Britain and France in a quotation from a 
speech given by the Pakistani Prime Minister in Karachi .3 
1 . U. N. , op . cit., 
2 . Ibid . ; one might consider the abstentions as an effort 
not to embarrass the three powers and as a hope to 
reach a reasonable settlement , saving everyone's honor. 
3. Ibid . , 565th General Assembly Plenary, November 4, 
1956 
Israel ~nounced that she could not accept any United 
Nations force on her territory though she did not 
outrightly oppose the composition of such a force . l 
Canada then introduced a draft resolution to 
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implement A/3276 which had become Resolution 998 (ES- I) . 
Again Canada voted with the Asian Commonwealth members 
to actually es t ablish the mergency United Nations 
Force, t<~hile the remainder of the Commonwealth abstained, 
though New Zealand announced she thought the nr inciple 
vias correct. 2 
The s cene then temporarily shifted outside of the 
United Nations when the Sovie t Union announced it was 
prepared to use force , unilaterally, in the Middle-East 
unless withdrawals immediately t ook place . 3 At the 
same time Israel and the United Kingdom had a sharp 
exchange over the question of Israeli t'l'i thdrawal from 
the Sinai peninsula . 4 
On November 6, 1956 , a general cease-fire went 
into effect in Egynt . The Israeli Army had accomplished 
its mission , the clearance of the Egyptian b?.ses in the 
Gaza Strip and the Sinai , as well as the ending of 
1 . U. N. , op . cit . 
2 . Ibid . 
3 . "Net·T York Times , " November 6, 1956 , p. 1 : 8 
4 . Ibid., p . 4 : 7 
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the Egyptian blockade of the Gulf : f Aqaba. The Anglo-
French forces, ho'\'rever, stopped their advance quite 
short of their goal of occupying the entire Canal. 
The delegate of Ceylon summed up the feelings of many 
when he addressed the General Assembly on November 7, 1956, 
••• It is gratifying to learn that the 
figh ting has stopped and that the senseless 
killing and destruction has been brought 
to an end . 
However, no withdrawal had occured and the Ambassador 
observed that 
it is a matter of regret that France, Israel 
and the United Kingdom have not complied 1vith 
that part of t he United Nations Resolution 
for the ,.Ji t hdravral of troops ••• It is the 
opinion of my Government that neither France, 
Israel, nor the United Kingdom have the 
slightest vestige of legal or moral point to 
laydown any conditions wha tsoever . l 
The Ceylonese delegation then introduc ed draft 
resolution A/3309 in the name of the nineteen Power 
Afro-Asian Bloc 
The General Assembly, 
Recalling its resolutions adopted by overwhelming 
majorities ••• 
1 . Reaffirms the above mentioned resolutions; 
2 . Calls upon Israel once again to withdraw 
immedia te ly ••• 
3 . Calls upon the United Kingdom and France to 
withdraw immediately ••• 2 
1 . U. N., 567th General Assembly Plenary, November 7, 1956 
2 . Ibid. 
In the ensuing debate Ne\·T Zealand announced that 
while she was willing to contribute to the international 
emergency force she thought it would be a mistake to 
pass the pronosed draft resolution as it would be 
fool-hardy for a withdra\·Tal to occur before the 
United Nations force could reach the area. 
The B~itish were equally unable to support the 
draft resolution because Her Majesty ' s Government felt 
that in the interval between the wi thdravTal of the 
Anglo-French forces and the arrival of the United 
Nations force, conflict be t\-Teen Egypt and Israel ,.;ould 
resume . 1 This ar pumen t vTas consistent with the 
British view that the intervention by Britain and France 
was in the nature of a police action . Ho-vrever, Sir 
Pierson reiterated that 
I think it would be opportune for me to make 
my Government ' s position quite clear . I 
refer to the policy of Her Majesty's 
Government ••• to ensure that Israel forces 
withdrew from Egy~ tian territory. 2 
The British also offered to place the technicians they 
had brought to the Suez during their police action to 
clear the Canal at the disposal of the United Nations . 
1 . U. N. , op. cit . 
2 . Ibid . 
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The Indian delegation, now headed by Defence 
Hinister Henon, again took the floor . Menon stated that 
the problem before the Assembly is a matter 
of great sadness for us because at least 
one of the parties concerned stands in 
extrenely close rel ~ tions to us, and our 
country is seriously concerned as to ,.,he t her 
it (the intervention) repre~ ents a reverse 
of the great processes of human emancipation 
that have been taking Dlace in Asia and 
Af~ica during the last half-century, in 
which the United Kingdom has made very 
siQ1ificant contributions.l 
The Indian Government had some\vhP-t s oftened in its 
attitude toward the United Kingdom, now that the 
firing had ceased . Considering that there had been 
great talk of Ind ia leading a break-up of the 
Commonwealth2 Mr . Henon's remarks were a great re2. ief 
to many. 
When the Nineteen-PmTer draft was voted upon only 
Israel opposed. Sixty- five nations, including Canada, 
India, Pakistan and Ceylon supported the me asure. 
Australia, New Zealand , Souhh Africa, the United Kingdom 
and the Benelux compl ex abstained . 3 On Novembe r 10, 
1956, the First Emeraency Session ended its deliberations 
and referred the Suez Crisis to the Eleventh Regular 
Session of the Genera l Assembly. 4 
1. U. N. , op . cit. 
2 . "Ne,·r York Times," November 17, 1956, p. 14:3; such 
agitation as by the Indian Socialist party. 
3 .. ~' op . cit . ~ Ibid . , 572nd Gene~al Assembly Plenary, November 10, 1956 
It is somewhat difficult to accept fully the 
thesis that it was the action of the United Nations 
which succeeded during the First Emergency Session in 
obtaining a cease- fire . The r e were many other factors . 
World opinion and, in particular, Commonwealth opinion 
ce~tainly had their effect on the decisions of the 
British Government . Having once decided to "go it 
alone" vri thout the Commonwealth, the United Kingdom 
suddenly discovered that the Corn.'lomJeal th, having 
grmm up, had quite a bit to say and what it said 
could not be ignored . And the center of gravity of 
the Commonwealth was slipping to the newer nations, as 
nationalism engulfed the world anew in Africa and 
Asi? . The drain on the British Treasury vTas heavy 
and the attitude of the American Government made it 
clear that Britain could expect no financial relief 
until the resolutions of the United Nations had been 
met . The same held true for France and Israel , though 
the latter had at least succeeded in its initial quest . 
Hhile the regular session of the General Assembly 
was organizing pressures were being maintained on 
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the United Kingdom, France and I srael to withdraw. These 
three nations first wanted assurances as to exactly what 
the mission of the United Nat i ons Force i-tould be, prior 
to their evacuation. l The Commonwealth continued to 
be split over this point . The New Zealand Ambassador 
to the United States supported the British vievr that 
withdravTal precipitously would create a dangerous 
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vacuum. R. S. S. Gunewardene, the Ceylonese Ambassador both 
to the United States and to the United Nations, maintained 
that the majority of nations wanted evacuation "quickly. "2 
The United Kingdom indicated its re?diness on 
November 11, 1956, to turn over the difficulties to 
the United Nations when Foreign Minister Lloyd made a 
rather remarkable statement that the action 
in the long run will be of benefit to 
the point of view of establishing the 
rule of law in the \vorld . We went in 
to stop a war . We believe we have 
achieved that objective and we are very 
ready to hand over the responsibility 
to an international force as soon as it 
is constituted. 3 
Lloyd ' s commen ts do not seem to tell the entire truth. 
The attempt to moralize the action fails to jibe with 
earlier Anglo-French activities . 
The Israel Government meanwhile went about its 
business in the occupied areas . Rav-A1uf Dayan took 
1 . 
2 . 
3· 
"New York Times , " November 14i 1956, p . 1 : 8 
Ibid., November 12, 1956, p . 1 : 5 
Ibid. , p . 5:1 
occasion to note that the Anglo-French action probablY 
saved Israel two or three days fighting on clearing the 
area, adding in a tremendous understatement that 
"we kne\·1 some thing Has going on in Cyprus . 11 1 
Hhile Israel had never stated thatshe intended to remain 
in the Sinai the Israel Foreign Minister, Golda Meir , 
did indicate that Israel considered the Gaza Strip an 
integral part of the country . 2 Israel railroad service 
and a postal administration were both opened . The 
Israelis attempted to restore normal conditions in 
the Strip. While such action could only increase the 
number of restless Arabs within Israel it was better 
than having t he area used for fedayeen raids . 
Israeli official opinion in regard to evacuation 
was mixed . On Nove mber 16, 1956, Israel demanded 
guarantees in advance of evacuation that Gaza would not 
be a springboard for further attacks, that the Sinai not 
be remilitarized, and that the Gulf of Aqaba be kept 
open. 3 In support of these dem Ands Israel released 
figures indicating that from 1949 until 1955, 360 
Israelis had been killed , 733 wounded by incursio~ists, 
1. "New York Times," November 15, 1956, p . 1:8 
2. I bid ., November 11, 1956, p . 1:6 
3· Ibid., November 17, 1956, p. 6:5 
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and that from January through October, 1956 , 74 Israelis 
had been murdered and 209 injured in raids from Egypt 
and the Gaza area . 
The Prime Minis ters of India, Ceylon, Burma and 
Indonesia issued a communique noting, regretfully, that 
withdra\val had not occured .l The Pakistani Prime 
Ninister had not bothered to attend the conference of 
his colleagues, feeling it would not accomplish much . 2 
Nehru was infuriated by the '\•lithd r ei'lel l' c l .? y for upon 
that withdra .. al in large measure depended the leadership 
that India was eyerting among the Afro-Asian nations . 
HO\·Iever , he rejected a formal demand of the Indian 
Communist Party that India sever its ties \vith the 
C O!Ili!l on weal t h . 3 
Canada was actively assuming Coin!"'omveal th leadership . 
Secretary Pe~rs on hoped to use the momentum of the 
pe~iod in order to have the General Assembly reach a 
final settlement in re gard to Suez and Palestine, a 
suggestion opposed by the United States and the 
Afro-Asian bloc . 4 On November 17, 1956 , the Canadian 
------------------------------------------------------------1. "New Yo:!"k Times ," November 15, 1956, p . 14 
2 . Ibid ., November 13, 1956 , p . 12:3 
3· Ibid., November 21, 1956, p . 12 :1 
4 . Ibid., November 16 , 1956, p . 1 :5 
Minister of Health and Welfare left Ottawa on a mission 
to help mediate intra- Commomvealth disputes over Suez 
and smooth over the badly ruffled feelings of several 
members . 1 
The Canadian Government was vitally concerned over 
the Commonwealth a nd its preservation . On November 27, 
1956, Lester Pearson informed the House of Commons at 
Ottawa that 
The Commonwealth was on the verge of 
dissolution if the fighting was not over. 
I suggest the Commonwealth might not 
have been able to withstand the strain: 
that the Asian members of the Commonwealth 
might not have been able to remain in it 
in those circumstances . There is evidence 
from New Dehli , Karachi2and Colombo to support that statement . 
Pearson ' s statement goes a long way in explaining the 
Canadian votes in the General Assembly, votes which 
went from abstention to support of the Afro-Asian 
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bloc . It also explains his insistence on an United Nations 
force, which could relieve Britain of its graceless 
burden and at the same time please the Asian leaders . 
Canada had obviously once again worked its usual 
moderating diplomatic role . 
1 . "New York Times, " November 18 , 1956, p. 31 :1 
2 . Ibid., November 28 , 1956, p . 1 : 6 
Secretary-General Hammarskjol d meanwhile was 
negotiating with those nations concerned over the 
United Nations Emergency Force . On November 12 , 1956 , 
Egypt announced her agreement to let in the Force, 
conditional upon evacuation at her request . l Advance 
units of the outfit, generally called UNEF, reached 
Abu Suweir in the Canal Zone three days later.2 
On November 19, Hammarskjold announced that the UNEF 
troops would leave the a ctual Canal Zone area after the 
complete Anglo-French withdr awal . 3 
On November 23, 1956 , Selwyn Lloyd again insisted 
to the General Assembly that the British-French action 
was necessary as the United Nations could not have 
acted and emphatically denied collusion with Israel . 4 
The British stand her e never altered. 
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The Afro- Asian delega tions introduced a new draft 
resolution calling for immediate Anglo- French- Israeli 
withdrawals, fortbwith . 5 Canada felt the draft resolution 
was unnecessa ry as the vli thdrawals were progressing6 
and joined South Africa in abstaining on the vote . 
-------------------------------------------------------------1 . "New York Times ," November 13, 1956, p. 1 : 5; p. 7:1 
2 . Ibid ., November 16, 1956, p . 1 :8 
3 •• Ibid. , November 20, 1956 , p . 1: 8 
4 U. N., 59lst General Assembly Plenary, November 23, 1956 
5. Ibid . , Documen t A/3385/Rev. l 
6 . Ibid ., 595th Gene~ al Assembly Plenary, November 26 , 
1956 
It carried, anyway, 63-5-10, (\vith Israel, France, 
Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom in the 
negative) .1 
At 5:50p. m., local time, on December 22, 1956, 
the last of the Anglo- French forces left Port Said and 
for the United Kin~d~m and France the military side of 
the Suez affair \'las over . 2 Israeli "'i t hdravral from the 
Sinai proceeded with deliberate speed . On December 12, 
1956, Foreign Minister Heir announced that while Israel 
would withdraw fron Egypt "the Gaza Strip is a special 
problem. 11 3 The New Zealand Ambassador to vlashington 
issued a \-rarning, reflecting a segment of Corn.raomveal th 
thinking, that a premature withdrawal of UNEF from 
Egypt would be an error and that the Canal still ought 
to insulated from the internal politics of any nation . 4 
Egypt was beginning to act like a victor rather 
than as a nation narrowly rescued from disaster . She 
placed serious difficulties in the v1ay of Canal 
clearance and managed to delay it until a final Israeli 
'\orithdra\-ral .5 David Ben-Gurion the Israel Premier, 
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1. 
2 . 
U. N., 596th Gene ral Assembly Plenary, November 26, 1956 
"Nevr York Times," December 23, 1956, p . 1:8 
Ibid., December 12 , 1956, p. 13:1 3· 4. ,. Ib~d., December 14i 1956, p. 3:6 Ib~d., January 1, 957, p . 1:7 
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announced that he would not let Egypt back into Gaza but 
was \villing to place the Strip under an United Nations 
High Commissioner .l 
The ties of the Commonwealth were meanwhile being 
mended. On December 15, 1956, Prime Hinister Nehru 
called on Prime Minister Eden in London and while the 
two men were stated to be miles apart on the Suez issue 
they announced that they "had not quarrelled ."2 
The British Government used the occasion of the 
Queen's annual address to the Commonwealth, Empire and 
world on Christmas Day for a plea for Commonwealth 
unity . In the course of her comments Her Majesty 
remarked 
1 . 
2 . 
If ~Y husband cannot be at home on 
Christmas Day, I could not wish for a 
better reason than that he should be 
travelling in other parts of the 
Commom.,real th ••• VIe talk of ourselves 
as a family of nations and perhaps our 
relations with one another are not so 
very different from those which eyist 
between the members of any fa~ily . We 
all know thAt ' ~ese are not always 
easy, for there is no law within a 
family which bids its members to think, 
or act, or be alike ••• In all such 
differences , however, there comes a 
moment when for the sake of ultimate 
"New York Times," December 19i 1956, p . 20:3 
Ibid . , December 16, 1956, p. :7 
harmony the heal ing povrer of patience, 
comradeship, and love must be allo\'led 
to play its part .l 
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The Speech was well-phrased and extremely tactful, and the 
placing of a major international problem onto a 
fa r1ilial stage lent a soothing note to the entire 
situation. Hhile effective on Christmas Day, the 
Anglo-French Hi thdra\val having occured, one does v•onder 
what effect the same words mi~ht have ha d in t he fir st 
\·leek of November . 
On J anuary 1, 1957, Egypt finally caught up vrith 
one historical event and abro g8 ted the 1954 Treaty of 
Alliance 1vi th the United Kingdom. 2 As Jordan had ta1{en 
a similar step several weeks earlier, the fabric of 
British military domination in the Hid - East broke into 
shreds . Great Britain decided to vreigh her overseas 
obliga tions . "The Times" vN3S quite blunt 
(Suez drove home the point that) a country, 
which like Britain is conducting her business 
all the time with too little money in the 
bank and too many creditors, is never master 
of her ovm des t iny . 3 
There is often a tendency to note t hat the identity 
of American and British interests is so close that one 
1 . 11 Ne\v York Times 11 December 26 , 1956, p . 12:3 
2 . Ibid . , January~' 1957, p . 12:8 
3 . Ibid . 
can remark that the two nations always act in concert . 
The Suez crisis proved otherwise . The l engthy pre-
invasion conferenc es were wrecked, from t he British 
point of view, by t he American Secretary of State , and 
the inflexible attitude of l{r . Dulles was a great 
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thorn in the side of the British at the United Nations . l 
In this context i t is fascinating to note that ne,·Ts 
analyst C • .• Sulzberger wrote in "The Ne''~ York Times " 
that a close adviser to ~tr . Dulles remarked that 
The Secretary had absolutely no policy in 
the 1-Iiddle East prior to the Suez 
invasion . His trouble is that ••• he neither 
heeds the advice of others nor reads the 
telegrams from his Ambassadors . A sinr le 
Assistant Seer eta .,.,y handles t he Near East, 
South Asia and Africa ••• the man in charge 
in the crisis was Herbert Hoover, jr . , 
renm·med for his vigorous anti-B:!"i t ish bias . 2 
The consequen ces to t he Commonweal th from th~ s blind 
American attitude just missed being disastrous . 
On January 9 , 1957, Sir :.nt hony Eden resi gned 
as Pr ime Minister, for reasons of ill-health (he was 
shortly to undergo ma j or surgery in Boston, 
Massachusetts) . 3 The re signation was met with regret in 
1 . See Eden , op . cit . 
2 . " Nevi York Times , " January 9, 1957, p . 30:5 
3 . Ibid ., January 10, 1957 , p. 1 : 8 
Ottawa and both Prime Ninister St . Laurent and 
Opposition Leader Diefenbc:~ker expr essed sorrovr at 
Sir Anthony ' s retirement. l Krishna Menon of India 
paid hi~ tribute2 while Ceylonese leaders expressed 
sympathy for his illness but viev1ed the resignation 
a s the end of British colonialism. 3 
The United Nations resumed debate on the 
Israeli wi thdra\oral as I srael slowly left the Sinai 
but did nothing in regard to the Gaza Strip . Ceylon 
congr atulated the British and French on their 
withdrawals .~ Austr~lia opposed any United Nations 
action at the moment and th~ufht simply that the UNEF 
troops should be a buffer , once a withdrawal was 
completed, un t il a final peace arrangemen ~ could 
be reached between Israel and Egypt . 5 Sir Leslie 
l1unro pleaded that the rna tter progr ess omvards 
••• in our opinion Israel's withdrawal 
behind the armistice line must be 
con~leted . But that is not all that 
must be done . A mere sterile re turn 
to the status quo would be worse than 
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---------------------------------------------------------1 . 
2 . 
~ : 
5. 
" Nevi York Times ," op . cit . , p . 3:~ 
Ibi d ., p . 5:1 
Ibid. , JC~ nuary 11, 1957, p . 2 : 7 
U. N. , 638th General Assembly Plenary, January 17, 1957 
Ibid . 
than inadequate; it would be unwise; 
it would be both unjust and dangerous . l 
Canada announced support of a nev: Afro- Asian 
draft requesting Israel to withdraw, immediately . 2 
Commander Alan Noble of the United Kingdom indicated 
that while the British Government insisted upon 
c ompl ete Israeli \·li thdravlal it was its view that 
the Gaza Strip might perhaps come 
under some form of internat~onal 
administr · tion and con t rol . J 
In the same session Begum Ikramullah of Pakistan 
supported the Afro-Asian resolution with the words 
the State of Israel can exist only if 
it can procure the willing co-operation 
of the Arabs . It would be wise to 
seek it ••• 
The Commom·Teal th nations were thus all committed 
to an Israeli withdrawal behind the 1949 A~mistice 
lines. However , the. c isagreed on what should then 
follow . The Asian members "'oul d l eave the ma tter 
there, the others believed something ~ught to be done 
to safe ~u~rd Israeli security. The vote on the Afro-
Asian dreft Has an overwhelming 74-2- 2 for ~assetge 
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1. U. N. , 639th General Assembly Plenary, January 17, 1957 
2 . Ibid., 640th General Assembly Plenary, January 17, 1957 
3. Ibid. 
with Is rael joined by France in the negative and with 
the entire Commonwealth voti ng in favor excep :; for the 
now absent South Africa . l Three d~ys later Israel 
evacu~ ted the entire Sinai peninsula eycept for the 
Sharm el-Sheik area . 2 
On January 23, 1957 , in the face of an Afro-Asian 
threat of reques ing sanctions, Prime Hinister Ben-
Gurion demanded that Egypt and Saudi Ar~bia sign a 
treaty wit~ Israel gua-anteeing safe Israeli navigation 
through the Gulf of Aqaba . He also asked that Israel 
continue to be res ponsible for Gaza•s inte~nal security 
through a civili~n police force and offered Israeli 
financial assistance to the Strip . 3 President Nasser 
was understood to be strongly opposed to such action . 4 
Lester Pearson stated that Israel should withdraw 
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without condition but that there was a "relation between 
wi thdravral and arranP"er1ents to maint;dn peace . 5 This 
argument made no impression on the Secretary-General and 
less on Egypt which threatened to keep the Canal blocked . 6 
1 . U. N. , 642nd General Assembly Plen~ry, January 19 1957 
2 . Ibid . , 648th General Assembly Plenary, January 28, 1957 
3 •• 11 Ne\.,r York Times," January 24, 1957, p. 1:2 
~ Ibid . , Janua~y 25, 1957, p. 1 :4 
5. Ibid. 
6 . Ibid . , January 27, 1957, p 1:3, Sec tion IV 
On February 2, 1957, the General Assembly passed 
Resolution 1124 (XI) VThich found that 
The General Assembly ••• 
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1. Deplores the non-compliance of Israel ••• 
2 . Calls upon Israel to complete withdrawal . l 
France and Israel stood alone in oppos i tion and the 
Netherlr nds and Luxembourg abstained . A second 
res olution (1125 (XI) ) also passed 
The Genera l Assembly ••• 
Reco~="nizing that \·li t hdravJal by Israel must 
be follo'\>Jed by action which vrould assure 
progress tow rds the creation of pea ceful 
conditions ••• 
2. Calls upon the Governments of Egypt 
and Israel scrupulously to observe the 
provisions of the Gene al Armistice 
Agreement ••• 2 
This resolution met with fifty- six favorable votes with 
the Soviet bloc, the Arab st c:;~ es, Israel and France 
abstaining . 
The question of Israel's withdrawal then moved out 
of direct United Nations influence and became a matter 
between Israel and the United States . On March 1, 1957, 
Mrs . Meir informed the General Assembly that 
The Government of Israel is now in a 
position to announce its plans for full 
1. ~' 65lst General Assembly Plenary, February 2 , 1957 
2. Ibid . 
and prompt withdrawal from the Sharm el-
Sheik area and the Gaza Strip, in 
compliance with the General Assembly 
Re colution 1124 (XI) of Februay 2 , 1957 ••• 
(on the) assumpt i ons ••• 
(a) That on its withdrawal the United Nations 
forces will be deployed in Gaza and that the 
take-over of Gaza from the military and 
civilian control of Israel will be 
exclusively by the UNEF ••• 
(c) ••• the aforementioned responsibility of 
the United Nations in the administration 
of Gaza will be maintained for a transitory 
per ~od ••• until there is a peace settlement, 
to be sought as ra~idly as possible, or a 
definitive agreement on the future of the 
Gaza Strip •• , 1 
Mrs . Heir's assumptions also included free navigation 
of the GUlf of Aqaba as well as the right to invoke 
Article 51 of the Charter, if necessary . 
While India welcomed the Israel move she ·nsisted 
229 
Egypt had a right to control the Straits of Tiran and 
the Gaza Strip . 2 The final Israel evacuation was 
ordered on March 4 , 1957, by Prime Hinister Ben-Gurion . 3 
The Israel assumptions in regard to Gaza '"ere not 
kept but the presence of UNEF troops along the Gaza 
border and at Sharm el- Sheik gave Israel increased 
security and opened the port of Eilat to trade . 4 
1. 
2 . 
~ : 
U. N., 666th General Assembly Plenary, March 1, 1957 
11New Yor;,. Times, 11 l-iarch 5, 1957, p . 1:6 
Ibid ., p. 1:7 
Ibid ., March 10, 1957, p. 2 :6 
Clearance of the Canal vras resumed and Egypt 
announced that 
It remains the unalterable policy and 
firm purpose of the Government of Egypt 
to respect the terms and the spirit 
of the Constantinople Convention of 1888, 
and the rights and obligations deriving 
therefrom. 
The Egyptian Suez Authority was to run the Canal and 
five percent of the gross receipts of the Canal was to 
be paid to the Egyptian Government as rayalty . The 
International Court of Justice would be asked to 
settle any future disputes .l Under no cir cumstances , 
however, was Israeli shipping to use the Canal.2 On 
April 19, 1957, a ship flying the Union Jack paid the 
toll and passed the Canal. To all intents and 
purposes the rnP t ter was settled and Egypt \'ras right 
where she wanted to be . 
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The Commonwealth was not exactly the same , however. 
Canada had exerted a str~ng hand on events and perhaps 
averted a break-up of the Commom·Jeal_ th. To her role 
Prime Nin · sters Macmillan and St . Lauren t paid tribute 
after a Bermuda meeting which 
-------------------------------------------------------------1. "New Yor'~ Times ,u March 29 , 1957, p. 1: 8 , 2 :4 
2. Ibid . , March 10, 1957, p . 1:8 
3. Ibid., April 20, 1957, p . 1:8 
a gain demonstrates the value of the family 
relationship between the peoples of the 
Commonwealth and the close and continuous 
co -operat i.on of the Governments of the 
United Kingdom and Canada .l 
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\'/hile Australia and New Zealand had stood firmly , t he 
position of the Asian Commonwealth nations gave Britain 
some cause for alarm. To remove any further dependence 
on air routes over India and Ceylon t he Commomvealth 
Relations Office announced that the Maldive Island Air 
Base was being rev i.ved in order to avoid the other 
areas on the Lond on-Canberra-Auckland air route . 2 
The various Common\<Teal th attitudes are understandable . 
For New Zealand and Aus t r a l ia the Canal was a vital 
link and they wanted it in friend l y hands. Far more 
than the United Kingdom government they wer e able 
to understand Israeli feelings of insecurity and 
offer support, ~he~efo~e , to Israel in altering t he 
status quo ante . Canada's main interest was the unity 
of the 1;/es tern AlliAnce and of the Common\>Jeal th and 
she had the unpleasant task of trying to keep all 
the threads together . 
The new Asian members could not but be expected to 
maint~in their ties with the Afro- Asian bl c . The 
--------------------------------------------------------1. "New Yor k Times ," Narch 27 , 1957 , p . 1:8 
2 . Ibid ., January~, 1957, p . 1:3 
position of India vias somewhat perilous as she was in 
a moral predicament over both Kashmir and Hungary . 
Pakistan vias caught between her cultural and religious 
ties with the Mid-East and her defense arrangements 
with the United Kingdom . Her Moderation was a pleasant 
contrast to the antipathy of Ind:a . 
The role of South Africa \'Ia s limited . She was a 
nation friendly \Tith all the "'arties to the dis ute . 
However, South Africa could hardly support those 
nations vrhich \·I ere harassing her on vlha t she 
conside~ed to be an internal affair . As she withdrew 
from the United Nations sessions shortly after the 
crisis began she had a necessarily small role to play 
in the matter . 
The Suez Crisis indicates a weakenin~ of the 
influence of the United Kingdom over the Commonwealth 
and a gradual shift of influence to younger capitals . 
Conside 'Y' ing thClt the Commom;eBlth is a "free 
associCltion of equals" the shift must be considered all 
to the good . 
232 
CHAPTER VII 
In the t~pestry of events of 1956, the strands 
of the Hung~rian Revolution stand out in bold and 
rough texture; strands which are woven into distinct 
and stark patterns in the fabric of history. 
Follmving upon the Second vlorld War, in which 
Hu.'Ylgary fought along 1-Vi th the Axis Powers, the nation 
was occupied by Soviet troops "rhich, under the terms 
of the Hungarian Pe~ce Treaty, were permitted to 
remain in order to maintain communications vri th the 
Soviet army of occupation in Austria . A coalition 
government gave way, in 1948, to the domination of 
the state by the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party 
and the establishment of a peoples ' republic, 
modelled after the Soviet Union. In a party purge 
in 1949, the former minister of the interior, 
' I 1 L~szlo Rajk was executed, presum~bly as a Titoist , 
along with several other former Communist leaders, and 
the control of the party and state fell firmly into 
/ , . the hands of Matyas Ra1 -os~ who vras First Secretary 
1. Lasky, Melvin J., ed. , ~Hungarian Revolution, (Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1957) , p . 21 
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of the Party and, in 1952 , becFme Prime Minister . 
Rakosi was a firm Stalinist and bitterly detested 
in his native land due both to his harsh policies 
and to a strong remnant of anti-Semitism. 
In the post- Stalin liberalizati on period 
Rakosi vras forced t o bend to the '"inds of change 
and he resigned the premiership to I mre Nagy , though 
he retained, as First Secretary, control of the 
party apparatus . The Nagy Government ,.,ent on a 
rocky course and within tv10 year s Ra ·osi found a 
new prime minister in the person of Andr a Hegedus . l 
Hmvever, events in the Communist v10rld 'tvere a bit t oo 
much for Rakosi . The Sovi et Gover nment resumed i ts 
friendshi p with Marshal Ti to in 1955, and the winds 
of change swept through Eastern Europe . Hungarian 
intellectual circles, led by the Pet~fi Club , were 
in ferment, pushing f or the l i beralization that 
pr oceeded in Hungary during the fateful Summer of 
1956 -- the Summer of the Poznan riots in Poland2 
---------------------------------------------------------1. Lasky , op . cit . , p . 21 
2 . These riots i nitiated a per iod of l i beralization in 
Poland which res ulted in the establishment of the 
national- Communist government of W. Gomulka . 
and , on July 18, Rakosi resigned his secretaryship to 
his close friend Erno Gero and left the country.l 
If the Yugoslav Communist Party was again 
respectable in the eyes of the Soviet Government it 
followed that accused Titoists throughout Eastern 
Europe were nm.v respectable . On October 6, 1956, 
following his official rehabili tation, the late Laszlo 
Rajk was reburied in Budapest . Approximately 200, 000 
Hungarians filed past his coffin in what \'les tern 
diplomats regarded as a spontaneous sign of protest 
against the government . It was also observed that 
Imre Nagy, who had been ousted from the Workers' Party, 
was present . 2 
Six days later the Minister of Justice, Erik 
Holner , announced plans to remove all state prosecutors 
and judges who had "played a provocative role in the 
proces ses of the la s t few years ,"3 a polite way of 
denotmcing the ea r lier purges . The pace of events in 
Hungary quickened . Imre Nagy vras readmitted to the 
party, the Defense Minister Farkas vias arrested for 
1 . Lasky, op . cit . , p. 21 
2 . "NevT York Times ," October 7, 1956 , p . 1:7 
3. Ibid . , October 13, 1956, p . 2 : 3 
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"breaking Socialist laws , "l and the Party paper 
"Szabad Nep" praised the Yugoslav Cor:ununist Party.2 
On October 19, 1956, the "Ne·H Yor'• Times" 
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Budapest correspondent commented that the terror of the 
Stalinist era was almost over in Hungary, as Rakosi 
was blasted in the trade union paper "r;epszava." 3 
Under continued Communist leadership Hungary was 
to have some relaxation from the strong and repressive 
measures of the past . 
On October 21, 1956, students from the Budapest 
Technical College demonstrated i n the streets, 
demanding the abolition of the death penalty and 
freedom of t he press, of travel and of r eading .4 The 
demons t v·a t ion continued the next day wi th the added 
demand that Imre Nagy be restored to the pre~iership .5 
These demonstration, in the words of the (London) "Daily 
Express" correspondent, were carried on under the 
protective mantle of r retended Communis t 
orthodoxy. Gigantic portraits of Lenin ~ 
are being carried at the head of the marchers . 0 
1 . "New York Times, " October 14, 1956, P. 1:5; p . 33:3 
2. Ibid . , Oct ber 15, 1956, p. 2:3 
3 •• Ibid . , October 19, 1956, p. 5:1 
~ Ibid . , October 22, 1956, p . 1:5 
5. Ibid . , October 23, 1956, p. 1 : 7 
6 . Lasky, op. cit., p . 49 
On October 22 , the police fired up n the marchers and 
communications \vi th the outside world vrere cut off . 1 
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Bowing to the rising storms of demands, the 
Hungarian Government was reorganized on the nig~t of 
October 24, and Imr e Nagy was named prime minister . At 
the same time Sovi et troops were used to quell the 
revol t . 2 The new governnent launched a general 
attack to put down the rebellion and to restore order . 
To placate the denonstrators Ger~ was removed as 
First Secretary and replaced by Janos Kadar3 who had 
first-hand knmvledge of the Hungarian secret police 
system, the A. V. o ., having once been its prisoner . 
However, the rebellion spread outside of 
Budapest . The Western Powers discussed placin~ the 
issue before the United Nations Security Council , 
though France warned against political exploitation of 
the issue.4 
------------------------------------------------------------1 . 11 Nev7 Yor'r Times, 11 October 24, 1956 , p. 1 :1 
2 . Accor( ing to the Soviet News Agency, 11Tass , 11 the 
Hungarian Government i nvited the use of Soviet 
troops under the War saw Pac t . See Lasky , op. cit ., 
p . 62 . ''The London Da i ly Mail 11 holds that Soviet 
t r oops wer e in use four and three-quarter hours before 
Nagy asked for them. See La s·ry, op . cit . , p . SO 
3 · France was sensit ve over U. N. intervention in any 
internal matter due to the Algerian Crisi s . She also 
felt that the Hungarian i ssue might get distorted 
by the emotiona 1 is~ of the American national elections . 
Shooting ceased in Budapest on October 27 and Nagy 
made use of the opportunity to broaden the base of the 
government by adding to it former President of the 
Republic Zoltan Tildy and Bela Kovacs , both former 
leaders of the nm.,r- defunct Smallholders Party, as 
Ministers of State and of Agriculture, re spectively. 1 
The next day Premier Nagy announced that Soviet 
troops were to leave Budapest , at about the same time 
as the Security Council voted to discuss the Hungarian 
issue on a Western Complaint . 2 Radio Kossuth, the 
official government br oadcasting station, announced that 
a Soviet withdrawal was in progr ess on October 30. 3 
Hm . ,rever, this withdra.,val was only from Budapest . The 
next day the Hungarian Governnent asked f or negotiations 
with the Soviet Government in order to effect a tota l 
4 
'!.vi thdra-v1al from Hungary. -
On November 1 , 1956, the National Fron t Government 
withdrew Hungary from t he Warsaw Pact and declared her 
neutrality . 5 As Soviet troops ringed the city of 
Budapest the government of Premier Nagy requested the 
1 . 
2 . 
~ : 
5. 
"Nevr York Times,n October 28 , 1956 , p. 1:8 
Ibid., October 31, 1956 , p . 1:8; p . 1:5 
Lasky~ op . cit ., p . 137 
"New York Times , " :tlovember 1 , 1956, p . 1:5 
Lasky, op . cit . 
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United Nations to place the Hungarian situation upon 
its Agenda . l As Soviet troops sealed off the 
Austro-Hungarian border, Nagy asked the United Nations 
to guarantee Hungarian neutrality .2 
In an effort to attract greater national 
adhe sion to the Government Nagy, by now a 
nationalist-Communist hero in the eyes of the 1:/es t, 
the sa~e eyes which in 1953, looked upon him 
as a Soviet lackey, broadened his government on 
November 3, 1956 . The For eign Minister , Imre Horvath, 
and t he Interior Minister , Ference Munnich, were 
relieved of their posts, along \'Ti th the other 
ministers, most of whose posts were filled only by 
ministers of state, rather than by direct appointment . 
A coalition ministry of eleven was named with two 
Communists, two Smallholders, three Social-Democrats, 
and three Petofi Peasants in it . Non-party General Pal 
Maleter vras named Ninister of Defense . 3 
The Soviet Union did not approve and Imre Nagy 
announced on November 4, 1956, that 
1. "New York Times," November 2, 1956, p. 1:2 
2 . Ibid . , November 3, 1956, p. 1:5 
3. Lasky, op . cit . , p. 218 
Todar at daybreak , Soviet fo~ces started an 
attack against our capital , obviously vrith 
the intention to overthrm·T the legal 
Hu..r1garian democratic Government . Our troops 
are fie l; ting ••• l 
The attack occurcd vlhile Defense Hinis ter Ha le ter vias 
necoti· ting \·lith the Soviet Military Corru.1and in 
regard to an evacuation of their troops from Hungary . 
The Na2y Govern~ent rapidly disintegrated with the 
prime minister and several others takinr asylum at the 
Yugoslav Embassy and the ra ainder being arrested by 
Soviet troops . 2 At the same time Janos Kadar announced 
the formation of a new Government with himself as 
Prime l-linis ter, F. Munnich as Deputy Premier, and 
Imre Horvath back at the Foreign Hinistry. 3 
By November 7, 1956 , the battle of Budapest was 
over and in December the last of provincial resistance 
to the Kadar re gime and the Soviet forces vras ended . 
The revolution coast approximately 20,000 lives . 4 
Imre Nagy and his pa rty of fifteen were granted 
safe- conducts in order to reach their homes fr om the 
Yugoslav Embassy . Outside the E~bassy they were 
1 . 
2 . 
Lasky, op . cit . , p . 228 
Minister of State Anna Kethly , bein~ in Vienna, left 
Europe for the United States . 
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4. 
"Ne\v York Times , 11 November 4 , 1956 1 p . l:7 . Apparently Kadar acted in collusion with the ooviet Army . 
Ibid ., November 11 , 1956, p . 1: 5 
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immediately arrested and transported to Romania . 1 The 
follow"ing year Nagy was executed for treason. 
On October 27, 1956, the United States and the 
United Kingdom asked the Security Council to consider 
the situa ti ~ n in Hungary.2 The Soviet delegate 
maintained that under Article 2, paragra ph 7, of the 
Charter, the Hungarian matter could not be discussed 
as it v1as an internal matter . Sir Pierson Dixon 
rejoined that as forei gn troops were involved it was 
a proper subject for United Nations intervention. 
By a 9-1-1 vote (Yugoslavia abstaining ), the Council 
seized itself of the matter . At the same session 
Peter Kos was recognized as the Hungarian representative 
and seated at the Council table for the discussions. 
Austra l i a supported the Un i ted Kingdom's 
desire for a debate, holding that United Nations 
intervention t·las ,jus t ified as a violation of the Hungarian 
Peace Treaty was involved, particularly the article 
protecting personal liberties . The Council took no 
action and did not resume discussion on Hungary until 
November 2, 1956. 
1 . Lasky, op. cit . , p . 281 
2 . U. N., Document S/3690 
3 . Ibid., 746th Meeting , Security Council, October 28, 1956 
In the interval between the meetings a question 
arose over the composition of the Hungarian delegation . 
Minister of State Zoltan Tildy announced the dismissal 
of ~·1r . Ko s as the Hungarian representative, via radio, 
and the appoin tment of a new delegation . l \vhen the 
Council res umed its discussion of the Hungarian 
situation Janos Szabo, \!rho \oras First Secretary 
of the H~~garian Mission to the United Na tions, 
appeared as his nation ' s representative . A lively 
discussion occured as to whether or not he had the 
privilege to sit, with the American delegate opposing 
his presence on a narrow technical ground2 that seemed 
to indicate American opposition to any Hungarian 
discussing the situation in Budapest . The British 
and Australian delegates felt that }tr. Szabo represented 
his government, at least provisionally . Upon a 
ruling by t he Council President the Hungarian 
representa t ive took his seat . 3 
1 . 
2 . 
Lasky, op. cit ., p . 140 
That Mr . Szabo's credentials had arrived within a 
tvrenty-four hour minimu.rn for verification and that 
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he could not be seated until the time period elapsed . 
The President held that as this was an ener r ency 
meeting that rule could be dispensed \·lith at the time. 
U.N. , 752nd Meeting, Security Council, November 2t I93b. An authorization ca ble from Budapest a r rived 
at t he same ti@e. 
At the Council session Sir Pierson maintained that 
••• ive should not allow our preoccupation 
with the Hiddle East to the exclusion of 
assisting the State of Hungary to regain 
its independence . ! 
The British were well aware that the Soviet Union had 
an effective weapon to throw back at the British in 
regard to intervention . ~vo days later, on the same 
theme, Sir Pierson took note of this attitude \vhen 
he s t~ te , that 
••• the activity of the United Kinrdom 
and France ••• is intended to stop the 
spread of war in the Middle East -- to 
stop, not to spread -- to restore 
international law and order ••• it does 
not have as its aim the domination of 
Egypt by the United Kinrd2m and France . 2 
Australia pressed for Council action 
to endeavor to prevent further bloodshed 
and to enco 1~rage the nef otia tions i·Thich 
will lead to the recognition of the 
rights of the Hungarian people and the 
true independence of its Government . 3 
The Aust~alian delegate a~ain stressed the right of 
intervention under the Hungarian Peace Treaty . One 
sees here an insistence upon well scrutinized 
1 . ~' op . cit. 
2 . Ibid . , 754-th Meetin:- , Security Council, November 4, 1956 
3 . Ibid . , 753rd l1eeting, Security Council, November 3, 1956 
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legality which would prevent any effort to maintain 
that Australia follm·1ed one lead in dealin: vii th the 
Soviet Union over Hungary and another \vhen the question 
of the internal affairs of South Africa were being 
discussed . 
The United States in~roduced a draft res olution 
calling upon the Union of Soviet oocialist Republics 
to desist from any form of intervention in the internal 
affairs of Hungary and noting the Council ' s hope for 
successful negotiations leading to a vli thdraHal of 
Soviet troops . 1 The Soviet delegate vetoed it . 
Stymied at the Security Council table, the '1-Jestern 
Powers turned to the same devise used in the Suez matter 
and StL1moned an emergency special session of the 
General Assembly , by a 10- 1 vote . 2 Thus, without 
comple ~ing the b~siness of the first emergency session 
the Assembly began •. ,ork in a sec ~nd such session. For 
the United N"' tions these vrere invigora t ing days . A question 
of the equal application of international morality 
was now squarely before the organization and in the full 
glare of international press and publicity . 
1 . U. N., Document S/3730/Rev . l 
2 . Ibid ., 754th Meeting , Security Council, November 4, 1956 
The initial minutes of the Second Emergency 
Session were spent discussing the inscription of the 
item entitled "The Situation in Hungary . " The 
Hungarian Mission stated that it could not discuss 
the matter due to the lack of off icial information 
and instructions from Budapest . l Soviet delegate 
Arkady Sobolev maintained that the entire question was 
a "gross breach" of Article 2 of the Charter and that, 
as the Nagy Government was unconstitutional and the 
Kadar Government had maintained it did not wish the 
United Nations to discuss the matter, the General 
Assembly had no right t :- do so. Mr . Sobolev argued 
further that the item had been proposed by the \vest 
in order to st8ll and gain time over the crisis in 
Egypt . 2 
In the Assembly I1r . Walker held that Australia 
al,-lays took into consideration , very seriously, the 
provisions of Article 2 of the Charter but it was not 
relevant this time as the Hungarian Peace Treaty had 
been violated and thus the United Nations had 
competency in the matter . 3 
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1. U. N., General Assembly Plenary 564, November 4, 1956 
2 . Ibid. 
3 . Ibid . 
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The South African delegation supported Australia 's 
contention, acknowledging t hat it vras extremely 
sensitive over Article 2, paragraph 7, of the 
Charter but that in this instance that prohibition did 
not apply . South Africa 1>1ould have \tTished the i tern 
read "e:xtern<'~ l interf er ence in the internal a f fairs 
of Hungary ," but, nonetheless, it vrottld support 
t~ e present wording. The item was inscribed by 
a 53-8- 7 vote .1 
The United St ~ tes then int ' oduced t he following 
draft res ol · tion 
The General Assembly, 
Considering t hat the United Nations is 
based on the principle of the sover ei gn 
equality of all its Me ~bers, 
Recalling ••• the Peace Treaty ••• signed at 
Paris on February , o, 1947 ••• 
Condemning the use of Soviet military 
for ces to suppress the efforts of the 
Hungari<'ln people to reassert their ri£hts ••• 
1. Calls upon the Government of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republi cs to desist 
forthwith from all armed attack on the people 
of Hungary and from any form of interven t ion, 
in particular, armed intervent i on in the internal 
affairs of Hungary; 
2 . Calls upon the Union of Soviet Socia l ist 
Republics to cease the introduction of 
additional armed f orces into Hungary and to 
'\·li thdra'\v all of its for ces without del ay 
from Hunr arian territory; ••• 
1 . U. N., op . cit . 
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5. Calls upon the Government of Hungary and 
the Government of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics to permit observers 
desi rnated by the Secretary-General to enter 
the territory of Hungary, to travel freely 
t herein, and to renort their findinPs to 
the Secre t ary-General . l 
At a pproximately the same time the General Assembly 
'\>las dealing with t his issue the Soviet Union '\'las pouring 
troops back into Budapest in a staggering attack 
calculated to crush the rebellion. An angry Lester 
Pearson arose in the Assembly Hall declaring that 
••• in the past tlventy- four hours we have 
witnessed in Hungary one of the grea test 
and grimmest betrayals in history ••• It 
is first of all and above all the people 
of Hungary who have been betrayed -- the 
students, t he peas~n~ the workers, 
whom the Sovie t Union so frequently 
professes to champion ••• The Soviet Union 
has betrayed the principles and ideals 
of our own United Nations . ';Je have heard 
a great deal in recent d; ys from the 
representative of the Soviet Union about 
the iniquities of aggression, the 
unpardona ble sin of force exerted by 
large coun t ries upon small countries ••• 
There is no need fo :!." me to dwell no\>T 
on the hypocrisy of the Soviet concern ••• 2 
Secretary Pearson continued by pointing out that 
Britain and France were vlilling t o hand over their 
claimed police power to the United Nations and suggested 
a similar fo r ce for Hungary. 
1 . U. N. , Document A/3286 
2 . Ibid . , 564th General Assembly Plenary, November 4, 1956 
Sir Pierson Dixon maintained t hat there '"as 
no comparison betv1een Suez and Hungary as in the 
former the Anglo- French action had been undertaken to 
21;.8 
pr event the spread of war and to res tore law and order . 
He wondered whether t he Soviet Union would really 
allow an United Na tions force in Hungary . 1 In 
these views he was ~trongly supported by New Zealand ' s 
Sir Leslie Munro . 2 
A slightly amended version of the United States 
draft r esolution passed the Assembly by a 50- 8-15 
vote . India and Ceylon abstained for different 
reasons, while the remainder of the Com.'Tionweal th 
voted for \vhat became Resolution lOol;. (ES-II).3 
Four de1ys later the delegate of Ceylon rose to 
expla in that his abstention was due to tec'"'nical 
difficulties, as there was no telephone link between 
NevJ York and Colombo . He had needed instructions and 
could not get them. He concluded with a ringing 
endorsement of the United Kint,dom, e1gainst whom 
he had been voting in the First Emereency Session 
--------------------------------------------------------1 . U. N., op . cit. 
2 . Ibid . 
3 . Ibid. 
Ue have not hesitqted to r egister our 
disagreemen t wit h the United Ki ngd om , 
1o1i th \¥hom \ve have the closest of ties . 
The United Ki ngdon mry be desc i bed as 
the closes t friend we h<Jve, but vie have 
not hesist~ted to exr ress our dissent 
from, and our disa~proval of, its actions 
in Egypt ••• I can assure the Assembly 
that if Ceylon abstained from voting . 
it WA S not from uant of symp;::~thy 
for a strugslinr people or from a lack 
of faith in thy principles of self-
deter ination . 
Thus Ceylon managed to re tain the respect of the 
Neobers of the Assenbly and eloquently set upon the 
record her views on the situation . 
The abstention by India on voting on Resolution 
1004 (ES-II ) had evoked storms of protest in view 
of the moral t one generally asserted by the Indian 
Foreign Office on most matters . I t als o acutely 
enbarrassed India's friends . In an ex~lanatory address 
Krishna Hen on ski rted the is sue on a na rrov1 let: a l i s tic 
basis 
I want to s ay here and novT that the 
abstentj_on of my delef"a tion was not due t 'J 
lack of instructions or any other 
difficult i es ••• we abstained because we 
agreed with some par ts of it (the draft 
r esolution), bu t di d not agree with others ••• 
1 . U. N., 569th General Assembly Plenary, November 8 , 1956 
He e1re not hes i tant '\vhere human freedom 
is concerned ••• even with all the 
emotion~! envir oment that surrounds the 
present tragic situation we may not 
forget the sovereign rights of a 
sovereign ste1te in the Assembly . We 
may not refer to a me~ber State as though 
it were struggling for its independence ••• 
The use of for ce and violence by 
250 
governments or by people is reprehensible ••• 
India is against the intervention of any 
Governr ent or of any outside authority 
in the affairs of States from wha t ever 
quarter it may come and vTha tever form 
it may take, whether it be subrersion or 
obversion makes no difference . 
The difficulty in the state~ent is that while it 
deplores emotional reaction that is precisely that 
attitude India took over Egypt . And the Indian 
concern for s overeignty see,s to have been forgotten 
in r egard to Israel -- after all , a sovereign nation 
has a sovereign right to defend itself against 
aggr ession, whether by fedayeen or by closure of 
the Suez Canal in contavention to existing treaties . 
Italy, alone vlith Cuba, Ireland , Pa'{istan and 
Peru, introduced a draf t res olution as follows, in part , 
The Genera l Assembly , 
Noting 'tvi th deep concern that the provisions 
of its Res olution Ioo4 (ES-II) of November 4, 
1956, have not been carried out and that 
----------------------------------------------------------1. ~' op . cit . 
the violent repression by the Soviet forces 
of the efforts of the Hungarian people to 
achieve freedom and independence continues ••• 
Concerned that the repression undertaken by 
the Soviet forces in Hungary constitutes a 
violation of the Charter of the United 
Nations, of the Peace Treaty ••• and of the 
Convention on Genocide ••• 
1 . Calls again upon the GoverLment of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to 
withdraw its forces from Hungary \·ri thout 
any further delay· 
2 . Considers that free elec tiomshould be 
held.in Hunfary under United Nations 
ausp~ces ••• 
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In the ensuing deba te Indic opposed United Nations 
elections arguing that as Hungar~· \vas a sovereign 
nation elections supervised by the United Nations 
would be an affront to the sovere i -nty of Hungary. 
Mr . Menon also argued that negotiations were proceeding 
for the evacuation of Soviet troops from Hungary and 
therefore the resolution, as proposed, was unnecessary . 2 
It ought to be recalled that these remarks were made on 
November 9, 1956, five days after Defense Minister 
Maleter had been betrayed by the Soviet Military 
Mission negotia ting vri th him. 
Ceylon opposed the draft resolution maintaining that 
the United Nations could not possibly secure free 
----------------------------------------------------------1 . 
2 . 
U.N., Document A/3316 
Ibid., 57lst General Assembly Plen<' ry, November 9, 1956 
elections and that the draft was simply a propaganda 
device and therefore valueless . Ceylon also opposed 
United Nations supervised elections on principle . 
Af ter all, when was a nation ready for elections? 
The delegate noted it had taken Pakistan eight years 
to write a Constitution. l 
Mr . Sole of South Africa rather regretted the 
call for United Nations supervision of elections , 
especially as the former Nagy Government had not 
reque c:ted them. He \-Tould revise the draft into a 
call for elections free of all foreign intervention. 2 
This neatly got ar ound hi s own nat i on ' s s i-and against 
outside interference i n internal affairs . 
In a vote on the phrase " under United Nations 
auspices" South Africa abstained , India and Ceylon 
opposed, and the rest of the Commonwealth voted in 
favor . On the wording of operative paragraph 2, 
India opposed, Ceylon abstained , and the rest of the 
Commonvreal th supported the '\'lOrding . A similar break 
occured in a vote on the entire draft resolution 
('\-Ti th the reference to genocide omitted) v1hen the 
draft passed 48- 11- 16. 3 
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2. Ibid., 570th General Assembly Plenary, November 9 , 1956 
3. Ibid . , 57lst General Assembly Plenary, November 9, 1956 
In voting on draf t resolutions in regard to 
humanitarian relief for Hungary, India and Ceylon 
both expressed their disapproval of what they ter~ed 
the attempt to make political capital out of 
tragedy and abst~ ined on an Anerican relief measure1 
though they supported a milder Austrian draft . 2 
India did support a move to place the Hungarian 
matter before the regular eleventh Session of the 
General Assembly, as long as the organization was 
already seized of the matter . 3 This was d ~ne by 
overwhelming vote . 
At the regular session the Hungarian delegation 
strongly opposed any further discussion of the issue , 
quoting fr om a cablegram sent by Foreign Minister 
Horvath to the Secretary- General 
••• The Hungarian Government most 
emphatically states the settlement of 
the situa tion which has arisen in 
Hungary lies excl usively \•!i thin the 
internal legal competence of the 
Hungarian st~te ••• the Hungarian 
Govern~ent is decidedly of the opinion 
that the sending of representa tives to 
be appoin ted by the Secretary-General 
is not warranted . The holding of elections 
1. U. N. , Doctment A/3319 
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2 . Ibid . , Documen A/3324 
3. Ibid . , 572nd General Assembly Plenary, Novembe~ 10, 1956 
in Hungary is entirely within1 the coopetence of the Hungarian autrorities . 
To this attitude India replied that Hungary had already 
admitted the riE;ht of the United Nations to intervene 
by thanking the organization for food and medical aid . 2 
Lester Pearson of Can?da, C':lnsistently an exp::-nent 
of United Nations intervention \vhere necess~ry, noted 
that the presence of observers in a nation already 
had a precedent, in Greece, in 1946. 
Surely, (lfr . Pearson stated) t hose cembers 
of the Assembly \-Thich may previously have 
had some difficulties in conaenninq the 
Soviet Union and the Hungarian authorities 
for what has happened, on the ground that 
authentic infor~ation was not avRilable, 
will \velcome and support the steps nm.; 
recommen( ed to secure inforna t ion. ~vha t 
possible objection to this course can be 
raised, except by t hose who wish to 
conceal the truth and confuse opinion?3 
The Assembly had before it a Cuban draft re s olution 
demanding pr orn::> t compliance \vi th ea ?"" lier resolutions on 
Hungary, the sending in of an United Nations 
observation mission, and the immediate cessation of the 
deportations of Hungarian youths and the re t urn of those 
already renoved from the country. 4 
1 . U. N., Document A/3341 
2 . Ibid ., 576th General Assembly Plenary , November 13, 1956 
3 •• Ibid ., 583rd General Assembly Plenary, Nove~ber 19, 1956 
~ Ibid ., Document A/3357/Rev. 2 
In the debate over the Cuban draft resolution, 
New Zealand supported the measure as her delegate 
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sarcastically referred to recent denunciations by 
Nikita Khruschev of the deportations of the Stalinist 
era in the Soviet Union . Mr . Casey of Australia flatly 
rejected t he s~viet and Hungarian denials of such 
deportations . l The draft resolution passed 
55-10-14, \'lith all of the Commonwealth in favor , 
except abstaining India . 2 
Speaking to the Assembly, Hr . Menon said that 
India stands 
without any reservation for the right of a 
people to have the form of government they 
desire and to order their own affairs in 
their ovm ¥ray, without any external 
pressures, from \:That soever quarter they 
may come ••• We think, first, that there is 
a res ponsibility for the Assembly to 
express itself in a restrained fashion, 
in order to obt~ in a settlenent . Secondly, 
the main concern that we should have is to 
try to obtain, in terms of the decision 
of the General Assembly, the introduction 
into Hungary of observers, and the good 
offices of the Secretary-General . 3 
This a~proach is not at all in line with the Indian 
approach over Suez . In that matter the Indian attitude 
1 . 
2 . 
3· 
~' 584th General Assembly Plenary, November 20, 1956 
Ibid . 587th General Assembly Plenary Nove~~er 21, 1956. This became Resolution 1127 (XI) . 
Ibid . , 586th General Assembly Plenary, 
November 21, 1956 
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was not restra ined, but bitterly condemnatory. If 
India opposed comdemning Soviet actions in Hungary she 
sho"red no hesitancy in condemning Israel in the Sinai . 
On the denortat ion question India, Ceylon and 
Indonesia i ntroduced another resolution under '\>lhich 
The General Assembly , 
Noting that certain Member States have 
affirmed that Hungarian nationals have 
been forcibly deported from their country; 
Noting further that cert<:dn Hember States have 
cate~orically affirmed that no such 
den ort~ tions have taken place , 
recalls Resolution 1004 (ES-II), paragraph 5, to have 
the Secretary-General enter Hungary, and urges Hungary 
to admit him. l \vi th the entire Commonwealth in favor 
this draft passed 57-8-1~. 2 India thus favored action , 
but noncomittal action . Its a~proach was non-
political and verged on hypocrisy. 
Again with full Common,.realth support the 
As sembly voted for assistance to Hungarian refugees . 3 
Provided politics was kept out such progr ams had Indian 
support . In this, perhaps , India 1-1as correct : the 
question of preventing starvation and death is not 
some thing out of \'lhich to make propaganda . Hi th the 
1. 
2 . 
U. N., Document A/3368/Rev. 3 
Ibid., 587th General Assembly Plenary1 November 21 , 1956. This became Resolution 1128 (Xl). 
Ibid . This became Resolution 1129 (XI). 
American elections saf ely passed the United States 
delegation (one of the s ponsors of this resolution) 
could afford to be less political . 
The first week of December saw the Assembly again 
debating the Hungarian situation, this ti e over 
another draft resolution concerned with the 
deportation question and the admittance Qf observers . 1 
Begum Ikramullah felt the draft was needed as the 
authority of the United Nations \vas at stake, 
previous resolutions having been dj~rega.rded . 2 Krishna 
Menon thought it best to do nothing and let Hungary 
quiet down . As for the deportations he maintained 
that there were no eyewitnesses to them in the 
Assembly, though there was much other prima facie 
evidence . On the vote, India and Ceylon abst<"lined, 
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the remainder of the Com..mom·Tealth sup"Jorted the majority , 
with the exce- tion of South Africa which was boycotting 
the ~est of the session . 3 
On December 10, 1956, tv1enty nations, including 
Australia and Pakistan introduced a draft resolution 
formally condemning Soviet violations of the political 
1 . U. N., Document A/3413 
2 . Ibid . , 606th General Assembly Plenary, December 4, 1956 
3 . Ibid . , 608th General Assembly Plenary , December 4, 1956 
This became Resoluti on 1130 (XI) . 
independence of Hungary and requesting immediate Soviet 
'\'Tithdra, al under United Nations observation . l India 
opposed this action as no solution coulf be reached 
without Soviet aereement an4 
We believe that re lutions which 
involve conde ~na tion ••• are not the 
eleoents t hat would assist a s~lution . 2 
It is unnecessary to rehecrse this attitude as against 
that involving Israel and Egypt . 
Ceylon pleaded for deliberation over the draft 
for in mak ing a moral judgement on a great poHer 
we should proceed with caution, without 
passion , without an undue display of 
emotion, so that we may be able not only 
to be fAir but also to seem f <' ir ••• 
The cry of anguish (froo Hungary) is 
heard t hous2nds of ni les a .. ay in the most 
desolate corners o . '\sia . Uorld opinio 
has been shoc':ed to ruch an e··tent that 
we c~nnot simply remain idle.3 
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On the vo te India ab~t~ined and (e--cept for absent South 
Africa) the rest of t~e Coomonwealth voted in favor . 
Neutralist as she was , and pleading for deliberate 
caution , the conscience of Ceylon was more aHake than 
India ' s . 
After the turn of the year, Ir0land pro~osed that 
1 . U. H., Document A/3436/Rev . l 
2 . Ibid., 614th Genera l Assembly Plenary, December 10 , 
1956 
3 . Ibid ., 616th General Assembly Plenary, Dece~ber 11, 
1956 
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a special investigating committee be established to 
ascertain, insofar as possib~.e , the facts of the situation 
in Huneary . Again India abstained and the remaincer 
of the Cor.unonv1ea1 t' , ~ South Afric<1, favored the 
mea '"' ure . l The Report of the Speci<1l Conr:ittee ,.,as to 
be made the follo· inc Autumn (beyond the date deadline 
of this dissertation) . Suffice to say that in spite of 
the Report the Soviet Union and Hunga--y continued t o 
flout t he United Nations . It arpeared , novT, that the 
United I~ations could act only against the non- great 
Fowers l .. Jithout their consent or Hhen , as in the 
Korean epi~ode, a Great Pm-1er vTas absent at a crucial 
vote . The orr;;:mization \·ras even further stymied Hhen 
a power generally ass 2cia\ed with moral integrity takes 
an attitude the1t, at best, c~n be called very inconsi ~tent 
and, at worse, dovmrirht hypoc~i ·cal. 
As their record at the United Nations indicates 
the na j ori ty of the Commonv,·eal t h nations \vere hor~ified 
and shocked by the Hungarian situation and desired to 
take some sort of action . Sir Anthony Eden spoke on 
behalf of his nation >-then, at the annu<"l Lord !~ayor ' s 
1 . U. N., 633rd General Assembly Plenary, January 9, 1957. 
This became Rcs~luti on 11 (XI) 
Dinner he remarked 
There is in the m~nr s of free men the 
world over shock and horror at the 
spectacle of Hhat has haupened in 
Hungary. We are seein r, the - iberty 
and national existence of a heroic 
people s tamped out, stamped out by 
the most ruthless repressions.l 
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Addressing the Canadian Parliament Prime Minister 
St . Laurent strongly denounced the Soviet action 
and the great powers vlho 
All t oo frequently have treated the 
Charter o: the United Nations as an 
instrument with vrhich to regiment 
smaller nations and as an instrument 
\oThich did not have to be c--nsidered 
when their m·m so-calleO. vital 
interests were at stake.2 
These words were aimed at the Soviet Union as well as 
at Britain and France. There was directness and 
resolutness in the manner of Canada's approach to 
the Autumn cr ises. 3he asserted her title to a 
moral leadership both within the Commonwealth and 
within the United Nations . 
Indian attitudes ,.rere different . While the "Times 
of India" was calling the Hungarian action a grc..s s 
violation of the Charter by the Soviet Union3 the 
1. "New York Times," November 10, 1956, p . 3:6 
2. Ibid., Nove 'ber 27, 1956, p . 5:1 
3. Ibid ., November 5, 1956, p. 14:3 
government at New Dehli was maintaining silence , much 
to the disgust of the Bombay paper . 
Prime Hinis ter Nehru broke official silence \·lhile 
addre ' sing an UNESCO Conference i n the Indi an capital 
We see today in Egypt , as \vell as in 
Hungary , both human dignity and freedom 
outraged and the force of modern arms 
used to suppr ess peoples and t o gain 
political objectives . l 
The statement attempted no comparison between the two 
actions or their causes . 
While in near-by Ceylon all parties eycept the 
Communist condemned the Soviet atta ck India simply 
asl.(ed the Soviet Government for details on November 
8, 1956. 2 Certain Indian leaders, however, S'"Oke out , 
among them the Socialist J . Narayan 
The t ~end of our foreign policy in the 
past few days has seriously distu~bed me ••• 
To Egypt ~tt . Nehru ' s reaction was 
immediate and fir~ and riz~ teJ' s ••• But for 
many days not even a Hhisper \•las heard from 
New Dehli about Hungary. Then, one fine 
morning, the paper reported ••• Mr . Krishna 
Henon as having stated that the Hungarian 
question was a domestic a~fair of the 
Hungarian peo ple . I t was an astounding 
sta t emenr that left me aghast ••• It was a t 
that stage that Hr. Nehru spoke out at t he 
UNESCO conference . It was ~ f utile ges t ure 
because it was too late ••• 3 
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---~-------------------------------------- - -- --------------1 . 
2 . 
3· 
"New Yor k Times , " November 61 1956, p . 1 :8 Ibid ., November 9, 1956, p . ~0 : 5 
Lasky, op . cit ., p . 269 
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However, at the Asian Prime Ministers' Confer ence 
Nehru subscribed to a statement that the events in 
Hungary were "watched \·lith deep distress . " 
They are of the opinion that Soviet 
forces should withdraw from Hungary 
speedily, and that the Hungarian 
people should be left frle to 
decide their o-.. m future . 
Indian opposition to United Nations supervised 
election is understandable as India opposed a plebiscite 
in Ka shmir . 2 In other \vords, morality \·rent down the 
drain v1hen national self-interest was at stfll-<:e . It was 
an attitude that India should have realized applied 
to other nations . 
Gradually Nehru ' s attacks on the Soviet action 
increased as more and ~ore news from Hungary came in 
to him. On January 6, 1957, he referred to "Commu.11ist 
aggression" in an address t o the Congress Party, which 
then passed a resolution calling for the withdrawal 
of "foreign" troops from Hungary . 3 
The Indian attitude might also have been the 
result of an impending loan from the Sovie t Union and 
a reluctance to antagonize t ha t feed ing hand . Then 
1 . 
2 . 
3· 4- . 
11 Ne\·T York. Times,'' November 15, 1956, p . 14-:1 
Ibid . , November 17, 1956, p . b : 3 
Ibid. , Janua r y 7, 1957, p. 4:4 
On November 15, 1956, the Soviet Union loaned India $126,ooo,ooo at 2~% interest . 
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one also ought to recall that India has a lengthy 
border with the Peoples ' Republic of China and is also 
relatively close to the Soviet Union . Of c -- urse, the 
latter also applies to Pakistan which denounced, from 
t he outset, the Soviet action. 
Indira Gandhi, the Indian Prime Ninister's 
daughter, als0 helped to expl ain her nation 's 
position 
We feel that more important than 
talk ing strongly is t he result we 
hope t c get.l 
The end res ult proved that view correct , but would it 
ever have had any chance for success? 
Frank Moraes , a biographer of Nehru, was asked 
to justify this double standard of India and replied 
To be candid, it's a ques t ion of color . 
vlhere a vlhi te man oppresses a colored 
man that, to us, is col oni?lism. 2 
Of course, one would expect a states: an of the calibre of 
Jawahalal Nehru to overccme blind pre judices and 
note th<1 t a white man can oppress another \¥hi te man 
and, morPlly, there is no diffe~ence of derree . 
1 . " Nevl York Times ," December 18 , 1956 , p . 14 :1 
2 . "The Ne\v Republic," issue 2191, November 26 , 1956 
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The Indian attitude lost for it the moral leadership 
of the Co!Ilillonwe 1 th \·Tbich passed to Canada, at least for 
the tine being . India could not even carry her Asian 
Commonwealth partners into alig~~ent at the United 
Nations . To them, as to the bulk of the Members 
of the United Nations, the issue was clear: violence 
must be condemned, regardless of who is doing it . 
To do other\·Jise would under11ine the mo:'al and legal 
concepts upon which the Commonwealth and the \vorld 
community is based . 
CHAPTER VIII 
The Commonv1ealth of Nations and the United 
Nations are two international organizations which 
represent a trend in world politics seeminPly adverse 
to the post-vlorld vlar II course of even ts . In an 
era of ramnant nationalism, '\'lhich has brought 
about the crea t ion of at least thirty-four distinct 
sovereignties since 1946, these two associations 
have grown and developed along supra-national lines. 
Perhaps they are foci for the newer nations to 
use in their search for security in a "rorld 
lacking definitive peace and security. 
In organization the United Nations and the 
Commonwealth could not be more dis-similar . The 
United Nations has a firm and stable form, bound 
by a written document, the Charter, which is 
amendable only with the consent of all five 
permanent members of the Security Council and t'\•TO-
thirds of t he Hember ship of the .Assembly.l This 
provision makes it unlikely that the Charter can 
be readily revised . 
The United Nations has a permanent Secretariat 
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--------------------------------------------------------1. ~' Charter of the United Nations, Article 108 
and an Executive Head, the Secretary-General, with 
certain set functions and rights . The Secretary-
General is assisted by a large number of international 
servants, each with specified tasks and supervisory 
duties . The bureaucracy of the United Nations has 
become an important part of the organization, 
important enough to have become the subject of 
strife among the major world pmvers for certain 
percent>ge shares of the positions . 
Further, the organization table of the United 
Nations is well-defined . The various major organs of 
the v/Orld group each have their particular ple~ces . 
They are assisted by established committees, to 
which, from time to time, there are added s pe cial, 
ad hoc, and temporary committees and commissions. 
The United Nations t bus has a fixed form and 
a set mission, the latter being the preservation 
of peace and the maintenance of international 
order and security. 
The Commonvieal th of Nations can claim no such 
organizational table as that of the United Nations . 
An outgrmvth of an EI!lpire which rei!lolded itself to 
266 
267 
meet nevi changes , the Commonwealth is, at best, loosely 
defined and even more loosely organized. There is no 
Charter of organization, no legislative measure 
actually establishing the body. Symbolically united 
by a pers on styled "Head of the CornmonvTeal th11 and ,.,ho 
happens to be the person enjoying the sovereignty 
of the United Kinfdorn of Great Britain and I; or thern 
Ireland, the Commonwealth has seen to it that its 
Head has absolutely no functions whatsoever in the 
worvings of the Commom,Jeal th as an unit . Composed 
of monarchies and republics the Commom·Tea 1 th in 
structure might be described as a monarchial republic . 
Functionally , the Comrnom1ealth is best cons idered 
as a committee in irregular session with permanent 
consultation . The various prioe minis ters, presidents, 
and other minis ters of the realms and republics meet 
on occasion to develop common policies , vThen possible . 
Tha t the group is expandable has been evident since 
the termination of vJorld War II by the admission to 
the Commom-real th of its As ian members . That it is 
also capable of contraction was pr oven by the 
\vi thd rawal of the Republic of South Afr ic?. on Hay 31 , 1961. 
The South African vri thdrawal, brought about by the 
refusal of several Members of the Commonwealth to 
permit that nation to use the republican formula 
of member ship, l indica ted that the C ommom·Tea l th 
could not withstand all divisions among its members, 
that some were not to be reconciled. It made 
strikinr ly apparent the fact that the older 
members no longer controlled the destinies of 
the Commom·real th. 
The Commonwealth lacks any permanent committee 
arrangemen t as well as any secretariat . Instead, 
daily and regular business between the various 
members is carried out through the media of the 
High Conmissioners who, in reality, are envoys from 
one Commonwealth government to another.2 
The most striking feature of the Commonwealth 
is its regulPr system of consultations. At the 
United Nations the Comnonwealth delegates regularly 
consult with one another, though there is no 
-------------------------------------------------------1. Had South Africa not withdrawn the sovereignty of 
Her Majesty the Queen from the Union it would have 
remained within the Commonwealth, if it desired, 
in spite of the opposition from certain members . 
2 . The use of ambassadors within the Commonwealth is 
impossible as within the Commonwealth realms 
Her Majesty cannot accredit an ambassador to 
herself . 
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partition, the ne1.,rer members were unable to do so, 
and the senior partner refused to support the 
decision of the United Nations . To the older states 
of the Commonwealth, except for the United Kingdom, 
the creation of Israel was a deb t that was owed by 
the world connuni ty - - and an a tte,.,l '.>t to cleanse its 
conscience for standing by 1-rhile 6,ooo,ooo members 
of the Je· ish faith died in Nazi concentration 
camps . It also offered a :!eans of payment of that 
debt vli thout havin£' to accept Jewish refugees within 
one's mvn frontiers . 
To India the notion of such a debt to the 
Jewish people was alien. Israel, to India, seemed to 
be an European island in the midst of the Hid-Eastern 
world and incompatible v;ith the development of that 
region ' s emergent nationalism. Then, too, there vras 
a sizeable J.iuslim minority to consider . Pa~cis tan, 
logically, threvr its support to i s l'~uslim brethren 
in later developments . 
As for the United Kingdom the Palestine question 
involved painful consequences . To support partition 
would mean the loss of Arab oil and a general 
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weakening of the British military position in the Near 
East . Not to support partition involved back-tracking 
on the word of Her Hajesty's Government and , 
ultim2tely , a challe nge to the authority of the United 
Nations . The latter course wa s f ollowed . The issue , 
perhaps , weakened the United Nations but the course of 
events favored Israel and the preservation of the 
Commonvrea 1 th. 
The Suez Affair s plit the Commonwealth badly. 
Here , with the senior member an obvious aggresso~ 
the members of the Commonwealth had their ties of 
loyalty badly shredded and the Comm onwealth emerged 
from the affair quite shaken . India could not 
countenance the use of force -- at least not of 
sizeable force; Pakis t an had, again , the co~i ~ment of 
ties of religion to Egypt; Canada was caught between 
the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Asian 
members of the Commomrealth; while Australia, and 
New Zealand in particular , stood loyally by Great 
Britain , a stance which defended the s hortest sea-
route to their markets . 
\~hile India stood aloof over Hungary, the rest 
of the Commonwealth cried out in hor r or. India could 
plead other interests, such as proximity to China 
and to the Soviet Union . Of course, Pakistan could 
have done likevlise and chose not to do so. Perhaps 
the answer is to be found in the different manner 
each nation would use the United Nations. World 
intervention in Hungary, and especially in 
Hungarian elections, could lead to such intervention 
in Kashmir, vrhich India 'vished to avoid . Pak istan 
would have nothing to lose by such an action. 
While the interests of the Commonwealth and 
of the United Nations coincide in theory -- the ideal 
of international peace and security -- there are, 
frequently, times when these interests do not 
necessarily come together . Certainly the United 
Kingdom's attack upon Egypt could not be said to 
be compatible with United Kingdom membership of 
the United Nations nor, as events proved, with 
it menbership in the Commonwealth. Nor did the 
attitude of South Africa accord with its membership 
in either organization in the question of the 
treatment of her Indian population . The intra-
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Commonwealth dispute over Kashmir (with which this 
dissertation does not treat), is not in accord, 
either, with membership in either organiza tion, nor 
has one organization nor the other been able to 
settle the dis pute . 
On the basis of the record one may ask, \~Tith a 
great deal of justice, whether or not the Commonwealth 
as an unit makes a marked contribution to the aims 
and goals of the United Nations, and whether or 
not that contribution could just as well have been 
made by each Member individually. 
In all likelihood each nation could have made its 
fair contribution to the United Nations. That point 
needs little elaboration . Nations act as they have 
to act . But as an unit the Connnom1eal th also has made 
its contr ibution. In several instances Commonwealth 
discussion has prevented issues from flaring out even 
worse then they were . 
The intra-Common'\·.real th discussions during the Suez 
crisis seem to have brou ~ht forth a mitigation of the 
attitude of the United Kingdom. The threat of the 
dissolution of the Commonwealth was enough reason for 
London to agree to a withdrawal from the entire venture. 
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\'lhile the reasons for vrhich London opposed a 
dissolution of the Commomrealth lie outside the 
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venue of the United Nations, the action nonetheless 
was important for that organization . The Commonwealth 
has been able to present to the world a striking 
exam·-·le of international corrmunity interests 
within a multi-racial framework , vri th but one 
exception . The idea is, in this case, as important 
as a practical political solution. Presenting an 
example of such international cooperation is of 
invaluable and incalculable help in furthering 
the goals of international amity . 
The Commonv1eal th has been of benefit to the 
United Nations, but has the United Nations returned 
the compliment'. An affirmative ansvTer may 
be given, but t'ii th some circumspection. The 
preservation of international peace is an undoubted 
boon to all nations, and the United Nations several 
times has prevented brush fires from becoming 
international catastrophes . One might well 
vronder vrhat the consequences would have been to 
the Conmonwealth had the Arab-Israeli conflicts, 
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for example , not been controlled by the United Nat ions 
and the United Kingdom forced to honor its military 
treaty with Jordan . The reaction of Canada, 
Australia and Nev1 L..ea land to a vmr between Israel 
and the United Kingdom is unknown, but one thinks 
it might have been chilling , for they had 
zealously supported the Zionist cause . The 
prevention of disputes that could split the 
Commonwealth has been a service of the United 
Nations to that or ganization . 
The United Nations and the Common-vreal th have 
both undergone their greatest development at 
the same time . They have been able to do this 
without injury to the other ; indeed, each 
mutually aided the other . In the realm of 
international cooperation there is room for many 
international mansiomand , perhaps, these two have 
hastened the day when 
All the nations are gathered together, 
And the peoples are assenbled; ••• 
The whole earth is at rest, and is quiet . 
APPENDIX A 
Commonwealth Membership of Major United Nations 
Organs, ~946 - 1957 
Member 
Australia 
Canrda 
Ceylon 
India 
New Zealand 
Pal{istan 
South Africa 
A 
Security Council 
46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 
X X X X 
X X 
(admitted to United Nati~ns in 1956) 
X X 
X X 
X X 
United Kingdom X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Austr alia 
India 
New Ze?.land 
B 
Trusteeship Council 
X X X X X X X X X X X X 
X X X X 
X X X X X X X X X X X X 
United Kingdom X X X X X X X X X X X X 
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c 
Economic and Social Council 
Hember Y-6 Y-7 Y-8 Y-9 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 
Austra : ia X X X X X X 
Canada X X X X X y X 
India X X X X X X X X 
New Zealand X X X 
Pakistan X X X X X 
United Kingdom X X X X X X X X X X X 
L 
APPENDIX B 
Commonwealth Memberships on United Nations organs 
and bodies for 1956; to display breadth of Commonwealth 
Activity in the United Nations . 
Organ Commom.·rea 1 th Her"ber(s) 
General Asse~bly 
General Assembly Vice-
Presidencies 
Security Council 
Trusteeship Council 
Economic and ~ ocial 
Council 
1st - 6th Com~ittees 
Credential Committee 
all 
United KinF"dom, 
United Kinp-dom, 
United Kingdom, 
AustrEllia, New 
United Kingdom, 
Pakistan 
all 
Special Session Australia 
Credential Commi ttee New Zealand 
Advisory Committee of 
Administration and 
India 
.fl. us tra~ ia 
India, 
Zealand 
Canada 
Budget India, United Kingdom 
Committee on Contr ibutions United Kin~dom, India 
Pakistan 
Interim Com~ittee all 
Committee on UNEF Finances Canada, Ceylon, India 
UNR\vA United Kingdom 
Disarmament Conmission Australia, CAnada, 
United Kinedom 
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Sub-Committee on 
Disarmament 
Special Co~ittee on 
Hu..l1gary 
Pc=mel for Inquiry and 
Conciliation 
Advisory Com~it ~ee on 
Peaceful Uses of 
Atomic Energy 
Special Committee on 
Effects of 
Radiation 
Peace Observation 
Commission 
Ball<an Sub-Commission 
Collec t ive Measures 
Committee 
Panel of ~ili tary Experts 
UNCURK 
Committee of UNCURK 
UNKRA Advisory Com~ittee 
U}T Committee Investigating 
Condit ions for Free 
Election s in Germany 
UNICEF Executive Board 
ad hoc Co~ittee on a 
Special UN Fund for 
Econonic Devel Jpment 
Canada 
Ceylon, Australia 
Australia, Canada, India 
Pakistan, United Kingd om 
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Canada, India, United Kingdom 
Australia, Cana da, India 
United Kingd om 
India, New Zealand , 
Pak istan , United Kingdom 
Pal{istan 
Australia, Canada 
United Kingdom 
Australia, Canada 
United 1\infd om 
Australia, Pakistan 
Australia 
Cana da, India, United Kin~dorn 
Pakis tan 
Austr al ia, United Kingdom 
Canada, India, Pakistan, 
United Kingdom 
UN Commission for 
French To ~ oland 
Committee on Southwest 
Africa 
Committee on Information 
from Non-Self-Governing 
Canada 
Pakistan 
Territories Australia, New Zealand, 
India, United Kingdom 
Sub- Committee on Education 
Sub- Committee on Revision 
of the Questionnaire 
Advisory Committee on 
Korean Cemetaries 
Negotiating Committee 
for Extra-Budgetary 
Funds 
Board of Auditors 
U. N. Administrative 
Tribunal 
U. N. Staff Pension 
Committee 
Salary Committee 
International Law 
Commission 
Special Committee on 
Defining Aggression 
U.N. Committee for 
Indonesia 
India, United Kingdom 
India 
Australia, United Kingdom, 
New Zealand, C?.nada, 
South Africa 
Canada, United Kingdom, 
Australia , Fa istan 
Canada 
India, United Kin gdom 
United Kingdom 
New Zealand, India , 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom, India 
United Kingdom 
Australia 
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ECSOC Commissions 
Transport 
Sta t is t ics 
PopulPtion, 
Social 
Human Rir hts 
Sub-Committee 
Status of vlomen 
Narcotics 
International 
Con:unodi ty Trade 
Economic Commission 
for Europe 
Econ~mic Commission for 
the Far East 
Econo,··ic Com"lission for 
South America 
Wor:dng Group of 
Technical Assistance 
Coordina ' ing Committee 
for Non-Governmental 
Agencies 
India, United Kingdom 
Australia, United Kingdom, 
Canada, India, New Zealand 
Canada, India, United Kingdom 
Australia, India, 
United Kingdom 
Australia, ?a~istan, 
United Kingdom 
India, United Kingdom 
Australia, Pakistan , 
United Kingdom 
Can?da, India, United Kingdom 
Canada, Aust~al ia , India, 
Pakistan, United Kingdom 
United Kingd om 
Australia, Ceylon, India, 
New Ze?land , Palcistan, 
United Kingdom, Hon~ KJn g, 
Malaya, North Borneo 
United Kingd om 
Pakistan, United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
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Internationel Committee 
for the Promotion of 
Conferences 
Permanent Central 
Opium Board 
UNICEF 
Slavery Co~ittee 
Petroleum Committee 
Visiting Mission to 
the Paci "ic 
United KingdoM 
India, United ran:;dom 
Australia, India, C?nada, 
P::ll(istan , United l'~in ... dom 
Austra1ie, In~ia, 
U!1ited Kin(':'dom 
India, Australia 
United Kingdom 
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Appendix to Chapter IV CHART A 
COMMONWEALTH VOTING - SOUTH AFRICAN INDIAN ISS UE 
-
~ ~ 
YEAR 1946- FIRST SESSION 1947- SECOND SESSION 
ISSUE NEED OF 2/3 S.A. BID TO RES IND RESOL IND RESOL IND RESOL 
VOTE COURT 44 (1) 
1st CTTE 
112 
PLACE 51 G.A. PLEN 51 G.A . PLEN 112 1st CTTE 121 PLE N <R BREAKDOWN 
'll1 'tl2 113 <fl4 'll5 
AUSTRALIA y y A N N N N N N 
CANADA y y N N - A A 
..J N N 
INDIA N N y y y y y < y y u 
NEW ZEALAND 
I y y N N N N N N N 
..J 
PAKISTAN - - - y y y y <5 y y 0:: 
SOUTH AFRICA y y N N N N N 0 N N z 
UNITED KINGDOM y y N N N y y N N 
. 
Note - Y =Affirm ative , N = Negative, A =Abstention 
- -- -
'fl6 
A 
N 
y 
N 
y 
N 
y 
F IVE-POWER 
RESOL 
121 PL EN 
y 
y 
N 
y 
N 
y 
y 
N 
()) 
.{::" 
COMMONWEALTH VOTING - SOUTH AFRICAN INDIAN ISSUE (Cont) 
YEAR 1949- THIRD SESSION 1950 - Fl FTH SESSION 
S.A. INDIAN FRANCO- FRANCO- COMPETENCE DRAFT ISSUE DRAFT DRAFT MEXICAN MEXICAN OF AD HOC CTT E RESOL RESOL 395 (Y) DRAFT DRAFT 
VIHERE 1ST CTTE 1 ST CTT E 1 ST CTT E 212 PLEN AD HOC CTTE !A D HOC CTT E 315 PLEN 268 268 26 8 46 48 
'fll 'fl2 '\13o <n b 'U4 
AUSTRAL! A A N N y N N A N N N N 
CANADA A A y y A A y A y A A 
INDIA N y A y y y y y y y y 
NEVI ZEALAND A A y y A A y A y A A 
PAKISTAN N y y y y y . y y y y y 
SOUTH AF RICA y N N N N N N N N N N 
UNITED KINGDOM A N A A A A y N y N A 
Note - Y = Affirmative, N = Negative, A= Abstention 
Whole 
N 
A 
y 
A 
y 
N 
A j 
N 
(X) 
'-" 
C OMMONWEALTH VOTING- SOUTH AFRICAN INDIAN ISSUE (Con t ) 
- -
YEAR 1951 1952 1953 
- SIXTH SESSION SEVENTH SESSION EIGHTH SESSION 
11 4 OF DRAFT DRAFT AND 'f\ 8 RESOLUTION 
ISSUE RESOLUTION SUSPENSION OF RESOLUTION UNCOMM TO AD HOC RECOMMENDAT ION GROUP AREAS ACT GIVE VIEWS 
WHERE 360 PLEN AD HOC CTTE 
AD HOC 401 PLEN AD HOC AD HOC 457 PLEN 
12 CTTE 12 21- 21 
AUSTR ALIA A N A A N A A 
CANADA A A A A A A A 
INDIA y y y y y y y 
HEW ZEALAND A N A A N A A 
PAKISTAN y y y y y y y 
SOUTH AFRICA ABSENT N N N N N N 
UNITED KINGDOM A N A A N A A 
-
Note - Y = Affirm a tive , N =Negative , A = Abs t ention 
1\) 
(X) 
0'\ 
COMMONWEALTH VOTING - SOUTH AFRICAN I NDIAN ISSUE ( Concluded ) 
-
YEAR 1954- NINTH SESSION 1955- TENTH SESSION 1956- ELEVENTH SESSION 
DRAFT RESOL AS DRAFT INCLUSI ON OF ISSUE RECOMMENDED BY AD . RESOL AS ITEM 24 HOC CTTE RECOMMENDED 
WHERE PLEN 497 AD HOC CTTE 33 PLEN 578 
PREAMBLE 'fll ~2 '1\3 'fl4 ens WHOLE 
AUSTRALI A y A y A N N A A A 
CANADA y A y A A A A y y 
INDIA y y y y y y y y y 
NEW ZEALAND y A y A N N A A A 
PAK ISTAN y y y y y y y y y 
SOUTH AFRICA A N A N N N N ABSENT N 
UNITED KINGDOM A A A A A A A A A 
C EY LON - - - - - - - - y 
-
. 
Note - Y = Affirm a tive, N = Negative, A =Abs t ention 
N 
co 
""-' 
Appendix to Chapter V 
INVASION 
IIIH ELO 8 Y N . I<.ORe:A O H 14 SEPT 50 
MAP B 
U.N. ADVANCE 
Ill HE.LO 8Y H. I(,OREA OW 2.<!) OC.TOB~R L9~· I l liCHO 
MAP C 
C.HINESE LNTER'VENTJO N 
Ill HE"I..O B Y N. I<,ORE:A AliO C.HIHES£ FORCES 
3 1 OECEM&IIi:R, 1!1~0 
Encyclopedia 
Britannica , 1951 
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~ .... ~- BATTLE I.. I Ne: 14 SEPT, 1~50 
v~~~ 
BATTL E LINE Z.9 OC.T05ER, 1950. 
3 8 ° N 
BATTLE. I..IHE ~ 5EPT, 1950. 
MAP B 
TRUCE LINE 
E n c y clopedia Britannica, 1954 
SOUTH 
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ABSTHACT 
This study of the Cornnonwealth of Nations at the 
United Nations is based primarily on the documentary 
record of the United Nations : the verbatim and 
summary records of the sessions of the General 
Assembly, the Security Council , and other br anches 
of the organization . The material on t he Commonwealth 
is taken from Commonwealth legislation, from 
information supplied by various governments and 
embassies , and from secondary sources . The ''Nev1 York 
Times" was of great use , especially for its reporting 
of press conferences and t 'J.e coverage of v1ars and 
revolutions . 
In organization the two international groups 
are dissimilar . The United Nations has a fixed t able 
of organi~ation and of function . 
executive and a large bureaucracy . 
It has a permanent 
The Commonwealth 
lacks any such fixed structure , being an expandable , 
and also contractable, associa tion of states . ln 
the Comrnonv1ealth, unlike the United Nations , decisions 
are not necessarily reached, and each Commonv;ealth 
nation acts as it sees fit . 
In the major internationa l crises before the 
United Nations with which this dissertation deals , 
the Co:m:monwe·1l th displayed a lack of unity . In the 
Pale stine Question there VIas a very noticeable split . 
The United Kingdom refused to assist the United 
Nations in carrying out the decision to partition 
Palestine . The pre- '.Jorld ~:ar II dominions generally 
supported partition while India opposed the Plan, 
favoring , instead, a federal Arab- Jewish state . ~or 
some time afterward the attitude of these nations 
toward Israel reflected tbis division . 
An intra- Commonwealth disturbance reached the 
United ha tions in t11.e matter of South Africa 1 s 
discriminatory practices against Indians in that 
country . For some time India and Pakistan stood 
against the rest of the Commonwealth until, led by 
canada , the older r..:embers became aware that "the 
winds of change'' v1ere sweeping across Africa, and they 
had best bend vlith ti::.ose winds . The issue embittered 
india, but , in the final analysis , it would be South 
Africa that would leave the Cornnonv1eal th . 
The Korean Incident found tne entire Commonwealth 
supporting the idea of repelling ag6ression . The 
ol der J,~embers gave mil~ tary aid to the United Nations . 
pakistan l ent moral support and India actively vJOrked 
to keep the conflict from spreading . The two 
organi zations complemented the \:ork of each other in 
an attempt to maintain peace and i nternational 
security. 
ln tne Suez Conflict , the Com."Tlonweal th v1as 
severely tried . Australia and New Zealand were 
sympathetic to t!le United l\in6dom. v:hile the Asian 
Uembers felt betrayed . ~ventually moderation 
prevailed and the Connnonv1ealth restored its ties . 
Canada emerged as a leader of the bloc . 
~xcept for long-hesitant India , the Common\ealth 
\~S as one in denouncing Soviet aggression in 
Hungary . India ' s action, or ~ack of it, lost for her 
the moral leadership of the Commonwealth . 
T'ne record indic .... tes that the Cm~l!lonwealth and 
the United Nat1.ons have aiaed each other wh1.le working 
together to attain the goal of international peace 
and security. 


